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CONTENTS

"Smooth Stones out of the Brook"	177
WILLIAM L. BAXTER	
Oberlin Perfectionism—Article II	225
B. B. WARFIELD	
Faith and Fellowship	289
DANIEL E. JENKINS	
The Bible in Shakespeare	309
PHILIP W. CRANNELL	
Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield (1851-1921)	329
Reviews of Recent Literature	331
Survey of Periodical Literature	363

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OSWALD T. ALLIS

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BOOKS REVIEWED *

BAILEY, A. E., and KENT, C. F., <i>History of the Hebrew Commonwealth</i>	341
BAYLEY, HAROLD, <i>The Undiscovered Country</i>	333
CLUETT, R., <i>Day by Day with the Master</i>	363
CLUETT, R., <i>Every Morning</i>	362
DOUMERGUE, F., <i>Moïse et la Genèse</i>	338
FLYNN, J. S., <i>The Influence of Puritanism on the Political and Religious Thought of the English</i>	357
HALDEMAN, I. M., <i>Can the Dead Communicate with the Living?</i> ..	333
HILL, O. A., <i>Ethics, General and Special</i>	332
HORNE, H. H., <i>Jesus the Master Teacher</i>	363
KAYSER, L. G., <i>Contending for the Faith</i>	337
KELMAN, JOHN, <i>Some Aspects of International Christianity</i>	354
LAMBUTH, W. R., <i>Medical Missions: The Two-fold Task</i>	360
LAWLOR, H. J., <i>St. Bernard of Clairvaux's Life of St. Malachy of Armagh</i>	345
MERCER, S. A. B., <i>Ethiopic Grammar</i>	341
MOORE, E. C., <i>West and East</i>	348
OMAN, JOHN, <i>Grace and Personality</i>	350
OTTOMAN, F. C., <i>J. Wilbur Chapman. A Biography</i>	352
RAYMOND, G. L., <i>Ethics and Natural Law</i>	331
STAFFORD, H. S., <i>The Vacation Religious Day School</i>	359
STEAD, W. T., <i>After Death: A Personal Narrative</i>	333
STEWART, G. JR., and WRIGHT, H. B., <i>Personal Evangelism among Students</i>	362
<i>The New Testament in Syriac</i>	340

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"SMOOTH STONES OUT OF THE BROOK"

The object of this article is to be helpful to a very numerous class, whom the writer regards as well worthy of the deep interest, and anxious efforts, of all who revere "the Word of God, contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, as the only rule to direct us, how we may glorify and enjoy Him." The class referred to is the great host of youthful inquirers and labourers, in our various churches—our Sabbath School teachers, our Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations, our Guilds, our Bible Classes, and so on—who, with a supreme desire to glorify God aright, are often inexpressibly perplexed by the contemptuous rejection of those views of the Grand Old Book, which their fathers have taught them to hold fast, and to rejoice in. We hold that there is scarcely any task which is of more vital concern to the pastor and to the Christian teacher, than that of establishing the faith of Christian people, *and especially of the children of the Church*, in the absolute authority of the Bible. Is the Old Testament an honest, and a reputable production? Or is it little else than a tissue of most unreliable asseverations? Did divine direction lead the writers, "by divers portions, and in divers manners," to give us a "sure testimony"? Or, did men, of whose very names and existence we are uninformed, multiply the most daring fabrications, and yet get them immediately welcomed, and gloried in, as the very truth of God? No wonder if, both at home and abroad, such an issue arouses a most painful interest. If the Bible we preach from can be exposed as a cheat, small wonder if our churches empty, and if the wail of the foreign missionary comes home to us, that his appeals are derided.

Now we do not, in the least, tremble for the ultimate safety of the ark of God. We are quite convinced that the honour and trust, which twenty centuries have placed on Holy Scripture, have not been misplaced; that, in particular, the dismemberment of the Old Testament, which, a generation ago, became fashionable, in succession to a series of similar, but quite exploded dismemberments, awaits, or to be accurate, has already met, a similar fate; that the waves have beat in vain against the Impregnable Rock; and that faith in "the holy men of old who spake from God as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," stands quite unshaken. But it is often far from easy for the members, specially many youthful and very earnest members, of our various churches, to feel fully assured of this. When they have the strongest declarations foisted on them, in the name of absolutely united scholarship, in the name of "all whose opinions are worth regarding," that the old view of the Bible is an outworn fiction, that it was never written, in the ages, and for the purposes, that have been usually believed, a very great stumbling-block to their faith does certainly confront them; and we do well to bethink ourselves, how their most natural anxiety may be effectually dispelled.

The title of our article suggests a wise and effective course, which, we think, should be frequently followed. Sometimes, as we think of the intricacies and complexities (not to speak of the *petitiones principii*, and the contradictions) of the critical theories, we might almost despair of being able to overthrow them without having recourse to such technical and "scholarly" methods of approach as are hopelessly confusing to those who do not have the special training presupposed. Indeed, it is the occasional and lofty boast of the Critics that the questions, with which they deal, are problems for scholars to settle, and that they must be left to scholars. How glad, for example, is many a reviewer to ride off on the plea—*Cadit quaestio*, the experts have spoken! Well, taking a general view, if the

Higher Criticism thus resembles (as it assuredly does very closely resemble) *Goliath*—with its ineffable bravado—belittling Christ, and His apostles—disdaining the fathers of the church, the reformers, and the sainted defenders of the faith, in every succeeding age—offering to prove by strictest logical process, that the people of God have hitherto been dwelling in tabernacles, which are mere refuges of lies: then let us take a leaf out of *David's* book, as described in 1st Samuel—"David chose him five smooth stones out of the brook, and put them in a shepherd's bag which he had, even in a scrip; and his sling was in his hand; and he drew near to the Philistine (1 Sam. xvii. 40)." The Christian layman need not hanker after "Saul's armour": he need not think that, if he could only pass through some theological seminary, or assimilate the tomes of some vast library, he might then confront the Philistine. God "ordains strength out of babes and sucklings." God "chooses the weak to confound the mighty." Let him just go, with his "shepherd's bag," to "the brook," and gather "five smooth stones out of it," and he will have weapons piercing enough, wherewith to defend the dishonored oracles of God. God may still, as of old, "hide the things of the kingdom from the wise and prudent." He may even cover with absolute ridicule many a "swelling word of vanity," many an "opposition of science falsely so called." But He may reveal all that is true, and needful, "unto babes"—to those who are ready to "receive with meekness the engrafted word," to scrutinize, with fairness, and with patience, the contents of their Bible, and to disregard the lofty taunts, that may be hurled at them, from "the seat of the scornful." It were sometimes a mistake for ministers, and professors, to be putting out their main strength on abstruse, and relatively unsubstantial, topics, while neglecting to drive home what lies on the very surface, what may be quite sufficiently comprehended by millions, who never dream of aspiring after academic degrees. "The common people heard the Master gladly": the average Christian layman is perfectly capable of appreciating the main defences of the faith.

Our aim, in this article, is to bring the foregoing principle to a point, and to exhibit a few of the "smooth stones out of the brook," which we, pastors and teachers, would do well to put into the hands of our people, as sufficing for them to overthrow Goliath. But, before exhibiting our pebbles, we desire to make very pointed reference to what has been the primary occasion of our writing the article, to what may give effective illustration of the great danger, Christian people are often in, of being submerged by a conspiracy of Critical Silence. *A Syllabus of Religious Instruction for Schools* (with a *Bibliography*), has recently appeared in Scotland, "Published by the Youth Committees of the Church of Scotland, and the United Free Church of Scotland." It spreads the suggested "Lessons," over 25 pages, which the children, at successive stages and ages are supposed to overtake, in thirteen years. Possibly, the mere mention of these figures may suggest to some the height of the stilts, on which the authors of the syllabus perambulate. And, after this painful exertion, they perambulate, over other thirteen pages, with an *Annotated Bibliography*—consisting of a catalogue of about 200 volumes, explanatory of Scripture, and embracing brief "annotations" indicating the comparative worth of the various volumes. It is on these "annotations" we fix, as showing "the wolf in sheep's clothing," as a most cunning attempt to mislead all the teachers, and all the education authorities, of Scotland, as to the origin, and as to the authority, of Scripture. We do not know how far the United Free Church may have officially gone, in surrendering to the Critics—we believe there are a multitude of leal-hearted defenders of the integrity of Scripture within it; but, if our memory serves us right, the morning after the George-Adam-Smith case had been thrashed out, in their Assembly, they were told, by a high and universally read secular authority, that the practical result almost was that, *as a church*, they now believed in nothing! We say, with great confidence, however, as regards the Church of Scotland, to which we belong,

that it has never made the slightest approach towards "acceptance" of Robertson-Smithism, nor of George-Adam-Smithism, nor of Driverism, nor of Wellhausenism, as a warrantable exposition of the truth of God. Yet this *Annotated Bibliography*, practically, puts the *imprimatur* of the Church of Scotland on these discredited fantasies. By what is said, and still more by what is left unsaid, all educationists, throughout Scotland, are invited to offer themselves, as a palatable morsel, to the maw of the Higher Critics. Standard works, that uphold the integrity, and trustworthiness, of Scripture, as these have been most warmly cherished by the ministers and members of the Church of Scotland, are studiously ignored: quite recent works, that proclaim the dismemberment of Scripture, that treat its manifold asseverations, as little else than a manufactory of fiction, are warmly pressed on the belief of those, by whom the religious views of the youth of Scotland are henceforth to be mainly moulded. A *fair* Bibliography would give an impartial catalogue of the publications of the two sides—of the scorers, and of the upholders, of the traditional views—and then leave educationists to an unfettered choice. *This* Bibliography shows an ill-disguised, and almost exclusive, preference for the publications of the scorers.

To justify this serious charge, we offer a few samples of evasion, and of favoritism. The *Bibliography*, in moving backward through universal religious literature, comes to an abrupt halt, about the date of the starting of the Graf-Wellhausen theory of the Old Testament: hardly any book, preceding that date, has attained recognition. What a host of inconvenient witnesses is thus silenced! But, waiving this, and keeping to the *Bibliography's* own restricted field, what kind of fair play is meted out to the teachers of Scotland? *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible* is put forward, with much prominence and fervour. But why is the *International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia* omitted? The editors of both these works (Dr. Hastings and Professor

Orr) were ministers of the same United Free Church of Scotland. Why was the one set on a candlestick? and the other put under a bushel? To show the significance of this contrast, and to drive home the deadly one-sidedness of the *Bibliography*, we feel it very desirable to quote the following comment. As soon as Orr's *Encyclopaedia* appeared, *Bibliotheca Sacra* reviewed it, as follows:

"... The two great dictionaries of Cheyne and Hastings, while in many respects invaluable, are vitiated for popular use, by the character of the critical views that permeate them. ... The situation of a country pastor, possessing only one or the other of these dictionaries, is deplorable in the extreme. ... a whole series of statements made by the Wellhausen school, and incorporated in these articles,¹ has been shown to be incorrect, and grossly misleading. In short, it is time these articles were already thrown into the scrap-heap, where they belong. ... From beginning to end it [Orr's *Encyclopaedia*] is the work of scholars who know whereof they write. While presenting the conservative interpretations of Biblical facts, the presentation of the contrary views is made with commendable fullness, so that the reader may judge for himself. In several cases, both sides of the question are presented by different writers. ... Ordinary students of the Bible now have in this great work a depository of facts and inferences relating to the religion upon which their hopes are based, to which they can turn with confidence that they are not being betrayed by immature theories and wild speculation, but are being led by scholarship which is both ample and sound. ... Thus it will be seen that the 'International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia' satisfactorily meets an imperative and widely felt want."²

Now, in asking careful attention to the foregoing comment, we are not meantime arguing that *Bibliotheca Sacra* was right: we are dealing solely with the question of *impartiality*. Was it fair to the teachers of Scotland to try to "thirl" them to a Dictionary, which glories in the professed extinction of traditional views, and keep from them all knowledge of a much later Encyclopaedia, which claims to

¹ Articles in Hastings' *Dictionary* on "Genesis," "Hexateuch," *et al.*

² *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oct. 1915, pp. 675-680.

have vindicated these views, on a wider, and more triumphant, platform than ever? There was also Dr. Smith's great *Dictionary of the Bible*, preceding Hastings': the *Bibliography* never mentions it. There was also the *Speaker's Commentary on the Holy Bible* preceding Hastings': the *Bibliography* never mentions it. *Lex Mosaica* (in which, as in the two preceding, a galaxy of prominent British writers upheld the faith of their fathers) synchronized with the publication of Hastings': the *Bibliography* never mentions it.

There is a subordinate curiosity, attaching to the fervent bolstering up of Hastings,' which might well provoke a smile. Murray issued, in a One Guinea Volume, his *Illustrated Bible Dictionary*, for such as might grudge adventuring on his larger three-volume Dictionary. Immediately in its wake, came out a One Guinea Volume of a new *Hastings' Dictionary*, for "those who have not the means to buy, or the knowledge to use, the Dictionary in five volumes." *The Bibliography* warmly praises Hastings,' but never mentions Murray's! Where is there an atom of fairness to the educationists of Scotland, in such procedure? Hastings' various *Dictionaries* (no less than four of them are paraded!) are lauded as "first-rate guides," and as the work of "the best modern scholars": the careful and exhaustive works, by writers on the other side, to which we have referred, are huddled out of sight, beneath a comprehensive extinguisher! They do not get the slightest notice.

Leaving Hastings' & Co., the work of studious ignoring is abundantly manifest elsewhere. The very admirable *Dictionary of the Bible* by Dr. Davis, Professor of Oriental and Old Testament Literature in Princeton, is never mentioned. No one has exposed the blatant arrogance of the Higher Critics more calmly, and irresistibly, than Dr. Green of Princeton. Not one of his many treatises is mentioned. *The Higher Criticism and the Verdict of the Monuments* by Professor Sayce, and *Ancient Hebrew Tradition* by Professor Hommel, both of which eviscerate the Critics, are

never mentioned.³ It might be expected that *Scottish* writers would get abundant notice, in a Bibliography for Scottish teachers. But the expectation is vain. *The Old Testament and the Critics* by Dr. Whitelaw, an ex-moderator of the United Free Church, and on the orthodox side, is never mentioned. *The Early Religion of Israel* by an honored Glasgow Professor (who has just passed to his rest), which also pulverizes the Critics, is never mentioned. *Isaiah One and his Book One*, by an ex-Principal of the United Free Church College, Glasgow, is never mentioned: and yet the Syllabus actually deals with Isaiah chapters xl-lxvi as the work of an exile! *The Bible under Trial (Apologetic Papers in view of Present Day Assaults on Holy Scripture)* by Professor Orr of United Free Church College, Glasgow, is never mentioned. *The Bible and the Critics (A Reply to "Modern Criticism," by Professor George Adam Smith)*, by Dr. McEwan, an honored minister of the United Free Church, Edinburgh, is never mentioned. *The New Biblical Guide* and *The Inspiration and Accuracy of Holy Scripture*, both by Rev. J. Urquhart, and in maintenance of the old paths, are never mentioned. And so on.

We have a special reason for adding that the laity are equally ignored, with ministers. In one instance, the *Bibliography* recommends a volume, as being *by a layman*. They might have praised the volume (which has no concern with the Critical controversy) much more warmly than they do, without exceeding its merits. But, if they mean this as a "camouflage," as a suggestion to the teachers of Scotland how anxiously they have scrutinized every quarter (not overlooking the laity even) to get suitable material for them, the pretense is vain. The most famous British "layman," of the last century, was Mr. Gladstone. His

³ The Victorian Institute, founded fifty or sixty years ago, and widely comprehensive of British learning, resolved, two years ago, to bestow their Gunning Prize on what they deemed the most notable book, published within the previous three years. And they fixed on *The Unity of the Pentateuch*, by Rev. A. H. Finn. The *Bibliography* never mentions a book, thus singled out for honour.

work, *The Impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture*, in which he very fervently upholds the old paths, is never mentioned. Another well-known literary "layman" was Sir Robert Anderson, barrister-at-law, and Chief Commissioner of Police in London. He published *Daniel in the Critics' Den*, and other works, to the confusion of the Critics. Not one of them is mentioned. An equally well-known "layman" (a Jewish "layman" by the way) is Mr. Harold M. Wiener, another barrister-at-law. He has published *Essays in Pentateuchal Criticism*, and other works, which have been widely advertised, as "giving the *coup de grace* to the Wellhausen Critics." Not one of his works is mentioned. A Glasgow "layman" published *A Layman's Reply to Professor George Adam Smith*. His reply is never mentioned.

Only one word more—but an all-important one. The whole trend of the *Bibliography's* Critical outlook can be discovered, in the following short sentence, describing Professor Driver's *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*: "Driver is the recognized English authority for a full knowledge of the Old Testament." For incomparable audacity, commend us to that sentence—as sanctioned by a Committee, *representing the Church of Scotland*. Driver was the "recognized" leader of the Destructive Critics, in Britain, during the past generation. With a great profession of candour, he multiplies, on his every page, the evasion, the cunning, and the prejudice, in which the Destructive Critics live and move and have their being. To ask the teachers of Scotland to train up the youth of our country in the study of such a Bible, as Driver would give them "a full knowledge of," is "Prodigious!"—if not profane. If such leaders as Principal Story, Professor Charteris, Professor Hastie, Dr. Scott, and others, could reappear in our General Assembly, and read the foregoing sentence, on the escutcheon of the Church they loved, they might well cry, *Ichabod!* and hurry from the house. *Committees* do sometimes attempt great liberties. At last Assembly, a Committee was trying to slip through a very du-

bious proposal about the Hymnary, but was peremptorily checked. This "Youth Committee" have equal need to be confronted, in the Assembly, with the foregoing sentence, and to be asked, "By what authority did you thirl this Church to Driver? And who gave you this authority?"

We trust that we have thus made sufficiently clear the special provocation, out of which this article has arisen. Some cunning bibliographist, with a plausible pretense of a universal offer of his material, has so restricted and annotated that material, that all Scotland is asked to cast away many time-honoured beliefs, and march, like sheep to the slaughter, to the Higher Critic shambles. It is told of Nelson, when confronted with an inconvenient superior order, that he immediately applied his blind eye to the telescope, and then declared, truthfully enough, that he had seen no such order. That is precisely how the oracle is wrought. The Critics employ their blind eye, in searching for the treatises, that tear their theories to tatters: and so they are able to report that no such treatises exist. Apparently, they never read them. *Certainly, they do not wish others to read them!* And so the parrot cry goes up, "All Critics are agreed!" Principal Story, with his usual fearlessness, once flailed the Higher Critics as follows—"dogmatic self-satisfaction is the badge of all their tribe." And his diagnosis is right. "Dogmatic self-satisfaction" is the disease that covers the Higher Critics from the sole of the foot to the crown of the head. You may annihilate them as you please: but they meet the most crushing exposure with *Nelson's blind eye*.

We now go forward to our main aim, which is to emphasize the readily discoverable inconsequence of the Higher Critical notions. We aim at showing that the average man, with common intelligence, with common sense, and with common honesty, is quite sufficiently equipped, for the exposure. Our title says, "Smooth Stones out of the Brook." Well, we are willing to take several Goliaths, and

see what a mere “shepherd’s bag” can supply for their demolition. We shall not take trivial, or out-of-the-way, instances: we shall take what every Higher Critic would swear by, as the very ark of his covenant—points, whose denial would evoke his indignant pity, as placing the denier outside the pale of responsible ratiocination. We shall take “The Post-exilic Priestist,” “the Pseudo-Jeremiah,” and “Ezekiel, the Sacrificial Pioneer.” These are hoary personages, whom the Higher Critic claims to have unearthed, after they had lain, for more than 2000 years, in forgotten graves. The Jews took no note of them: Jesus and His apostles never scented them: but the unfailing acumen of modern adepts has, at last, brought them to an indisputable existence, and it calls on a “modern” world to admire them. What has Common Sense to say in reply? Take first—

THE POST-EXILIC PRIESTIST

Here, if anywhere, the Critic feels he is invincible. If he has done anything, he has rescued the latter half of Exodus, the whole of Leviticus, and most of Numbers from all association with the age of Moses. He has gathered out most of the Laws, contained in these books, and has shown them to be a grand literary concoction, which first came out, about 1000 years after Moses; and he calls it “The Priests’ Code.” If you were to deny the separate, and late, establishment of this Code, he would regard you, as utterly unfit to be reasoned with. Without fear and trembling, we would say to every lover of truth,—Come and see!

I. Consider first, then, what an accumulation of falsehoods this discovery puts into your Bible. In Leviticus, its Laws are expressly stated, 32 times over, to have been delivered by “the Lord speaking to Moses and Aaron.” These 32 statements (the Critics say) have not an atom of truth in them. God never delivered one of these Laws at Mount Sinai. Moses and the prophets would have been *horrified* at the idea of putting such Laws into the Lord’s

mouth. Now, if our Bible comes from the God of truth, if, as our Lord says, it is "Scripture which cannot be broken," how can we accept it, with 32 daring fabrications, (and they are only samples of a legion of others), flaming on its forefront? Certainly, if we accept it, we *are* "following cunningly devised fables."

These "fables" (the Critics tell us) were spun by some unknown writer, about the time of Ezra, when he was bringing back the exiles from Babylon. But (a) They cannot give his name, nor his pedigree, nor any occasion of his receiving, or communicating, a divine revelation. (b) His existence is a pure guess; it is an absolute invention, to buttress their own fancies. (c) We know quite well the names of Israel's chief leaders, throughout that age, Zerubabel and Joshua, Ezra and Nehemiah, Haggai and Zechariah. *Is it credible* that the Jews would not have preserved the slightest reference to the Critics' author of such a divine message as Leviticus, had he ever existed? (d) Nay, but these contemporaries of the alleged writer have told us who the real author was. Ezra and Nehemiah show plainly that he was not a Babylonian novelist: he was Moses the man of God (Ezra iii. 2; vi. 18; Neh. viii. 14; ix. 14; xiii. 1). Their testimony is explicit, and unreserved: had they not better means of knowing than the Critics? (e) And how would Ezra and Nehemiah have got the Jews, who were very jealous for their sacred records, to canonise offhand, a well-known (for well-known it must have been) and wholesale forgery? (f) Besides, Israel's history under the Judges, and the Kings (to which we shall afterwards refer in detail) would be, at many points, inexplicable, if Moses had not written Leviticus. We may, therefore, dismiss the untruthful forger of Leviticus, as an absolute hallucination.

II. A quite similar reasoning applies to the Critics' treatment of the second half of the Book of Exodus. There again, according to the Critics, in chaps. xxv-xl (omitting xxxii-xxxiv), you have nothing but a series of shameless misstatements. The writer fills up chapter after chapter,

with minute instructions, from God to Moses, for the erection of the Tabernacle, with its pillars, and curtains, and all its furniture; with its altars, and priests, with their robes, and anointings. And then it describes, with equal minuteness, the carrying out of these instructions. But (say the Critics) this is a huge romance! No Tabernacle was erected. No mercy-seat, nor altar, nor table of showbread, was constructed. There was no clothing, nor anointing of Aaron. An unscrupulous forger, in the time of the exile, sat down and coined these chapters, knowing quite well that there was not a syllable of truth in them, from beginning to end! He took the name of God—the name of Moses—the names of Israel's cunning workers—took them all in vain, in the most manifold, and inexcusable, fashion. And he got his whole nation instantaneously to believe in a Tabernacle, as having been erected 1000 years before, not one of whose boards, or pillars, or curtains, had ever existed!

We always feel that the mere statement of this outrageous (might we not say blasphemous?) caricature of history, should be its sufficient condemnation. (a) We would be quite justified, in refusing to accept as sacred, a Bible, that teems with such wholesale fabrication. It is revolting to describe God, as having inspired men, to overturn the fundamental facts of His people's history, and to accomplish the feat, with the most deliberate intention to deceive. (b) It must be obvious to anyone that the historians of Israel are clear, and consistent, in their testimonies regarding the Tabernacle. (c) After we read, in Exodus, of its construction, we can follow on and read of its location, by Joshua, at Shiloh, as soon as Canaan was conquered (Josh. xviii. 1). (d) Then, in Judges and 1 Samuel, we read proofs of Israel's habitual recourse to it, for ages, as their central sanctuary (Judg. xviii. 31; xxi. 19; 1 Sam. i. 3, 21, 24; ii. 11, 18, 22, 28). After Shiloh's overthrow, we read of its transference to Gibeon, and of its being brought up thence into Solomon's temple (1 Kings viii. 4; 2 Chron. v. 5). (e) We

also read a psalmist's reference to its location at Shiloh, as one of the most indisputable facts, in his people's history (Psa. lxxviii. 60). (f) We have also Jeremiah's testimony to the same effect (Jer. vii. 12). Thus, on the one hand, we have a few modern Critics, out of the depths of their own omniscience, presuming to declare that no Tabernacle was ever made. On the other hand, we have the inspired historians of Israel recording very minutely the Tabernacle's construction, and then following it, in most artless references, through its chequered history. A choice between such authorities should not be difficult.

III. In attempting to tear up, by the roots, the historicity of the Mosaic books, and, specially, of the sacrificial references, contained in these books, the Critics conjure up a series of what they call *Historical Impossibilities*. We anticipate no difficulty in showing that their proper name would be, a series of *Baseless Imaginations*. But, before going on to show this, we desire to point out the frequent difficulty of saying definitely, what the Critical host believe, and what they reject; they are far from being a happy and united family. What was hailed, by their recent predecessors, as certain, is already contemptuously scorned by them. And their present idol—their most recent importation from Germany—gets a very varying homage from them. They may profess a general adhesion, but each dissects Scripture, at his own sweet will, and has no scruple over most decided differences from his neighbor's views. But, as we need a *ποῦ στῶ*, in dealing with them, it is probable that Professor Robertson Smith would be acknowledged by them, as an accomplished and adored promulgator of their views. He has given the most unreserved assurance to the English-speaking public, that "the key to the right understanding of the history of Israel," has been discovered, in Professor Wellhausen's *Prolegomena to the History of Israel*: that that work contains "the first complete and sustained argument," which has "at last, set all Old Testament problems in a new light," and has done this, in

a form "which every one can understand and ought to try to master." He says that previous investigators made "many false and uncertain steps"; but that "*now* the Truth has been reached"—and reached "in a comparatively simple form, that may be justified even to the general reader."⁴ "The Truth," as *we* apprehend it, is that the *Prolegomena* has been utterly shattered, and that its *dissecta membra* may be viewed, lying plentifully along the pages of the many volumes, on whose exclusion from the *Bibliography* we have commented. Still, the Critics have made no formal repudiation of the *Prolegomena*: they still employ a multitude of *pickets* (for the reviewers are often little else) to prevent the demonstration of its overthrow flowing freely to the public; and, if individuals among them may decline to be bound by some of its vagaries, they cannot deny that it continues (as described above by Robertson Smith) to be the recognized originator, and embodiment, of the tenets of their reigning school. We shall therefore, in what follows, deal with it, and quote from it, as expressing the views of the Critics.

We desire to point out also that, notwithstanding the hard things that we have to say against the Critics, there is often less of what may be called doctrinal or theological heresy, in the absurdities, which they advocate, than might be anticipated. Their prophetism is a singularly loose and unscriptural concoction; yet they profess to be able to proclaim it, while standing up manfully for much of the essence of "the faith once delivered to the saints." They do not professedly (whether or not they do virtually) impugn what the Apostle had mainly in view, when he spoke of "the form of sound words." And it is pleasing to think of many of them, as most strenuously upholding "the record that God has given us eternal life, and that this life is in His Son"; and also "that they that have believed in Christ be careful to maintain good works." Still, the manner in which they dissect, and degrade, the Bible, (taking the volume

⁴ Preface, pp. vi to ix (*italics ours!*).

which we have particularised, as a touchstone), makes it impossible to reverence that Bible, as a gracious deposit from the God of truth. If the writers of Scripture were unknown, and unauthorized, inventors: if they have solemnly and deliberately testified regarding God a thousand inaccuracies: if they have kept the real dealings of God with His people utterly concealed, and have presented a farrago of fiction, which every truth-lover must condemn, then it is impossible to regard such writers, as "holy men of God, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost"; and the trustworthiness of such a Scripture is hopelessly destroyed. No doubt, the Critics may and do assure us, that their views exalt Scripture, and transfigure Scripture, into a seemlier, and more veritable, volume than ever. But that is just the way of all error. "Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light." Unitarians may tell us that their denial of the Divinity of Christ gives a great added reasonableness to Scripture. Papists may tell us that their Mariolatry yields them an inexpressible comfort. And so the Critical "wresters of Scripture" may imagine that they are doing God service, and may yet find themselves saved, not in consequence of, but in spite of, their dishonoring views.

In exposing these views, we will make them a great concession. We will concede, for the moment, that E, J, and P were writers who once lived, and wrote. These writers are, we believe, the most shadowy and ridiculous of inventions: but we will meantime concede that they wrote Scripture, which was afterwards redacted, in general conformity with the contention of the Critics. And out of their own transmogrified and "Rainbow" Bible, we will show that their analysis of the Priestly Code is a pure fiasco.

In especial, the point, we are setting ourselves out to illustrate, is the *patent*, and *easily discernible*, *absurdity* of the views in question. They are not in heaven, that we should say, Who will bring them down? nor in the depth, that we should say, Who will bring them up? The Higher Crit-

icism is such a bundle of contradiction, and self-conceit, and unauthorised pronouncement, that, when it is patiently opened out, the wonder is that any, with high gifts of reasoning, can continue to do it homage. Any one, with a moderate equipment of learning, if he have a good and honest heart, is quite equal to its unravelling. Robertson Smith, in the quotations we have given from him, appeals to "the general reader." So do we. And we now proceed to choose, out of our shepherd's bag, a few more of the pebbles, which seem quite sufficient to slay Goliath.

IV. The Critics hold that a *radical difference* exists between the Priestly Code and all previous sacrificial praxis, in Israel, in the fact that, while previously sacrificial meals abounded, the Priestist extinguished them.⁵ "In the early days, a sacrifice was a meal, a fact showing how remote was the idea of antithesis between spiritual earnestness and secular joyousness. A meal unites a definite circle of guests" (p. 76). Regarding "the praxis of the older period" we read: "Where a sacrifice took place, there was also eating and drinking: there was no offering without a meal, and no meal without an offering" (p. 71). The Priestist (we are told) abolished all this: he would have no feasting at sacrifices. "How different from this picture is that presented by the Priestly Code!" "The voluntary private offering, which the sacrificer ate in a joyful company at the holy place, has given way before the compulsory, of which he obtains no share, and from which the character of the sacred meal has been altogether taken away" (p. 72).

We invite our readers to assure themselves that the contrast, thus portentously proclaimed, is a mere *Baseless Imagination*. The Priestly Code does *not* abolish sacrificial meals: it encourages them, and ordains them, in the most manifold and constraining manner. All that is necessary is to turn to Leviticus, and read. The first seven chapters pre-

⁵ Unless otherwise indicated, our quotations are all from the superlatively lauded volume already mentioned, Wellhausen's *Prolegomena to the History of Israel* (italics are ours unless otherwise indicated!).

scribe the ritual, and other procedure, at the leading divisions of Israelitish sacrifices. Chap. i deals with burnt offerings; chap. ii with meal offerings; chap. iii with peace offerings; chaps. iv and v with sin and trespass offerings; chaps. vi and vii with the disposal of those portions of the flesh of sacrifices, that were not consumed at the altar. Now it is with the peace offerings we are chiefly concerned, as the Critics hold that it was they, and their accompanying meals, that had predominated, "in the early period." What change then does the Priestist make in them? The disposal of their flesh is prescribed in chap. vii. 11-21. Read vs. 15: "And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving *shall be eaten* the same day that it is offered; he shall not leave any of it until the morning." This is the inexorable rule of the "thank-offering": it must be accompanied by a sacrificial meal. But the thank-offering is only one of the three classes of peace offerings: the other two classes are "vows" and "voluntary offerings." What becomes of the flesh of these two classes? Read vs. 16: "But if the sacrifice of his offering be a vow, or a voluntary offering, *it shall be eaten* the same day that he offereth his sacrifice: and on the morrow also the remainder of it shall be eaten." Thus, in all classes of peace-offerings, the Priestly Code has a "Thus saith the Lord" for a sacrificial meal. The participators in the meal are also expressly specified, in vs. 19: "And as for the flesh, all that be clean shall eat thereof." Thus we have the materials for the meals, the duration of the meals, and the participators in the meals, all rigorously prescribed by a Code, which has been pompously paraded, as frowning such meals out of existence!

Leviticus enforces these same arrangements throughout. If you go forward to chap. xix, the Priestist is giving a summary of the already prescribed peace-offerings, and re-enforcing them. And he does not forget the sacrificial meals. Read vss. 5 and 6: "And if ye offer a sacrifice of peace-offerings unto the Lord, ye shall offer it at your own

will. *It shall be eaten* the same day that ye offer it, and on the morrow: and if aught remain until the third day, it shall be burnt in the fire." If you go forward to chap. xxii, you have another reenforcement of the thank-offering: and the sacrificial meal is not forgotten. Read vss. 29 and 30: "And when ye will offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving unto the Lord, offer it at your own will. On the same day *it shall be eaten up*; ye shall leave none of it until the morning: I am the Lord." Said we not well that it is facts which lie on the surface, and not necessarily recondite reasonings, needing to be painfully passed through a German mill, by which any Christian can effectually repel the assaults on his Bible? And let him consider, as regards the point immediately before us, that if sacrificial meals were as abundant as the Critics argue "in the early period," that is eminently compatible with Leviticus, which prescribes such meals, having come from the pen of Moses, and having been the sacrificial guide, throughout that period. It needed no unknown forger to come back from Babylon, and write the book. Our Bible is an unpretending and consistent whole.

V. Another equally inexcusable charge, brought against Leviticus, and the parts of Exodus and Numbers that are made to go along with it as the work of the post-exilic Priestly writer, is that they establish *national sacrifices*, but bring *individuals' sacrifices* to an end. This charge is reiterated, in the most positive and unqualified terms. Formerly, "worship arose out of the midst of ordinary life, and was in most intimate and manifold connection with it" (p. 76). The varying experiences of the people (we are told) called forth the sacrifices. "There was no warlike expedition which was not inaugurated in this fashion, no agreement that was not thus ratified, no important undertaking of any kind was gone about without a sacrifice. . . . The occasion arising out of daily life is thus inseparable from the holy action. . . . one could seize on the spot any occasion that casually offered itself for a sacrificial meal" (pp. 76-77). Again the Priestist came, and put an end to these

happy possibilities. "Religious worship was a natural thing in Hebrew antiquity; it was the blossom of life. . . . But now the warm pulse of life no longer throbbed in it to animate it; it was no longer the blossom and the fruit of every branch of life. . . . Human life has its root in local environment, and so also had the ancient cultus: in being transplanted from its natural soil it was deprived of its natural nourishment. A separation between it and the daily life was inevitable. . . . Life and worship fell apart. . . . The soul was fled; the shell remained. . . . The sacrificial worship had assumed a perfectly firm shape, which was *independent of every special motive, and of all spontaneity*" (pp. 77-80). Such was the dire havoc which the man (not to say scoundrel), named P, brought about in Israel. He deprived religion of its "soul;" he deprived it of all its ancient relation to "the daily life."

Let not the reader be perturbed. Here again, what is so manifoldly, and so magniloquently, asserted, is a mere *Baseless Imagination*. It describes a conspiracy, and a transformation, which never took place. Throughout Leviticus and Numbers, the connection of religion with "the daily life" is maintained, with the most anxious repetition! He needs no rare and far-fetched weapon, to overthrow the boaster. Let him again just open his Leviticus, and read: (a) Chap. i deals with burnt offerings, and they are all brought by the individual, as his daily life may supply occasion. In the clearest and most individualistic language, the Code begins, "Speak unto the Children of Israel, and say unto them, If any man of you bring an offering unto the Lord," etc. He is given a choice of three kinds of offering, according to his wealth or poverty. Vs. 2 allows him to bring of his "cattle"; vs. 10 allows him to bring of his "flocks"; vs. 14 allows him to bring of his "fowls." But, in every case, it is the individual who sacrifices, and his right of free choice is preserved. (b) Chap. ii deals with meal offerings (as the Revised Version properly translates), and again it is the individual who brings them: "And

when any will offer a meal offering unto the Lord." He is again offered three choices in preparing his meal offerings: vs. 4 allows him to bring it "baken in the oven"; vs. 5 allows him to bring it "baken in a pan"; vs. 7 allows him to bring it "baken in the frying pan"; and, if his meal offering (vs. 14) be one of "first-fruits," he is to bring "green ears of corn dried by the fire." It is an individual sacrificer who figures in the chapter from its first verse, to its last. (c) Chap. iii deals with peace offerings; and again it is the individual and his free choice, that are put forward. He has three choices: vs. 1, "of the herd"; vss. 6 and 7, "of the flock . . . a lamb"; vs. 12, "a goat." (d) Chaps. iv and v deal with sin and trespass offerings, brought for sins committed in ignorance, and they are, if possible, even more closely connected with "the daily life" than chaps. i-iii! Chap. iv specifies four offerings, not as fixed national tributes, but as brought when four separate cases of transgression, in ignorance, shall have definitely emerged, in the people's history. And the fourth case is, "if anyone of the common people sin through ignorance"—surely an individualistic enough pronouncement. (e) The individualising continues, quite minutely, in Lev. v. 1-4, and in Lev. vi. 1-3. (f) And be it noted that, when a national and non-individual sacrifice of two lambs every morning and evening, which had been prescribed in Exodus xxix. 38-42, then gets its priestly accompaniments enforced, these are disposed of in a few verses, Lev. vi. 8-13, while all the previous chapters have been devoted to those sacrifices, whose number cannot be told beforehand, and which the varying necessities, and experiences, of the people may call for. How ludicrous to say of such a Code, that, under it, "life and worship fall apart!"

When the foregoing statutes are again referred to, with some additional sacrificial details, in Numb. xv, the freedom of the people is again provided for. "Set feasts" are not overlooked; but priority and prominence are given to "a vow," and "a free-will offering." And an additional note-

worthy individualising of the offerings is introduced in the law that "the stranger that sojourneth among you," shall have the same freedom and choice in sacrifice, as members of the congregation—"as ye are, so shall the stranger be before the Lord" (vs. 15). Definite occasions of sacrifice, emerging in the experience of the congregation, or of individuals, but specially of individuals (whether "stranger," or "born of the country"), permeate the whole passage, Numb. xv. 1-29.

The only additional proof we offer is that, when state, or national, offerings are commemorated, jealous care is shown that varying or individual offerings shall be held equally in remembrance. Take two instances: (a) In Numbers xxviii and xxix a catalogue is given of all the sacrifices, at successive feasts, for a year: but the following significant addendum is prescribed: "These things ye shall do unto the Lord in your set feasts, *beside your vows*, and your free-will offerings, and for your meal-offerings, and for your drink-offerings, and for your peace-offerings" (Numb. xxix. 39). (b) The other passage is Lev. xxiii, which gives a similar enumeration of the set feasts; but again we have the all-important addendum: "These are the feasts of the Lord which ye shall proclaim . . . *beside the sabbaths of the Lord*, and beside your gifts, and beside all your vows, and beside all your free-will offerings, which ye give unto the Lord" (Lev. xxiii. 37-38). In such manifold and emphatic terms are the individualistic sacrifices, arising out of the daily life, preserved for Israel. Let the reader, therefore, as he closes his Leviticus, again consider that, if these sacrifices were even more numerous, "in the early period," than the Critics make them, this would be quite in keeping with Leviticus being known to the offerers, and with its being followed by them as their divine and honoured guide, at every stage of the worship. And let him consider, further, that the chapters, Exod. xxi-xxiii, which the Critics pompously style a Jehovistic Code, and which they declare to have been reigning, through all "the early

period," makes no approach to providing for Israel's individualistic sacrifices, with the particularity and the certainty, with which these sacrifices are provided for, in the so-called Priestly Code.

VI. Another achievement of the Priestist is said to be, that he *banished* from Israel the *overflowing gladness*, by which past ages were characterised, when they were at sacrifice. Sacrifice had been a delightful thing, in the days of old—"Where a sacrifice took place, there was also eating and drinking. . . . at no important *Bamah* was entertainment wholly wanting. . . . To be merry, to eat and drink before Jehovah, is a usual form of speech. . . . even Ezekiel calls the cultus on the high places an eating upon the mountains. . . . The ancient offerings were *wholly of a joyous nature*,—a merrymaking before Jehovah with music and song, timbrels, flutes, and stringed instruments" (pp. 71, 81). But the Priestist made these age-long merrymakings flee before the "mental shadow of the great congregation." "Where formerly a thank-offering which was eaten before Jehovah, and which might with greater clearness be called a sacrificial meal, was prescribed, the Priestly Code, as we shall afterwards see, has made out of it simple dues to the priests. . . . the voluntary private offering which the sacrificer ate in a joyful company at the holy place has given way before the compulsory. . . . No greater contrast could be conceived than the *monotonous seriousness* of the so-called Mosaic worship" (pp. 72, 81).

It is difficult to see how anyone, with Leviticus and its allied Books before him, could pen such rank inaccuracy, telling with ten-fold emphasis, the thing that was not. Let the reader again go to his "shepherd's bag"; in other words, let him again open Leviticus and Numbers, and read. Let him remember the demonstration we have already given, that it is the Priestly Code which originated and encouraged those joyous sacrificial meals, of which the critics are so enamoured. (a) And then let him read such a prescription as the following: "And ye shall take you, on the first

day, the boughs of goodly trees, branches of palm trees, and the boughs of thick trees, and willows of the brook; and ye shall *rejoice* before the Lord your God seven days" (Lev. xxiii, 40). Whether is this "merrymaking," or "monotonous seriousness?" (b) Then read the following: "Also in the day of your gladness, and in your solemn days, and in the beginnings of your months, ye shall blow with the trumpets over your burnt-offerings, and over the sacrifices of your peace-offerings; that they may be to you for a memorial before your God: I am the Lord" (Numb. x. 10). There you have, practically, *all* the sacrifices of Leviticus (except possibly the sin-offerings), grouped together, and all of them associated with "trumpets," and with overflowing "gladness." (c) What the Code thus prescribes, the History should exemplify. Let us then look at the History,—remembering that the Critics hold the ordinances of Leviticus to have been "scrupulously followed by the post-exilian time" (p. 82). We can get the "post-exilian" sacrifices, from Ezra and Nehemiah. Only four are recorded. We shall look at each. (d) After the set-feasts and free-will offerings, have been established, and the altar built, here is a graphic picture: "And when the builders laid the foundation of the temple of the Lord, they set the priests in their apparel, with trumpets, and the Levites, the sons of Asaph, with cymbals . . . and they sang together by course in praising and giving thanks . . . and many (of the priests and Levites) shouted aloud for joy . . . for the people shouted with a loud shout, and the noise was heard afar off" (Ezra iii. 10-13). Priests and people feel quite unable to pour forth all their "gladness." The tumultuousness of their "joy" is "heard afar off." (e) Let twenty years pass, and the temple now be finished: what do we read? "And the children of Israel, the priests and the Levites, and the rest of the children of the captivity, kept the dedication of the house of God with joy . . . for the Lord had made them joyful" (Ezra vi. 16-22). (f) Put Nehemiah next in the witness-box. The city is now rebuilt, and

Nehemiah calls on Ezra, to read to the people Leviticus, of whose requirements they feel they have come far short. And the great effort of Ezra and Nehemiah is to get them to *multiply their joy* in the Lord: "This day is holy unto the Lord your God; mourn not, nor weep Go your way, eat the fat, and drink the sweet, and send portions. . . . And all the people went their way to eat, and to drink, and to send portions, and to make *great mirth* And there was very great gladness" (Neh. viii. 9-17). (g) After the rebuilding of the city, came the rebuilding of the city wall. Of its dedication, and attendant sacrifices, let the following record suffice: "And the singers sang loud, with Jezrahiah their overseer. Also that day they offered great sacrifices, and rejoiced: for God had made them rejoice with *great joy*: the wives also and the children rejoiced: so that the joy of Jerusalem was heard even afar off" (Neh. xii. 42, 43). These are all the "post-exilian" sacrifices of which we have any record: they are all a "scrupulous following" of the ordinances of Leviticus: and we ask anyone, gifted with common intelligence, and with common honesty, if it is not the veriest hallucination, to represent Leviticus, as ending the people's "sacrificial joys," and overrunning their whole service with a "monotonous seriousness."

VII. We think we have, to a large extent, discredited the Critics' Priestist. He is a mere man of straw. The acts, which they would fain foist on him, he is quite unable to perform. He is like the heathen idols, "which have eyes but see not, hands but handle not, and feet but walk not." We have shown that successive main achievements, for which they glorify him, are just a series of baseless imaginations. But we are far from having enumerated all the wreaths which they bind to his brow. We shall, therefore, glance more briefly at a few more of them. And we shall find them of the same un-suggested, un-proved, and easily exploded kind, as those we have already dealt with. Let our reader just keep his Priestly Code (*i.e.* Leviticus, with closing chapters of Exodus, and most of Numbers), and other Scriptures ready to open.

(1) The Critics hold that the Priestly Code shows notable evolutions in the *materials* of sacrifice. First, in the matter of flour, "In the meal offerings it will have *soleth*, and not *kemach*" (p. 63). "From Ezekiel onwards, *kemach* as sacrificial meal entirely disappears" (p. 64). (a) Turn up Numb. v. 15: "Then shall the man bring his wife unto the priest, and he shall bring her offering for her, the tenth part of an ephah of fine flour (*kemach*)."¹ Here is *kemach* in the very heart of the Priestly Code! (b) Turn up Ezekiel xvi. 19: "My bread also which I gave thee, fine flour (*soleth*), and oil and honey, etc." Ezekiel is denouncing Israel's malpractices, after the Exodus: they gave God's glory to idols: and, among their gifts, when they entered Canaan, they used not *kemach*, but *soleth*! (c) We are told: "The Septuagint is offended by the illegality of the material in 1 Sam i. 24, and alters the reading so as to bring it to conformity with the Law" (p. 64). Stick, then, to the Septuagint as touchstone, and turn up its translation of Numb. v 15. It is not here "offended with the illegality of *kemach*," and translates it, not as if it were *soleth*, but by its ordinary synonym for *kemach*! We might expatiate: but is it needed?

(2) The Critics have another marvellous evolution of sacrificial meal, which their Priestist brought about. In the early period, the meal was *baked*, before being sacrificed. But the Priestist insisted on having it *raw*: "the raw condition as much as possible," was his preference. "The phenomenon that in the Law meal is by preference offered raw, while in the earlier period, even as an adjunct of the burnt offering, it was presented baked, belongs to the same category" (p. 68). What a "phenomenon!" (a) The first mention of meal in the Priestly Code is in Exod. xxix, which prescribes the sacrifices at the consecration of Aaron and his sons to the priestly office: the carrying out of these priestly prescriptions is given in Lev. viii, and in both passages the same phraseology is maintained. Read Exod. xxix. 2: "(Take) unleavened *bread*, and *cakes* unleavened tem-

pered with oil, and *wafers* unleavened anointed with oil: of wheaten flour shalt thou *make* them." In fulfillment, read Lev. viii. 26: "And out of the basket of unleavened bread, that was before the Lord, he took one unleavened cake, and a cake of oiled bread," etc. This is the inauguration of the whole ritual, and, probably, its most minutely prescribed sacrifice. Is the meal to be offered "raw"? Nay, it is to be baked into "bread," and "cakes," and "wafers." The "phenomenon" is laughed to scorn! (b) Read Lev. ii, where the meal offerings are prescribed, and you have four states, in which the meal may be brought to the altar. You have it in an undefined state (vs. 1); "baken in the oven" (vs. 4); "baken in a pan" (vs. 5); "baken in the frying-pan" (vs. 7). Where can "the raw condition, as much as possible," be found, in these inaugural statutes? (c) Turn to Lev. vi. 9-21, which prescribes a perpetual meal-offering by the high priest, half in the morning, and half at night. Read vs. 21: "In a pan it shall be made with oil; and when it is baken, thou shalt bring it in: and the baken pieces of the meal offering shalt thou offer for a sweet savour unto the Lord." (d) Turn to Lev. vii, 11-14, which prescribes the Law, whenever a worshipper desires to offer a thank-offering. Read vs. 12: "If he offer it for a thanksgiving, then he shall offer with the sacrifice of thanksgiving unleavened cakes mingled with oil, and unleavened wafers anointed with oil . . . of fine flour, fried." (e) Another prominent sacrificial prescription is for the Nazarite, after the days of his separation. It is minutely detailed in Numb. vi. 13-21. Read vs. 15: "(He shall offer) a basket of unleavened bread, cakes of fine flour mingled with oil, and wafers of unleavened bread anointed with oil, and their meal offering, and their drink offerings." Much more might be added. But surely we have pulverized the "phenomenon" sufficiently. The Priestly Code protests most vehemently against its meal being brought to its altar "raw": it prefers it to be first "baked" into "cakes," and "wafers," and "bread." And let us again reflect that, if we find meal "baked," in the sacri-

fices of "the early period," this is just what we might expect, if the Priestly Code were then known and regulating: for it prescribes the "baking." We can think also what a curious "step in advance" (for so it is grandly styled on p. 69) it was, to pass from "baked" meal to "raw." Was not that retrogression, rather than evolution?

(3) A very similar evolution is claimed by the Critics for sacrificial flesh. It had been *boiled* (say the Critics) in all preceding ages, but the Priestist insisted on having it *raw*. "The flesh of the sacrifice . . . is no longer boiled, but consigned to the altar flames in its raw condition. Such was not the ancient custom. . . . The word *bashal* (to seethe in water) occurs with extreme frequency. . . . All sacrificial flesh (*bashalah*) was boiled, and there was no other kind" (p. 68). (a) Is not this another singular evolution—from "boiled" to "raw"? Man advances from raw to boiled: the Deity is made to advance from boiled to raw! (b) There is not a shred of Scripture proof for the statement that all sacrificial flesh was boiled, in pre-exilic ages. No express statement is ever given, as to an inexorable method of preparing it for the altar: but the almost irresistible inference is, that it was always burnt raw on the altar. Can we suppose that Elijah boiled his bullock on Carmel? or Abraham his ram on Moriah? Did Abel boil his firstlings? or Noah his clean beasts and fowls? Had Balaam seven boiling-places, as well as seven altars, on the mountains of Moab? These may be possibilities: but they are also extreme improbabilities. (c) The exegesis of *bashal* is quite misleading. It does *not* always mean "to seethe in water." It means to cook, or to make ready, in a quite indeterminate sense: the special form of cooking must be otherwise ascertained. Joel applies it to the ripening of the harvest (Joel iii. 13); and Pharaoh's butler to the ripening of the grape-clusters in his dream (Gen. xl. 10). It is applied to baking, as when Tamar baked cakes for Amnon (2 Sam. xiii. 8). It is applied to the Passover, where we are sure that the sense was roasting (Deut. xvi.

7). Read 2 Chr. xxxv. 13: "And they *bashalled* the Passover with fire, according to the ordinance: but the other holy offerings they *bashalled* in pots, and in caldrons, and in pans." There the same *bashal* is applied to the roasting of the Passover, and then to the preparation (it may be by boiling, by stewing, or by baking) of the other holy offerings, "in caldrons, and in pans." (d) The following is another faulty exegesis: "In 1 Sam. ii. 15, the sons of Eli will not wait till the sacrifice has been boiled, and the altar pieces burnt, but demand their share raw for roasting." This is sheer misrepresentation. Vss. 13-14 show that it was while the flesh, for priest and worshipper to eat, was being boiled, that the sons of Eli stuck in their flesh-hook. And then vss. 15-16 add, as a great aggravation, that, at a previous stage, before the altar-pieces had been burnt (observe the word is, burnt—not, boiled) they demanded flesh to roast, without waiting for the separation of the altar-pieces ("the fat") from the festal pieces. And, when the outraged worshipper said to them "Let them not fail to burn the fat (that is, the altar-pieces) presently; *then* take as much as thy soul desireth," the sons of Eli scouted his protest: "Nay, but thou shalt give it me now: and if not, I will take it by force." Twice over, in this chosen passage, the sacrifice is said to be burnt not boiled. Such tactics may enable the unbiased inquirer to learn how much credit he would often be safe in placing on the Critics, in their most unblushing asseverations.

VIII. We have stripped off a goodly number of the rags, that cover the Priestist. But there are several hanging still. The Critics go on to tell us, through their chosen corypheus, that "the altar of incense is a sheer invention"! It was neither commanded, nor constructed, nor used. An unscrupulous, but poorly-equipped forger, whom the Jews failed to execrate, but whom the Germans have scented out, foisted it into Holy (?) Writ:

"But the importance which incense has attained in the ritual legislation of the Pentateuch is manifest above all from

this, that it has led to *the invention* of a peculiar new and highly sacred piece of furniture, namely, the golden altar in the inner tabernacle, which is unknown to history, and which is foreign to the kernel of the Priestly Code itself. We expect to find the altar of incense in Exod. xxv-xxix, but find it instead as an appendix at the beginning of Exod. xxx. Why not until now? Why thus separated from the other furnishings of the inner sanctuary? And not only so, but even after the ordinances relating to the adornment of the priests, and the inauguration of the divine service? The reason why the author of chapters xxv-xxix is thus silent about the altar of incense, in the passage in which the furniture of the tabernacle, consisting of ark, table, and candlestick is described, is, that he does not know of it. There is no other possibility; for he cannot have forgotten it. . . . The rite of the most solemn atoning sacrifice takes place in Lev. iv indeed on the golden altar, but in Exod. xxix, Lev. viii, ix, without its use. A still more striking circumstance is that in the passages, where the holiest incense-offering itself is spoken of, no trace can be discovered of the corresponding altar. This is particularly the case in Lev. xvi. To burn incense in the sanctuary Aaron takes a censer, fills it with coals from the altar of burnt offerings (vss. 12, 18-20), and lays the incense upon them in the adytum. . . . The altar of incense is everywhere unknown here; the altar of burnt offering is the only altar, and, moreover, is always called simply *the altar*" (*sic!*) (pp. 65-66).

The foregoing long quotation is just a conglomerate of most dogmatic asseverations, resting on the most pitiably inconclusive evidence. (a) It is said the incense altar is "unknown to history," because the subsequent books of Scripture do not refer to it as the Critics hold they should have done. But see what havoc this will make of chaps. xxv-xxix. In xxvi. 31-35, is described the veil of blue; in xxviii. 31-35 is described the robe of the ephod; in xxviii. 36-39 is described the plate of pure gold. Now, how often are these articles referred to in the subsequent books? There does not happen to be a single reference to any of the three! Are they therefore to be tossed aside as "unknown to history"? (b) But the altar of incense is *not* so unmentioned as these three. It is mentioned three times over,

when described as introduced by Solomon into the Temple (1 Kings vii. 20-22; vii. 48-50). (c) Here is another *reductio ad absurdum*. Among the articles, said to be prescribed in the original Priestly Code, and not in a mere appendix, is the golden candlestick, Exod. xxv. 31-40. How often is this subsequently referred to? Only once, namely, in 1 Kings vii. 49, which we have just quoted. Now, with what consistency can the golden candlestick be retained as historical, when mentioned only once in 1 Kings, while the incense-altar is cast aside as unhistorical, though it is mentioned thrice in the same passage? (d) Ezekiel shows acquaintance with both altars in his vision (Ezek. xl. 47; xli. 22). (e) It is significant that Ezekiel gives his *second* altar "walls." The critics vainly insinuate that he may mean the shewbread table. But, in Exod. xxv, that table has no "walls," while, in Exod. xxx, the incense altar *has* "walls." And the term *kiroth*, for "walls," is the same in Ezekiel, and in Exod. xxx. (f) The author of Chronicles testifies to the golden altar in history, as known to David (1 Chron. xxviii. 18.); as known to Uzziah (2 Chron. xxvi. 16); as ministered on by Aaron and his sons (1 Chron. vi. 49). Since we are pointed (p. 65) to this author, as *proving* the prevalence of incense subsequent to Jeremiah; we cannot, therefore, consistently scout his evidence, when he testifies regarding Aaron, regarding David, and regarding Uzziah. (g) The critics ask us to reject the golden altar because it crops up in Exod. xxx, instead of in Exod. xxv. This implies overwhelming self-conceit and dogmatism. Surely the Divine Prescriber could enumerate the various articles in the order he thought best. And we think the order chosen extremely appropriate. The great altar of burnt offering is prescribed in chap. xxvii: its priesthood in chap. xxviii: its daily sacrifices in chap. xxix. Is it not most natural that God should straightway proceed, in chap. xxx, to prescribe the *other altar*, which the system was to embrace, and which was quite diverse in character? Further, two great daily services of the priests were

thus brought into near and seemly conjunction. Exod. xxix. 38-42 has just told of their daily offerings on the altar of burnt offering; how natural that Exod. xxx. 7-8 should straightway remind them of their daily offerings on the other altar! and remind them, too, (vs. 9) that the sacrifices on the first altar must never be transferred to the second. We are not insisting that these natural conjunctions were actually in the divine intention, but we do insist on the rank absurdity of dubbing Exod. xxx, 1-10 a forgery, because it was not included in Exod. xxv. And we would just add that, when the *construction* of the various articles is afterwards detailed, the altar of incense is embedded in their heart, and not as a mere appendix, three times over (Exod. xxxvii. 25-28; xxxix. 33-41; xl. 18-33).

It is irksome to be belabouring a mere phantom so much. But the ineptitudes have not all been told. So, look a little longer. (h) The Divine Prescriber, in chap. xxx, might well raise indignant protest against the Critics' belittling of His handiwork. In that chapter, He prescribes, in vss. 11-16, the atonement, which is to save them from the plague; in vss. 17-21, the laver, in which Aaron must wash, when approaching the tabernacle, else he will die; in vss. 22-23, the anointing oil, which must be poured on every minister, and on every vessel: which is not only holy, but "most holy," and which dare not be imitated, on pain of death; in vss. 34-38, the *incense*, which is also "most holy," and dare not be imitated on pain of death, and is put up for a perpetual memorial before the mercy seat. How do the Critics estimate all these provisions which God prescribes to Moses as "most holy," and whose neglect He decrees to be punishable by death? In a footnote on p. 66, they belittle them as "subsidiary," as "having no importance," and such as might be "either passed over altogether, or merely brought in as an appendix." Enough surely to answer, What profanity! (i) And if *incense* were thus a mere triviality, how could its altar be described as "the most important vessel in the sanctuary," as it is in the above-

mentioned foot-note? (k) The statement that the atoning sacrifice, in Lev. iv, takes place on the golden altar, is the reverse of truth. It takes place on the altar of burnt offering, in all the four sacrifices of that chapter, as vss. 10, 19, 26 and 31 plainly tell. (1) Lastly, the demand for the altar of incense, in Lev. xvi, is most shallow and indefensible. Had the high-priest burnt his incense on the golden altar that day, it would have resulted in his death, when he went within the veil: for he would have had no cloud of incense, to take in with him, to cover the mercy seat, and to be his protection. He would burn incense on the golden altar, morning and evening, that day, as usual; for we are told that his ordinary ministrations were not suspended (Numb. xxix. 11). But the fact that the golden altar is unmentioned, in the great Annual Atonement of that day, is just one out of countless proofs of the sanity, and the consistency, with which our Scriptures have been put together. And we sum up with the declaration that there is not the veriest shade of good reason for saying, so positively and so grandiloquently, that the golden altar was neither prescribed by God, nor constructed by Moses.

IX. We shall not wander further among the vagaries, which the Critics have multiplied, in their favorite pastime of inventing authors for the Pentateuch. When Peter asked how often he must forgive his brother, he was answered, "I say not unto thee until seven times, but until seventy times seven." And so, if we are asked: "How many smooth stones out of the brook must we gather against the Critics? Can we stop short of David's five?" we would answer, "I say not until five of them, but until fifty times five." Their vagaries are legion: for they are many. Our aim is the simple but important one, to encourage earnest inquirers to stand up, bravely and confidently, against the rubbish, which is often palmed off on them as "science," and which claims to have unmasked the Mosaic records as little else than a mass of persistent forgery. The technical knowledge of the specialist is far from

indispensable to them: there is no need for their being super-erudite, or splendid linguists: they have just to open their Bibles and follow them with simplicity and candour. And we shall now take leave of the Post-exilic Priestist, by showing that the cutting out of a large section from Moses' writings, and dubbing it "the Priestly Code," and "a book," by itself, is quite without warrant:

"The Priestly Code alone occupies itself much with the subject (of sacrifice); it gives a minute classification of the various kinds of offerings, and a description of the procedure to be followed in the case of each. . . . This point accordingly presents us with an important feature, by which the character of *the book* can be determined" (p. 52).

This insinuation of a separate "book" is pure pretense. Let us illustrate the fallacy. Suppose an author, in giving the history of a country, stops at a certain point, and gives a special outline of their *agricultural* knowledge and pursuits—their implements, their styles of cropping, their leases, their small holdings, and so on—and then resumes his narrative: are we to cut out these portions of his treatise, and dub them "The Agricultural Code," simply because the other references to agriculture, in his treatise, are more casual and fragmentary? Or, if he stops to give an exhaustive outline of their medical knowledge and pursuits, and then resumes: are we to cut that out from all the rest of the work, and call it "The Medical Code"? That is the absurdity, that has been practiced on Moses' writings. At a certain highly appropriate point, he stops, to give a set outline of the sacrificial knowledge, and requirements, of his people, and then resumes his narrative; the Critics pounce on this, and cut it out, and dub it "The Priestly Code," because the prior and subsequent references to sacrifice, in his writings, are less connected and less exhaustive. In the greatness of their folly, they go astray; though they live to be as old as Methuselah, they will never be able to show their Priestly Code as a separate "book." And, be it remembered that their Priestly Code is taken up with a

great deal more than "priestliness," and sacrifice. It contains dietary regulations, and marriage prohibitions; it contains laws against wizards and blasphemers; it contains quasi-medical, or sanitary, rules; it contains laws inculcating social kindness and benevolences; it contains agricultural laws for each seventh year; it contains multifarious civil enactments for the year of Jubilee. To say that the so-called Mosaic Law "is nothing more than the institution, for the purpose of carrying on the cultus, after the manner ordained by God" (p. 53), is a monstrous misrepresentation. It does provide for "the carrying on of the cultus"; but it provides for a vast deal more. The letter P, written large, is all the description, the Critics can give, of the author of their Code. They go on, prating about P, as if they knew all about him. Make P an abbreviation for Pretender, or for Prevaricator, or for Profaner, and the nomenclature may do well enough. But such a *double* P—such a Post-exilic Priestist—as the Critics dream of, never breathed, nor wrote.

We have been occupied so long with the Priestist, that the other Goliaths, whom we specified, have had to wait far too long for attention. We hurry on now to—

THE PSEUDO-JEREMIAH

He will not occupy us so long, as it is the exegesis of only two verses of Jeremiah (vii. 22-23) on which we propose to join issue. The consideration of these verses will come very appropriately immediately after the Post-exilic Priestist, because the Critics contend that, in these two verses, Jeremiah absolutely annihilates the fiction that Leviticus was written by Moses. First, we will give the two verses in full: "For I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt offerings or sacrifices: But this thing I commanded them, saying, Obey *my voice* and I will be your God, and ye shall be my people: and walk in all the ways that I have commanded you that it may be well with you."

We might quote from the *Prolegomena* a very emphatic exegesis of these verses, as a critical stronghold. But, in this instance, we shall give two short quotations from other sources, to show how wide-spread and unreserved is the certainty, with which the Critics lean on the verses, for support. The one quotation is from *The Quarterly Review*.⁶ In a general review of Old Testament Criticism, the following occurs: "Jer. vii. 22 distinctly states that Jehovah gave no commands to Israel concerning burnt offerings and sacrifices; in the wilderness, His commands had been only ethical." The other quotation is from Professor Robertson Smith,⁷ and is, if possible, even more dogmatic: "It is impossible to give a flatter contradiction to the traditional theory that the Levitical system was enacted in the wilderness." So, we are thus brought to very close quarters. Two inspired books of our Bible—Jeremiah and Leviticus—are brought face to face, and we are asked to recognise the unsurpassable "flatness," with which the one contradicts the other. We accept the challenge: and we ask our reader to note with what ease he may often turn aside the most vehement asseverations of the Critics.

Let us conduct him a little, first, on the path of *analogy*. (a) In I Cor. i. 17, he will find: "For Christ sent me, not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel." Is he to infer from this that Paul rejected baptism as a binding ordinance? Is he to say, "It is impossible to give a flatter contradiction to the theory that baptism was one of the two essential sacraments of the Christian Church"? That were a marvellous conclusion to reach; for Paul was himself baptized by Ananias, as soon as he was converted: he baptized the jailor, as soon as he believed: he treats baptism as universally obligatory, and employs it as one of the most striking emblems of our death to sin, and rising to newness of life. The obvious meaning of the words, which we have quoted, is that baptism, as a mere external rite, is of *vastly less consequence*

⁶ No. 410: January, 1907; p. 187.

⁷ *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 288.

than the preaching of the Gospel. He does not abrogate baptism: he only keeps it in its proper place. (b) In 2 Cor. xii. 14, Paul says, "For I seek not yours, but you" (*i. e.*, I seek not your property, but yourselves). Are we to infer from this that Paul discountenanced Christian liberality? that he was satisfied, if he could bless his converts in their *souls*, and that he made no claim on their possessions, for the service of his Master? Or, is not the obvious full meaning this, that they might multiply deeds of beneficence, as they pleased, but these would prove quite ineffectual, apart from their first giving *themselves* to Christ? "Not yours, but you!" He did seek "yours," for he gives the injunction, "Let every one of you lay by him in store, as God hath prospered him" (1 Cor. xvi. 2); and again, "not grudgingly, or of necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver" (2 Cor. ix. 7). But he sought "you," with far more consuming earnestness; for, "though I give all my goods to feed the poor," yet, if I have not first given *myself* to Christ, it profiteth me nothing. (c) In Luke xiv. 26, Jesus says: "If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." Are we to infer from this that Jesus abrogated the Fifth Commandment, which His voice spake from Sinai? Are we to say, "It is impossible to give a flatter contradiction to the theory," that "honoring father and mother" is a divine and ever-enduring ordinance? Or, did not our Lord lovingly remember the Fifth Commandment, in His own home at Nazareth? And is not His plain meaning just this, that all earthly affections—even the nearest and the seemliest—must be *subordinated* to the one supreme rule of "loving the Lord our God, with our whole heart, and soul, and strength, and mind"? (d) Once more, in Matt. vi. 25-34, our Lord says: "Therefore I say unto you, Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. . . . But seek ye first the kingdom of God." Are we to

infer from this that diligence in business is strictly forbidden? Are we to say, "It is impossible to give a flatter contradiction to the un-Scriptural theory" that "a man should provide for his own, and specially for those of his own household"—that he should "study to be quiet, and to do his own business, and to work with his own hands, as commanded"? These are the pleasantries, in which "science" would land us. But our Lord's words are amply interpreted, and fulfilled, if we *subordinate* the concerns of Time to those of Eternity.

There is no end to the similar analogies, that might be multiplied. Carry up their spirit to Jeremiah's words, and they will effectually reveal the vanity, and the grotesqueness, of the significance, which the Critics would foist upon these words. "When your fathers came out of Egypt, I prescribed for them, not sacrifices, but holy and faithful lives." Does that mean that sacrifices could be neglected, if only the heart and life were given to God? Or, is not the plain meaning that sacrifices, in themselves, would not be of the slightest avail, if the heart were full of unbelief, and the life were full of immorality? At the Exodus, God prescribed both morality, and ritual. But he put morality first, and made it the very basis of His covenant. The order of events, in Ex. xix-xxi, should be carefully noted. First, God sums up morality in the Ten Commandments. And He showed their fundamental, and ever-enduring significance, by speaking them with His own "voice" from the smoking mountain, and by writing them with His own finger, on the stony tablets. No such honours were put on any other of His requirements. It is of the Ten Commandments alone that He says, "Ye have seen that I have talked with you from heaven" (Exod. xx. 22). It is on their basis that He takes the people into covenant. "If ye will obey *my voice* indeed, and keep my covenant, . . . ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation" (Exod. xix. 5-6). Jeremiah quotes these very words, "Obey my voice, and ye shall be my people," as the well-known basis of the cov-

enant. The subsequent requirements, which the rest of Exodus goes on to record, do not deal with morality; they deal with ritual, and civil law; and they have their inferiority, and their temporariness, indicated, in the fact that Israel hears them uttered not by "the voice of God," but has to be content with hearing *them* uttered by the voice of Moses. "These are the judgments, which *thou* shalt set before them" (Exod. xxi. 1). The ritual was a temporary seal; but the covenant—the imperishable covenant—was in the Ten Commandments. "Not baptism, but the gospel"; yet baptism was a divinely appointed ordinance. "Not sacrifices, but holy obedience"; yet sacrifices, for the time then present, were a divine requirement.

We will just add that, if the Critics would discard their *Nelson's blind eye*, and look straightforwardly at *all* the verses in Jer. vii, that very chapter would lead them to discover their egregious blunder. In vs. 12, Jeremiah points to Shiloh, and to God's house and service there, from the days of Joshua, as well-known historical realities. To discover what these realities imply, read 1 Sam. ii. 29: "Wherefore kick ye at my sacrifice and at mine offering, which *I have commanded* in my habitation; and honorest thy sons above me, to make yourselves fat with the chiefest of all the offerings of Israel my people?" That verse proves sacrifices to have been established, by divine command, as soon as Israel conquered Canaan! And Jeremiah appeals to this fact. The Critics strive to glorify Jeremiah, as an exceptional witness, in vs. 22, as to what took place in the days of Moses; they cannot, therefore, scout his witness, in vs. 12 of the same chapter, as to what took place in the nearer days of Joshua. Say to Jeremiah, as was said to Paul, "Thou art permitted to speak for thyself"; and he is neither the discoverer of incense, nor the annihilator of sacrifice.

The reader should take note that Jeremiah was put forward as a palmary witness against our views. "It is impossible to contradict these views more flatly," than Jeremiah does. We trust that he can now look back and see

how a little common sense, and a little careful sifting of Scripture, are all that is required, to dissolve such magniloquence into smoke.

We pass now to—

EZEKIEL THE SACRIFICIAL PIONEER

The claim for Ezekiel is that he revolutionized Israel's sacrifices; and it is put forward, with great precision and force. But its flimsiness, and imaginariness, can be most easily established. Two pages of the *Prolegomena* (pp. 59-60) are devoted to it (though, singular to say, not a single quotation from Ezekiel is to be found on these two pages: assertion is manifold; proof is *nil*). Throughout their writings, the Critics then treat this unproved theory, as though it were axiomatically true. Ezekiel (they say) was the first to introduce any divine regulation of sacrifice. In previous ages, people sacrificed, just as propriety, or their own inclination, led them. But Ezekiel called them to sacrificial fetters; he drew up a hard-and-fast Ritual for their worship, which previous prophets would have abhorred, but which, on their return from Babylon, they docilely established, in the Priestly Code. With the Critics, Ezekiel is the great Transition from pre-exilic to post-exilic: and, if Ezekiel fails them, all is gone.

I. The first, and really quite sufficient, answer to such a claim, is that Scripture "knows nothing" of it. Neither Ezekiel himself, nor any of his contemporaries or successors, makes such a claim for him. There is not the slightest reference, in any crevice of our Bible, to Ezekiel, as a sacrificial reformer—as one who transformed the past, and adumbrated the future. When God makes a new pronouncement regarding His *name* (Exod. vi.), or regarding His *sanctuary* (Deut. xii), the changes are unmistakably registered. Might we not have expected some similar registration of the vast change, ascribed to Ezekiel?

II. But we add a still more awkward comment, when we say that the prophets and historians, who succeed him, are

unanimous in passing him by, and in fixing on one, who lived 1000 years before him, as the originator of Law in Israel. (a) When Zerubbabel and Joshua head the newly returned exiles, at their inaugural devotions, there is no mention of carrying out new laws, revealed to Ezekiel in Babylon; the whole ritual is shaped according "as it is written in the law of Moses the man of God" (Ezra iii. 2). (b) One hundred years later, when city and temple are rebuilt, and the people are again "gathered . . . as one man" to Jerusalem, and their religious services are detailed, there is the same utter ignoring of Ezekiel—the same grateful fulfillment of what "the Lord had commanded by Moses" (Neh. viii. 1). (c) The prophets re-echo the historians. None of them has the slightest acknowledgment of a sacrificial revolution by Ezekiel. (d) Haggai will not stop short of Moses, in his authoritative appeals (Hagg. ii. 5). (e) Malachi is, if possible, even more express, in mirroring the people's duty, in "the law of Moses, my servant" (Mal. iii. 7; iv. 4). (f) Nay, Ezekiel himself had preceded them in ignoring the neo-German claim of pioneerhood for him, and in pointing to previous "statutes," and "judgments," as the ancient, and unrevoked, Law for Israel (Ezek. v. 6, 11; xx. 10-13; xxii. 8, 26; xxiii). What a farce to bind a sacrificial wreath round Ezekiel's brow, on which neither himself, nor his collaborators, ever gazed!

III. The fatuity of the Ezekelian Torah (as the Critics pompously phrase it) is further discernible, from what they tell us of the manner of its origin. It was invented, after the temple was destroyed; and it could not, appropriately, have been thought of, nor invented, sooner:

"But once the temple was in ruins, the cultus at an end, its personnel out of employment, it is easy to understand how the sacred praxis should have become a matter of theory and writing, so that it might not altogether perish, and how an exiled priest should have begun to paint the picture of it as he carried it in his memory, and to publish it as a programme for the future restoration of the theocracy. Nor is there any difficulty, if arrangements which, as long

as they were actually in force, were simply regarded as natural, were seen, after their abolition, in a transfiguring light, and, from the study devoted to them, gained artificially a still higher value" (pp. 59-60).

(a) Was ever an arrant absurdity penned, in such confident and magniloquent language? Codification can never come naturally, till praxis is abolished. How unspeakably absurd! Was there ever a nation that waited till its nationality was effaced, and its laws no longer binding, before it took to codifying them? Or, is it not at the start of nations, and in their progress, that their laws are established, and developed? (b) How does their Jehovist's conduct square with the above-mentioned canon? He did not wait till nationality was effaced. His date is fixed, solely because (they say) he must have photographed the practices, which he saw everywhere around him! (c) How does their Deuteronomist square with it? He does not photograph existing praxis: he forbids "doing according to the things that ye do here this day." He "paints" the future, as the Jehovist "painted" the present, and as Ezekiel "painted" the past. We thus have the three legislative "painters"—past, present, and future—mingled in splendid absurdity. (d) One more word. The Critics tell us it was "from the study devoted to them" (p. 60) that Ezekiel learned to revere, and codify, the laws. But Ezekiel tells us the very opposite! He tells us that the codification was the result of a definite, and well-remembered, divine rapture: "In the five and twentieth year of our captivity, in the beginning of the year, in the tenth day of the month, in the fourteenth year after that the city was smitten, *in the self-same day* the hand of the Lord was upon me, and brought me thither. In the visions of God brought he me into the land of Israel, and set me down upon a very high mountain" (xl. 1-2). John, in Patmos, has an equally vivid remembrance of being "carried away in the spirit to a mountain great and high," to see what is, practically, the prolongation of Ezekiel's splendid vision (Rev. xxi. 10, ff.).

IV. This reference to John, in Patmos, suggests how we may best obtain a sane and reverent contemplation of Ezekiel's visions. Read over chaps. xxxiii-xlvi. They form the third great, and closing, group of prophecies. Chaps. i-xxiv are the first group—judgments against Israel. Chaps. xxv-xxxii are the second group—judgments against heathen nations. The third group constitutes a series of glowing Prophecies of Restoration, in which, under successive emblems—(a) regathering the universal flock, under David; (b) resurrecting the dry bones, in the valley; (c) annihilating the invaders, Gog and Magog; (d) framing a city, and temple, on a high mountain—the exceeding riches of God's grace are shown to be in abundant and sure reserve for all His faithful people. Take note that there is not the slightest special reference to Zerubbabel, nor to Cyrus, nor to the ending of the captivity, in any of the visions. Then, read the closing chapters of John's Apocalypse (Rev. xix-xxii), where Ezekiel's identical emblems are prolonged: He who is the Root and the Offspring of David leads innumerable armies to victory: Gog and Magog are finally annihilated: a grand symmetrical city, and temple, are again beheld—sealing the same assurance (which Ezekiel gave, when he named his city, *Jehovah-is-there*), that "Behold the tabernacle of God is with men, and He will dwell with them, and they shall be His people, and God Himself shall be with them, and be their God" (Rev. xxi. 3). Can it be doubted, in view of these analogies, that He, whose "manifold wisdom" sees the end from the beginning, has employed both Ezekiel and John, in similar and instructive metaphors, to give assurance of His omnipotent reign of grace—(a) feebly adumbrated by a reviving Judaism; (b) more memorably developed, when the Word was made flesh; (c) gradually unfolding, as the heathen become Christ's heritage; (d) and, at last, to be openly beheld, and celebrated, when a multitude, that no man can number, shall be assembled on the mountains of Israel; when the dry bones of the dead, small

and great, shall stand, an exceeding great army, before the great white throne; when the city *Jehovah-is-there* shall be thronged with worshippers, that rest not day nor night from serving Him; and when the river, whose streams make glad the city, shall flow full, and refreshing, for evermore?

V. In order to satisfy the reader that we have not misled him, as to the significance of the two groups of chapters, which we bade him read, let us now ask him to read a third group. Let him now read Ezra and Nehemiah right through. He has there the doings of the returned exiles. Does he find, in them, one slightest reference to their carrying out some minute "programme" by Ezekiel? Do they construct the "wall," and the "porch," and the "stairs," and "the little chambers of the gate," and the "posts," and the "narrow windows," of the "house," as Ezekiel had rigorously prescribed them? Do they make the temple walls, "with cherubim and palm trees"; its altar of wood, "three cubits high, and two cubits long"; and its "two doors" with "two leaves"—all as Ezekiel prescribed? Do they attend to the "great altar" outside, with its "ordinances," its "set-tles," its "horns," its "seven days' offerings to purge it"? Such questions might be indefinitely multiplied. The returned exiles (taking their own inspired narratives as our guide) evince not the slightest homage for Ezekiel; they never mention his name, nor any of his numberless minutiae; they "know nothing" of him, as a pioneer and head, in a grand sacrificial revolution.

VI. It will put the copestone on this silent, and sustained, disregard by the people, if the inquirer, keeping his Ezekiel open, will notice how several of Ezekiel's fundamental requirements would have been utterly impossible of literal fulfillment, had the people attempted it. (a) How could they have discovered even the site of the new city? "In the visions of God brought He me into the land of Israel, and set me down upon a very high mountain." Not the slightest inkling, beyond this, is given. He would be

clever indeed who could deduce the site from it. Clearly, it could not be Zion. (b) And how could the dimensions of the city be made to fit Jerusalem? It was to be an exact square, each side 4590 reeds. This seems to represent 36 miles. Josephus tells us the circuit of Jerusalem, in his day, was 4 miles. (c) And how could they have offered the "holy oblation of land," in the midst (xlv. 1-3)? The city, and its suburbs, work out at about 40 miles by 8. (d) Whoever tried to divide the land (xlvii. 14-31; xlviii. 23-29) among the 12 tribes (for that was to be the reunited number) would have had to lift the Jordan, carry it eastward, and straighten it; to treat the Mediterranean somewhat similarly; and to perform other geographical feats, too many to mention. (e) Was the "profane place" (xlviii. 15-17), with its "measures," and with its "suburbs," each of which was to be "250 reeds" to north, south, east, and west, ever actualised? (f) Chap. xliii. 1-6 describes the Lord, coming from the east, and entering the house; "and the earth shined with His glory." Was this ever actualised? (g) Chap. xlvii. 1-12 describes waters issuing from under the threshold, and flowing eastward, till they became "waters to swim in." By no possibility, could the returned exiles have actualised that river. It may shadow "the fullness of the blessing of the Gospel"; yet it could have only an ideal flow. It is thus overwhelmingly clear that neither Ezekiel, nor the people, could possibly regard his vision, as a hard-and-fast catalogue of prescriptions and ceremonies, to be rigidly carried out, on their reëntering Canaan. And it may be pertinently asked, when every successive landmark of the vision is incapable of literal execution, when the site is ideal, when the city is ideal, when the house is ideal, when the divine glory is ideal, when the divisions of the land are ideal, when the river, flowing from the sanctuary, is ideal, with what consistency, or authority, can we strip off this ideal character from the sacrifices, which are represented as offered, in this ideal house, for this ideal

people, by this ideal prince? Ideality is stamped on the vision, from its first verse to its last.

VII. If it will not be called "slaying the slain," we may add, as a further exhibition of the naked rhapsody of the Ezekielianism of the Critics, some contradictions, in which it lands them. After insisting on the literalization of Ezekiel's Code, they speak (p. 60) of it as "corresponding completely," in every respect, with the Priestly Code, and treat any divergences of the one from the other as "too casual and insignificant" to be intentional. Let us see. (a) In Ezekiel's vision, there is no high-priest. Now, when they are off their guard (at a safe distance of 90 pages!), the Critics' estimate of the high-priest is the following: "The copestone of the sacred structure, reared by the legislation of the middle books of the Pentateuch, is the high-priest" (p. 148): "Only in him (the high-priest), at a single point, and in a single moment, has Israel immediate contact with Jehovah. The apex of the pyramid touches heaven" (p. 149). And yet, when it suits them, the omission of this "heaven-touching" and "copestone" functionary from a Code, is "too casual and insignificant" (p. 60) to trouble about! (b) Ezekiel mentions no day of atonement. Now, the following are the Critics' estimates (when they are off their guard, at a safe distance again!) of the incomparable importance of that day, according to the Priestly Code: "In a certain sense the great Day of Atonement is the culmination of the whole religious and sacrificial service" (p. 80). "In the Priestly Code, the great feast in the tenth of the seventh month has become the holiest day in all the year. . . . Unless a man has cut himself adrift from Judaism, he keeps this day, however indifferent he may be to all its other usages and feasts" (p. 112). And yet we are told (p. 60) that the absence of this "holiest" and "culmination" day, from the Code, is not worth dwelling on—it is "too casual and insignificant"! (3) There is no Pentecost with Ezekiel. What is the Critical estimate of this feast? "Easter then is the opening, as Pentecost is the closing, . . . of the seven weeks'

'joy of harvest' " (p. 87) ; it is one of those indispensable annual festivals "the occasions for which recur regularly with the seasons of the year" (p. 89) ; which "rest upon agriculture, the basis at once of life and religion" (p. 91). And yet the absence of Pentecost from a Code is "too casual and insignificant" a characteristic, to make any ado about ! It may thus be truly said that, if Ezekiel was the first to draw up a sacrificial ritual for the restored of Judah, then not only is it a ritual, which neither historian nor prophet, in their thanklessness, ever deigns to notice, but it is also a ritual, which is notably imperfect, regarding matters, so vital as to involve "the keystone of the sacred structure," "the culmination of the whole service," "the holiest ceremonies of all the year," and "the basis at once of life and of religion."

We part with the Ezekielianism of the Critics, by declaring that a more illogical, and unstable, house of cards was never reared.

Had space permitted, we should have liked to devote, say to "Daniel the Maccabee," and to "The Poly-Isaiahs," (as well as to some others), the same wholesome attention, as we have now given to "the Post-exilic Priestist," to "the Pseudo-Jeremiah," and to "Ezekiel the Sacrificial Pioneer." But these must wait for another occasion. Enough has been already said, we hope, to accomplish our immediate object which has been to make prominent the important fact that it is both possible and practicable for us ministers and teachers to teach the often sadly-puzzled members of our churches, that *they have in their own hands* the power of delivering themselves from the Higher Critic nightmare. We have not dealt with any subordinate outworks of the Critical position : we have been assailing its central citadels. And, on every page, we have shown the warrant for encouraging the inquirer (be he Sabbath-School teacher, or Bible Class member, or Scottish headmaster, or toiling artisan), to trust to his English Bible, and to his sanctified common sense, as armour sufficient, to prick the portentous

soap bubbles, wherewith "science," and "modern scholarship," would fain appall and overwhelm him. We have not made a single appeal to Church authority; we have not made a single call for a knowledge of the Greek and Hebrew tongues; we have merely counselled our inquirer to "gather a few smooth stones out of the brook"—to open his Bible, and read it with straightforwardness and care. It is the attempt to hoodwink the teachers, and through them, the whole of the rising generation, in Scotland, that has suggested the article; but the devices, which we expose, are as rampant on the west side of the Atlantic, as on the east. It were an aim, worthy of anyone's holy ambition, to unmask before a bewitched laity, and before a bewitched ministry, as well, the combination of sophistry and arrogance, of which the Higher Criticism is made up. It remains as true, as when Principal Story wrote it, "Dogmatic self-satisfaction is the badge of all their tribe." To overthrow them is easy enough: the difficulty is to pierce the serried hosts of their *pickets*, who keep jeering at old beliefs, and assuring a deluded public that these beliefs lie prostrate before up-to-date investigation. What a crafty and comprehensive picket the *Bibliography* was, beckoning every educationist in Scotland to Professor Driver "for a full knowledge of the Old Testament"! Well, the Critics are meantime having their little day: and, while it lasts, they may go on, browbeating the public, shouting their "assured results," and "spreading themselves like a green bay tree." But the truth of God can never die: He that sitteth in the heaven shall laugh: and great will be the fall of them.

St. Andrews, Scotland.

WILLIAM L. BAXTER

OBERLIN PERFECTIONISM

II. MAHAN'S TYPE OF TEACHING

We have given more space to the earliest presentation of the Oberlin doctrine of perfection than it intrinsically deserves. This, partly, because it was its first presentation; but more because, despite its brevity and the colloquial looseness of its language, it was in more than a temporal sense the forerunner of a whole group of others which shortly followed it. For nearly two years, it is true, it stood alone. Then, at the opening of 1839, *The Oberlin Evangelist* was founded to be, above everything else, the organ of the doctrine. And early in 1839 the book was published which has the best right of all to be considered the representative statement of the Oberlin doctrine at this stage of its development. This is Mahan's *Christian Perfection*.¹ The nucleus of this book was a sermon first preached in Oberlin and afterwards widely published and especially printed by request in *The New York Evangelist* (in November 1838).² The "series of discourses" of which it professes to be further made up were delivered in the Marlboro Chapel, Boston, where Mahan was supplying the pulpit dur-

¹ *Scripture Doctrine of Christian Perfection; with other Kindred Subjects, illustrated and confirmed in a series of discourses designed to throw light on the way of holiness*, 1839. We cite it always from the seventh edition, 1844, but the pagination of all editions after the first is the same.

² On this sermon, see D. L. Leonard, *The Story of Oberlin*, 1898. p. 253: "In September (1838) President Mahan gave his famous perfection address before the Oberlin Society of Inquiry, which was printed the next month in the [Ohio] *Observer* (published at Hudson) filling ten columns, and a month later still appeared in the first issue of *The Oberlin Evangelist* [January 1839], and about the same time also in the leading Eastern papers. The Hudson organ invited its readers to peruse the same and send on the results of their thinking. Which thing they did so abundantly that for a long period well-nigh every number is redolent of reviews and refutations." Hudson was the seat of the rival Western Reserve College.

ing the illness of the pastor.³ The book ran through many editions and enjoyed a very wide circulation.⁴ During the same year Henry Cowles' little booklet on *The Holiness of Christians in the Present Life* was reprinted "with some revision" from *The Oberlin Evangelist*; and in 1840 the much more considerable volume by Finney, entitled *Views of Sanctification* was reproduced from the same journal. A pamphlet by Charles Fitch, pastor of the Free Presbyterian Church at Newark, New Jersey, bearing the same title as Finney's volume—*Views of Sanctification*—preceded that volume by a year (1839). It deserves to be included in this group of writings, because, although its author was not connected with Oberlin, he teaches the same doctrine as the Oberlin writers; and although he does this perhaps more attractively than they do themselves, he does it obviously in immediate dependence on them.⁵ All this group of writings not only teach the same doctrine, but

³ Compare N. S. Folsom, "Review of Mahan on Christian Perfection," in *The Biblical Repository* for July 1839, p. 143.

⁴ The tenth edition was published in 1849. We have seen no later.

⁵ Fitch's pamphlet was occasioned by an inquiry into his teaching instituted by his Presbytery, which resulted in asking him to withdraw from its fellowship (cf. Leonard, as cited, p. 256). Along with it should be cited: "*An Appeal, together with a Brief Account of the Sentiments of Five Members of the Free Presbyterian Church of Newark, New Jersey, termed by their Opponents Modern Perfectionists*, Newark, 1840—although the perfectionism of the writers of this pamphlet is more of the New York variety. Fitch's pamphlet was answered by William R. Weeks: *A Letter to the Rev. Charles Fitch on his Views of Sanctification*, 1840; and it is supposed to be included (along with Mahan's and Finney's writings) in the basis of Leonard Wood's discussion, "The Doctrine of Perfection" in the January and April numbers for 1841 of *The Biblical Repository*. Fitch was the youngest son of Ebenezer Fitch, first President of Williams College, and there is a very brief notice of him in C. Durfee's *Williams' Biographical Annals*, 1871, p. 387. He was born in 1799; was graduated from Williams College in 1818; studied at Princeton Theological Seminary, 1818-1821. An outline of his life may be found in the *Princeton Biographical Catalogue*, 1909, p. 40. He appears to have been as extreme in his views on the Second Advent as in those on Sanctification.

teach it after the same fashion, employing common definitions, a common logical method, the same supporting Scriptures, expounded on the same principles and applied with the same argumentative peculiarities; there has clearly been the closest collusion between them. Each writer has an individuality of his own, of course, and shows it in his use of the common material. But this does not abate the essential oneness of their conception and mode of presentation. They all obviously come from one mint; and there seems good reason to believe that the dominant influence producing this uniformity was Mahan's. It is only fair to speak of this phase of Oberlin perfectionism, therefore, as the period of the ascendancy of Mahan's thought.

At this stage of its development, Oberlin perfectionism would not be inaptly described as Wesleyan perfectionism grafted on the stock of the New Divinity—Wesleyan perfectionism so far modified as to adjust it to the paradigms of the New Divinity. As the New Divinity was primarily an ethical scheme and Wesleyan perfectionism primarily a religious doctrine, this process might be not unjustly described as so far a process of "religionizing" the New Divinity. Mahan took the lead in this work. That was the significance of his rediscovery of the supernaturalness of salvation as already described; of his conjoint vision of Christ as the soul's all in all and of the Spirit who baptizes the soul with power; of his suspension of everything on the simple act of faith. This was no ephemeral enthusiasm with him. It was a profound spiritual revolution which reversed all the currents of his being and determined the course of his subsequent life. From this time to the end of his life, a half a century later, he knew nothing but the twin doctrines he acquired in this moving religious experience—the doctrines of Christian Perfection and the Baptism of the Spirit; and he gave himself to their exposition and propagation with an unwearied constancy which his readers may be tempted sometimes to think wearisome per-

sistency.⁶ He infected his colleagues with these doctrines; but they never took the place in their theology which they did in his. In the succeeding adjustments it became thus his function to emphasize the new doctrines to the utmost; it was the function of Finney, say, on the other hand, to see that in the engrafting of the new doctrines on the stock of the New Divinity the concepts of the New Divinity suffered no loss. This brings about a certain difference in tone—not exactly in teaching—between the two writers. Mahan's *Christian Perfection* and Finney's *Views of Sanctification* teach the same general doctrine, and they teach it with the same clearness of conviction. But in the one the main interest has shifted from the New Divinity to Perfectionism—though the concepts of the New Divinity are not abandoned; in the other it remains with the New Divinity—though the concepts brought in by Perfectionism are welcomed. Perhaps it would be too much to say that the emphasis differs: what differs is not so much the emphasis as the concernment, and that seems to be rooted less in a difference in the convictions than in the temperament of the two writers.

The perfectionism of this stage of Oberlin Perfectionism, as we have said, is fundamentally Wesleyan. It was not merely the "terms" which were retained from the Wesleyan doctrine, as Mahan tells us; but so far the thing.⁷ What

⁶ In his *Autobiography*, 1881, p. 321, he says that for the forty-six years preceding that date, the one theme of his life had been "the two great doctrines" of Christian Perfection and the Baptism of the Holy Ghost. This is only one of many such statements; and the fact asserted is absolutely true—the *Autobiography* itself, for example, shows him to have been simply possessed by these two ideas.

⁷ Mahan finds it possible, therefore, when speaking in general terms, to describe his doctrine in language derived from Wesley. When telling us in the opening discourse of his *Christian Perfection* what the thing is of which he is to speak he says: "It is, in the language of Mr. Wesley, 'in one view, purity of intention, dedicating all the life to God. It is the giving God all the heart; it is one desire and design ruling all our tempers. It is devoting, not a part, but all our soul, body and substance to God. In another view, it is all the mind that

was taught was the immediate attainment of entire sanctification by a special act of faith directed to this end. Justification was presupposed as already enjoyed. There were accordingly two kinds of Christians, a lower kind who had received only justification, and a higher kind who had received also sanctification. This is all Wesleyan, although, of course, it is not all that is Wesleyan.⁸ When this doctrine was transferred into a New Divinity setting, the primary effort was to adjust to the new setting the conception of the content of the perfection thus attained. The New Divinity was a Pelagian scheme; a scheme of ethics; it was therefore essentially legalistic and could not conceive of perfection otherwise than as perfect obedience to law—the law of God. It could not homologate therefore the Wesleyan idea of an “evangelical obedience,” graciously accepted of believers in lieu of the “legal obedience” they were not in a position to render. Of anything else, as constituting perfection, than complete obedience to the law of God, the Oberlin men would hear nothing. But they had their own way of reaching the same relaxing result

was in Christ Jesus, enabling us to walk as He walked. It is a circumcision of the heart from all filthiness, from all inward, as well as outward, pollution. It is the renewal of the heart in the whole image of God, the full likeness of Him that created it. In yet another, it is loving God with all our heart, and our neighbor as ourselves.” This is the loose language of metaphor: but it indicates a conscious as well as real connection with Wesley.

⁸ Despite the dependence of the Oberlin doctrine of Perfection on the Wesleyans, the remarks of S. B. Canfield, *An Exposition of the Peculiarities and Tendencies of Oberlin Perfectionism*, 1840, p. 83, are perfectly just: —“The Wesleyan doctrine of ‘Christian Perfection’ is not only different in itself from the Oberlin theory, but held in connection with different views of native depravity—of the heart—of moral agency—of the nature of sanctification. . . . Those Methodists who have been at the pains to analyze the Oberlin system regard it as differing very widely from their own. A writer in *The Christian Advocate and Journal* of June 19, (1840) after making various strictures on the Oberlin theory, says: ‘It is not the Arminian theory. It is Pelagian Perfectionism, and the truth will suffer loss if we permit the public to be misled by the supposition that their theory and ours is the same.’”

which the Wesleyans had reached. They defined the content of the law, obedience to which constitutes perfection, as just "love"; and although this language meant with them something different from what it meant with the Wesleyans, it is not clear that they were able to give it any greater ethical content. Supposing them successful, however, in pouring into the concept of love, objectively, the whole content of righteousness ideally viewed, they did not in any case require this content for the love by which a man is made perfect. To be perfect, he does not require to love as God loves—in whose love all righteousness is embraced—or as the angels love, or as Adam loved, or even as any better man than he loves. He only requires to love as he himself, being what he is, and in the condition in which he finds himself, can love. If he loves all he can love in his present condition, he is perfect. No matter how he came into his present condition; suppose if you will that he came into it by a long course of vice, or by some supreme act of vice, it makes no difference. His obligation is limited by his ability; we cannot say, he ought to do more than he can do; if he does all he can do, he has no further obligation, he is perfect. The moral idiot—Finney does not hesitate to say it—is as perfect as God is: being a moral idiot, he has no moral obligation; when he has done nothing at all he has done all that he ought to do: he is perfect.⁹ God Himself cannot do more than all He ought

⁹ In a long note, pp. 12ff of his *Lectures on Systematic Theology*, Finney notes some grave objections which had been brought against his doctrine; among others this one,—that "the more ignorant and debilitated a person is, the less the law would require of him"; so that he could extinguish his obligation by committing violence upon himself, and through his wickedness become perfectly holy—that is completely observant of all that is required of him. This assault does not lead Finney in any way to modify his doctrine; and indeed he could not modify it, seeing that it is a mere corollary of his fundamental doctrine of moral accountability. "God so completely levels his claims to the present capacity of every human being, however young or old, however maimed, debilitated, or idiotic," he reiterates, "as, to use the language or sentiment of Prof. Hickok, of Auburn Seminary,

to do; and when He has done all He ought to do, He is no more perfect than the moral idiot is—although what He has done is to fulfill all that is ideally righteous and the moral idiot has done nothing.

In this conception the law of God, complete obedience to which is perfection, is made a sliding scale.¹⁰ It is not that

uttered in my hearing, that 'if it were possible to create a *moral pigmy*, the law requires of him nothing more than to use whatever of strength he has, in the service and for the glory of God.'” It is quite clear that Finney is entangled here in some ambiguities. He very properly distinguishes between a fault and the effects of a fault. But there is a further ambiguity latent in the conception of “demoralization,” which leads him astray. He treats the term as implying that “to demoralize” is to make *unmoral*, not *immoral*: and so supposes that we cease to be moral agents in proportion as we become wicked. The source of his difficulty lies in his doctrine of “natural ability,” which leads him to scale down obligation to fit decreasing ability. “If a man should annihilate himself,” he asks, “would not he thereby set aside his moral obligation to obey God? Should he make himself an idiot would he not thereby *annihilate his moral agency*?” “The truth is,” he answers himself, “that for the time being, a man may destroy his moral agency by rendering himself a lunatic or an idiot; and while this lunacy or idiocy continues, obedience to God is naturally impossible, and therefore not required.” A moral agent cannot annihilate himself; neither can he annihilate his moral agency. He exists everlastingly and so long as he exists he is a moral agent, possessing a moral character and acting in accordance with it. If his moral character is bad, it inhibits good action, but does not in the least lessen obligation to it. If the wickedness becomes absolute the inhibition to good action becomes absolute; but the obligation to good remains absolute also. When J. L. Wilson said in the course of Lyman Beecher’s trial that “moral obligation does not require any ability whatever,” the phraseology may be open to objection, but the thing intended is true. The fact is that Finney and his fellows did not believe in moral agents; they believed in moral volitions.

¹⁰ George Duffield (Finney, *Systematic Theology*, p. 979) tellingly arraigns Finney’s teaching “that moral law requires nothing more than honesty of intention,” and “that sincerity or honesty of intention is moral perfection” (so Finney explicitly, pp. 138, 295). “By this rule,” says Duffield, Finney’s teaching “graduates the claims of the law of God, so as to make it a most convenient sliding scale, which adapts itself to the ignorance and weakness of men. It unduly perverts men’s notions of that high and absolute perfection which the law demands, and makes moral perfection a variant quantity, changing continually, not only in different persons but in the same individual.

perfect rule, which as the Greeks say, like a straight-edge, straight itself, measures both the straight and the crooked; but a flexible line which follows the inequalities of the surface on which it is laid, not molding it, but molded by it. Obligation here is interpreted in terms of ability with the result that each man becomes a law to himself, creating his own law; while the objective law of God, the standard of holiness in all, is annulled, and there are as many laws, as many standards of holiness, as there are moral beings. To object on this basis to the Wesleyan doctrine of "evangelical obedience" on the ground that it supposes a relaxation of the universal obligation of the law, is fatuous. There is no such thing as a universal obligation of the law to be relaxed; or indeed as a universal law, binding on all alike, to create a universal obligation. Each man's obligation is exhausted in the law which his own ability creates for him; and as soon as the Wesleyans remind us that in their view "evangelical obedience" is accepted primarily because it alone is within the capacity of men to render—"legal obedience" being beyond their power—the Oberlin objector is dumb; that is just his own doctrine. Except for this—that, not content with this general adjustment of the requirements of the law to the moral capacity of sinful men, he pushes the principle to such an extreme as to adjust them in detail to the moral capacity of each individual sinner, all the way down to moral idiocy; with the effect of making our sin the excuse for our sin, until we may cease to be sinners altogether by simply becoming sinful enough. Of course he does not really believe this. If he had really believed it, we should not have found Finney troubling to

It reasons as follows, namely: Moral law respects intention only. Honesty of intention, or sincerity, is moral perfection. But light, or knowledge of the ultimate end, is the condition of moral obligation. Consequently the degree of obligation must equal the mind's honest estimate of the value of the end. Thus, to love God with all the heart, soul, mind, and strength, means nothing more than 'that the thoughts shall be expended in exact accordance with the mind's honest judgment of what is at every moment the best economy for God.'

argue—as we have found him arguing¹¹— that the ingrained habit of evil need not inhibit the attainment of perfection—that would be a matter of course; or that men may become so wicked that they cannot be saved—that would be absurd. He would only have needed to point out that the acquisition of unconquerable habits of evil, by progressively destroying obligation, renders perfection ever easier of acquisition by constantly reducing the content of the perfection to be acquired; and that one of the surest roads to salvation is therefore to become incurably wicked.

One of the most striking features of these earlier presentations of the Oberlin doctrine—though not of them only—is the strenuousness with which they insist that they are not arguing for the “actual attainment” of “entire sanctification,” “perfection,” but only for its “attainability.” An unpleasant impression is sometimes produced that an attempt is being made to escape from the real question at issue by a logical trick. The contention made this impression on its New England critics, and called out from them, from that point of view, somewhat sharp words of rebuke. Nobody, they say, doubts the attainability of perfection; the only question in dispute is whether it is ever attained. We have already seen this position taken up by Enoch Pond in criticising Finney’s *Lectures to Professing Christians*. “The question between us,” he says,¹² “is simply one of *fact*. The Perfectionist asserts, not only that Christians *ought* to be perfect in the present life, but that they *are* so;—not only that perfection is metaphysically attainable, but that, in frequent instances, it is *actually attained*.” N. S. Folsom, in reviewing Mahan’s *Christian Perfection* goes so far as to express a sense of outrage at the impression, created by his mode of stating the question, that none but the Oberlin men believe in “the attainableness of entire sanctification in this life.” This doctrine, he asserts, is, on the contrary, admitted on all hands. The editor

¹¹ *Lectures to Professing Christians*, p. 313.

¹² *The Biblical Repository*, January 1839, p. 47.

of the *New York Evangelist* in remarking on Mahan's primary perfectionist sermon, when it was first printed in that journal, allows it; Enoch Pond has just expressed his agreement with it. At the basis of every exhortation to be holy, lies "the metaphysical truth that perfection in holiness is attainable." To give the impression that anybody doubts this, is not to argue fairly; it is to play the sophist.¹³ Leonard Woods, in his comprehensive discussion of the Oberlin arguments up to the date of his writing, echoes this protest.¹⁴ He and his friends, he declares, hold as decidedly as Mahan does—he takes Mahan as his example—"that, in the common acceptation of the term, complete holiness is *attainable* in the present life." "When we assert that a thing is *attainable*, or *may* be attained," he explains, "our meaning is, that a proper use of means will secure it; that we shall obtain it if we do as we ought; and that if we fail of acquiring it, truth will require us to say that we *might* have obtained it, and that our failure was owing altogether to our own fault. There surely is not included in the assertion of the attainableness of anything the assertion that we have done all we ought and therefore have actually attained it; attainability and actual attainment are different things and the proof of the one has no tendency to prove the other." Whatever was the purpose of the Oberlin men, then, in their insistence that they were contending not for the actual attainment but only for the attainability of perfection, it actually had the controversial value to them that it threw their New England opponents into confusion.

The ultimate ground of this confusion cannot, however, be laid at the door of the manner in which the Oberlin men preferred to frame their argument. It lay in the ambiguities of the New England doctrine of "natural ability." Accordingly W. D. Snodgrass¹⁵ very properly criticizes Woods' use of language in representing perfection as "at-

¹³ *Ibid*, July 1839, p. 144.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, January 1841, pp. 174ff.

¹⁵ *The Scripture Doctrine of Sanctification*, 1841, pp. 30ff.

tainable," only never "attained." This language is founded on the current New England distinction between "natural" and "moral" ability; and is intended to assert that we are commanded to be perfect, that full provision for our perfection is made, that it is our duty to be perfect, and that there is no reason why we are not perfect except that we will not strive to be perfect with the energy requisite to attain it. This is supposed to be justly expressed by saying that perfection is attainable, but will never actually be attained. Perhaps the words may bear that sense. It is not their natural sense. Snodgrass very justly says that to say that perfection is attainable is just to say that it is practicable for us to be perfect; and yet those who employ this language fully recognize that it is not practicable for us to be perfect. Say that nothing but a "will not" stands in the way. This "will not" is a fixed, an unvarying, incorrigible will not. It is really a "can not"; and a perfection to which we cannot attain is not an attainable perfection. He might have added that Woods himself knew perfectly well that the "will not" affirmed in the case is really a "can not."¹⁶ If he denies a "natural inability," he confesses a "moral inability," an inability which "results from moral causes"; and he is unable to deny that this is a real inability.¹⁷ God, he

¹⁶ *Biblical Repository*, October 1840, pp. 474ff.

¹⁷ The situation among the parties dividing theological thought in New England is vividly brought before us in a letter of Lyman Beecher's to N. W. Taylor of April 25, 1835, printed in Beecher's *Autobiography* (Vol. II, p. 344). The New Divinity represented by Beecher and Taylor (as by Finney and Mahan) denied all inability, and all "physical" operation of God, and confined the divine operation in man to suasion: the older school (Woods, Tyler, Nettleton) drew back and in one way or another affirmed these things. Beecher declares that what lay "at the foundation of revolt in Woods, Tyler and Nettleton" was "the doctrine of a physical operation of God's decrees, and of physical regeneration—in short of moral government by direct omnipotence." This, he says, tends to go back to the "natural inability of the Old Calvinism in the Emmons and Burton form." On the other hand he deprecates preaching free-agency in a form which "avails to save by its own actual sufficiency, without the Holy Ghost." The Holy Ghost is to be necessary but is permitted to act only sua-

himself says, with the emphasis of italics, "*cannot* lie"; "the unrenewed sinner *cannot* call forth the affection of love to God, and so be subject to His law." Assuredly he is right, then, in saying that there is an important sense in which men "cannot obey" God; and if he contends at the same time that there is also an important sense in which they *can* obey God, we will not fail to observe that he is compelled to allow that their moral inability to obey "prevents obedience as certainly and as effectively as a natural impossibility could." In these circumstances it would seem to be eminently misleading to speak of things as attainable, on the ground of "natural ability," the attainment of which is inhibited by "moral inability."

Let us remind ourselves moreover that the matters which fall under discussion here are of the order of what the Bible calls "things of the Spirit," things which are not to be had at all except as imparted by the Holy Ghost; and that it is therefore peculiarly infelicitous to speak of them as "attainable," merely on the ground of "natural ability." In so speaking of them, we seem gravely in danger of forgetting the dreadful evil of sin as the corruption of our whole nature, and the absolute need of the Spirit's free action in recovering us from this corruption. The unregenerate man cannot believe; the regenerate man cannot be perfect; because these things are not the proper product of their efforts in any case but are conferred by the Spirit, and by the Spirit alone. It is good to see Mahan in some degree recognizing this fundamental fact; and indeed founding one branch of his argument upon it. It is not enough, however, to say that perfection is attainable only "through the Spirit." Mahan says that, and then goes on to give it the Pelagianizing turn that the believer nevertheless "at-

sively, inducing men to save themselves by a free agency quite capable of doing all the saving, if only it can be persuaded to do it. Man is naughty and requires correction—not reconstruction of nature, but correction of manners; he is perfectly able to behave properly if he will; it is inducements alone that he needs. This in a nutshell is the whole New Divinity System.

tains" perfection, by employing the Spirit to do this work for him. The Scriptures do not thus subordinate the Spirit's action to that of man; they do not think of the gifts of the Spirit as "attained," but as "conferred." Snodgrass is incapable of such a *bêtise* and rightly emphasizes the supernatural nature of sanctification, as of regeneration, and of salvation at large. We do not sanctify ourselves by our own power; we do not even sanctify ourselves by using the Spirit as the instrument by which alone we can accomplish this great result. It is God who sanctifies us; and our activities are consequent at every step on His, not His on ours. Though he fails to rise to the height of the Scriptural supernaturalness of sanctification, however, Mahan's reference of it to the Holy Spirit, acting at the behest of man, nevertheless recognizes the supernaturalness of the actual process of the sanctifying work; and enables us to see what he and (so far as they shared his views) his colleagues meant when they spoke of the attainableness of perfection. They were not thinking in terms of "natural ability"; they were prepared to assert that the so-called "natural ability" of the New England divines is no ability at all. They were not arguing for a "metaphysical attainability" of perfection; they were talking religion, not metaphysics. They were clear, to be sure, that any perfection which should ever be achieved by any man must be achieved through his "natural ability," that is to say through the action of those powers which belong to him as a moral being and are inseparable from him as a moral agent; but they were equally clear that no man of himself would ever employ those powers with the energy, and diligence and singleness of purpose requisite to reach the high goal of perfection, and that therefore actual perfection is the product of the Spirit of God. They had no interest in affirming and arguing the "attainability" of perfection in the sense in which their New England critics took the phrase. They were as free as those critics were to declare that that "attainability" did not infer attainment, and was a barren notion unillustrated

by a single case of attainment under it. What they were interested in affirming was that God in His grace had made provision in the Gospel of His Son and the baptism of the Spirit to transmute that natural "will not" which, despite the so-called "natural ability" results in every child of man in a real "can not," into a glorious "can." What they were concerned to assert was a real practicable "attainability" due to the provisions of God's grace which placed within the reach of every believer at his option an actualized perfection. And the establishment of this attainability rightly seemed to them a much greater fact than the establishment of the actual attainment of perfection by these or those. They did not fail to assert this actual attainment of perfection. Perhaps the establishment of the attainability of perfection would have been difficult had there been no "samples" to adduce. But they sought to keep the evidence for actual attainment in the subordinate position of an additional argument for its attainability. If it has been actually attained, it will be hard to deny that it is attainable.

There is a noticeable difference among the several Oberlin writers in the relative interest they show in the different elements which enter into their common teaching. Finney, to whom the New Divinity was the Gospel, dwelt proportionately more fully on the conception of "natural ability," which constituted the basis on which any and all holiness must be built. Mahan, who had come to see the Gospel in the supernaturalness of salvation, naturally threw the stress of his discussion on it. Henry Cowles writes with such brevity as to discourage seeking to ascertain the niceties of his particular way of looking at the common doctrine. It is perhaps enough to note that he states it with some sharpness of outline. The vital question to which he addresses himself, he declares to be, not "whether any man on earth has ever attained absolute and confirmed perfection," but "has God given us such moral powers and made such provisions in Providence and Grace for our aid, that real death to sin, victory over the world, and living by faith

in constant obedience to all the known will of God, are objects of rational effort, the duty and privilege of Christians."¹⁸ There are many loose ends left in this statement and the matter is not bettered when a little later,¹⁹ repeating it, he proceeds to reduce the notion of perfection which he is ready to affirm to be attainable. It is no heavenly perfection, but an earthly one, including "such service and obedience as man is able to render in his present state." On this purely relative holiness he lays the greatest stress, and brings his discussion to a close, accordingly, by remarking that his object in writing is to express his full conviction that "God has made provision for the attainment in this life of all the holiness which the present state admits of." That says so little that it practically says nothing at all. God has only made provision for the attainment of this holiness: He does not secure its attainment—that is left to us. And the holiness attainable is only what "the present state admits of." That might be said of the devils in hell. The only point of interest is, not whether we may attain "all the holiness our present state admits of"—that might be no holiness at all. It is whether we may be *holy*.

To these propositions little more than hinted at by Cowles, Finney gives the definiteness of dogmatic statement. When he comes, in his *Views of Sanctification*, to the point where he discusses the attainableness of "entire sanctification,"²⁰ he lays down the fundamental proposition "that entire and permanent sanctification is attainable in this life." This he at once pronounces "self-evident"—on the ground of "natural ability." "To deny this," he affirms, "is to deny that a man is able to do as well as he can." And, he declares, "the language of the law" bears out the assertion, because, in requiring us to love the Lord our God with all *our* heart, and the rest, it levels "its claims to the capacity of the subject, however great or small." If

¹⁸ *Holiness of Christians*, 1840, p. 8.

¹⁹ P. 14ff.

²⁰ Pp. 59ff.

there were a moral pigmy, he would be required to love God up to his pigmy strength. If we morally mutilate ourselves, we may no doubt be answerable for doing it; but having thus reduced our powers, we would have lessened our responsibility to the law, and could be entirely sanctified on this lower ground. "An angel is bound to exercise an angel's strength; a man the strength of a man; and a child the strength of a child." "Now," he sums up, "as entire sanctification consists in perfect obedience to the law of God; and as the law requires nothing more than the right use of whatever strength we have; it is of course forever settled that a state of entire and permanent sanctification is attainable in this life on the ground of natural ability." This he says is New School doctrine and necessary New School doctrine. Ability limits obligation, hence there is no obligation where there is no ability—hence (it is but an identical proposition) it is possible for every man to do all that is required of him (not all that may be required of another man); and that is to be perfect. After all this exploitation of "natural ability," however, Finney turns and says that we have on this line of reasoning arrived at only an abstract possibility. Whether this abstract possibility is ever realized in fact, must be the subject of further inquiry. A second proposition is therefore laid down.²¹ It is this: "The provisions of grace are such as to render the actual attainment of entire and permanent sanctification the object of reasonable pursuit." This proposition he transmutes into the question, "Is this state attainable as a matter of fact before death; and if so, when in this life may we expect to attain it?"—and submits the inquiry to the arbitrament of the Scriptures. Thus even Finney suspends the actual attainment of entire sanctification on grace, not nature; and seeks the evidence for it therefore in Scripture.

The vigor with which the Oberlin men asserted that they were primarily interested in the attainability, not in the actual attainment, of perfection, not only led to misunder-

²¹ P. 61.

standing, but sometimes, it must be acknowledged, has an odd appearance in itself. To the man in the street the affirmation of the attainability of perfection seems to derive all its value from the promise it holds out for its actual attainment. And it is very clear that the Oberlin men were not contending for the barren attainability of the New Divinity, unillustrated by examples of attainment and indeed incapable of being so illustrated. Theirs is an attainability, they said, which can be realized in fact; and which, they affirmed, had been, is, and will be realized in numerous cases in fact. What they affirmed was, not that we must posit merely an inoperative attainability in order to ground accountability for the universal non-attainment of perfection; but that we must assert an operative attainability which realizes itself constantly in attainment. They have advanced here beyond the New Divinity; and they have it chiefly at heart to validate their difference from it, which becomes the main matter at issue precisely because it carries with it the affirmation of attainment as its corollary. The Oberlin men thought themselves to have laid their hands on a factor in the problem, which, as they said, had been neglected by the New Divinity, and which, in their view, transformed the barren "attainability" which served no other purpose than to ground accountability, into an operative "attainability" of possible and ready accomplishment.

This new factor was nothing less than the factor of grace. The New Divinity, they said, operated with "natural ability" only; and, as obligation is, as it taught, limited by ability, was bound to affirm that the perfection required of man is "attainable" by him; otherwise he would not be obligated by it, and would be perfect, that is, all that he could be required to be, without it. But this "attainability" is only the postulate of accountability and affirms only that man could be perfect if he would, leaving the undoubted fact that he will not untouched,—and in strict logic this will not ought to be expressed in terms of can not. In

point of fact, man, standing in the conditions in which he finds himself, with an ingrained disposition to evil governing his conduct, can not be perfect, despite all the underlying "natural ability" to be perfect which can be ascribed to him. You may prefer to say that this "cannot" is only a "certainly will not," but this choice of soft words to express it does not alter the hard fact.

Now, the Oberlin men were altogether willing to say that *this* attainability never passes into attainment. This was not the attainability for which they were contending and which they looked upon as the issue at stake. Mahan says plainly enough, one would think,²² that "our natural ability may exist in all its fulness, with the absolute certainty that no attainment in holiness will be made." "This is a fact," he adds, "true of all fallen spirits, and of all mankind, in the absence of the influence of the grace of the gospel." There is, he says, another kind of "attainability," however, over and above that grounded in "natural ability," and that is what they are contending for, and the appearance of logomachy given to their reasoning by their opponents rests on neglect to note this fact. They are contending for a real, concrete, and not merely a theoretical, abstract attainability; not common to all men, but peculiar to those under "the influence of the gospel." The opponents of the Oberlin teaching have uniformly assumed that there were but two parts to the question brought into debate. Is perfect holiness attainable? Is it actually attained? As both parties agreed in an affirmative answer to the first question, they declared the only issue concerned the second. Stop, said the Oberlin men; the first question is ambiguous and hides in it two separate ones, on one of which we are agreed and on the other not. And the question hidden in it, on which we are not agreed, is the crux of the whole matter. What do you mean by saying that perfect holiness is attainable? Do you mean that we have "natural ability" to obtain it if we will—though most certainly we will not? Or do

²² *Biblical Repository*, Oct. 1840, p. 410.

you mean that perfection has now in the gospel been brought by the grace of God within our practicable reach, and relying on that grace we may in the power of Christ through His Spirit actually attain it? There are in point of fact, says Mahan at this place,²³ three, not two questions raised: "(1) What is the natural ability of man? or, have men natural ability to yield perfect obedience to the command of God? . . . (2) Are we authorized, in view of the provisions and promises of divine grace, together with the other teachings of inspiration, to expect to attain to a state of perfect holiness in this life? (3) Do the Scriptures teach us that any *have attained*, or *will attain* to a state of entire sanctification in this life?" The opponents of the Oberlin doctrine, he now adds, overlook entirely the second question, "in respect to which we are at issue."

It is precisely on this second question, however, that the Oberlin men lay the whole stress of the argument, says Mahan. "Everything is said as a means to one end—the determination of the great question: To what degree of holiness do the Scriptures authorize us to *expect* to attain in this life? That which is practicable to us on the ground of natural ability is in one sense attainable. That which is rendered practicable, not on the ground of natural ability, but by the provisions of divine grace, is attainable in a different and higher sense of the term. It is in the last sense that the term is used by me." The reaction here from the Pelagianizing conceptions which ruled the New Divinity we have already called attention to, but it is good to dwell on it. An appeal is made from nature to grace.²⁴ An at-

²³ P. 410.

²⁴ Leonard Woods, *The Biblical Repository*, January 1841, p. 140, says: "I am glad to see, that, as Mr. Mahan has come to entertain more exalted views of the gracious provisions of the gospel for the sanctification of believers, he has ceased to give such prominence, as he formerly did, to the ability, or free will, of man, and has expressly renounced it, as furnishing any ground of hope for sinners or any spring of holiness to Christians, and has been brought to rely wholly on the grace of Christ, and to look to Him, for the whole of salva-

tempt is made to ground a doctrine of perfection in the great fact that grace overcomes the disabilities of nature, and to point to the sufficiency in Christ for what "natural ability" cannot do. Thus the debate is carried away from the natural powers of men, to the provisions of the gospel, and becomes at once a purely Biblical one. Do the Scriptures represent God in Christ as providing for the immediate sanctification of his people? That becomes the sole question of real interest, and as such the Oberlin men treat it. It would be inexplicable, of course, if such provision has been made, that it should be illustrated by no single example. It becomes important therefore to show that there have been, are and will be perfect saints in this world. But this takes the secondary place of illustration and verification.²⁵ The main matter remains the witness of Scripture

tion." There is overstatement here. Mahan renounced human free will only as the *immediate* ground of hope and source of holiness in the Christian. He retained it as the *ultimate* ground of our hope and source of our holiness; for he suspended the action of the Spirit on our faith, not our faith on the action of the Spirit. He remained fundamentally therefore Pelagian.

²⁵ They betray a tendency indeed to underestimate its importance. They do, it is true, argue at length that many have been perfect—Paul, John, Isaiah, and perhaps, on the basis of Rev. xiv. 4, 5, 144,000 and certainly an indefinite number of souls of the Old and New Covenants (Mahan, *Christian Perfection*, pp. 37ff.; Finney, *Systematic Theology*, 1851, ch. 61). But Mahan explains that the Oberlin people did not concern themselves so much with "mere personal attainments" (the "mere" should be noted) as with the "revealed privileges of the Sons of God." "The question of what attainment we have made," he explains (*Out of Darkness into Light*, p. 360) "lies wholly between our consciences and our God. The question, what are our revealed privileges, is to be settled not by an appeal to the conscious, or visible attainments of any individuals, but wholly and exclusively by reference to the Law and the Testimony." Though arguing that many had been wholly sanctified, Finney did not in 1837 (*Lectures to Professing Christians*, p. 358) claim to be himself wholly sanctified: "I do not myself now profess to have attained perfect sanctification." In 1840 (*Views of Sanctification*, p. 9) he even seems to deprecate anyone making such a profession, though apparently only on the ground that such a profession would be sure to be misunderstood. "Nothing is more clear than that in the present vague unsettled views of the church

to the gracious purpose of God. And the whole matter being thus referred to the Scriptures, the Oberlin men adduce the provisions made in the Gospel for the attainment of perfection, the promises of perfection given to Christians, the commands to them to be perfect, the prayers for their perfection which are recorded, and the like,—a very impressive showing, which beyond question proves what Mahan, indeed, declares it is solely intended to prove,—that Christians are to seek after perfection “with the expectation of obtaining it.” The mistake that Mahan makes lies in his supposing that this means that perfection may be attained by any Christian, at any time, all at once; that it lies at the disposal of Christians, to be had for the taking; and not rather that it may be and is attainable only through so long a curriculum of preparation that a lifetime may well be none too long for its accomplishment. We are to seek it with the expectation of attaining it; he that seeks it will certainly find it; but the attainment is a great task—and it delays its coming. The attainment of perfection in other words, is not an act but a work: and this is the real point of difference between the parties to the debate—whether the perfection which is provided for, promised, commanded, urged to, is a gift received all at once, or an attainment acquired through a long-continued effort. That it is supernatural, not natural, in its origin and nature was a great discovery for the Oberlin men to make in the Pelagianizing atmosphere in which they were immersed. But its supernatural origin and nature do not in the least prejudice the question whether it comes all at once or only as the final crown of a life of “working out our salvation in fear and trembling.” We are brought here, however, to perceive the important part played in the early Oberlin scheme by

upon this question, no individual could set up a claim to having attained this state without being a stumbling block to the church.” In a later section he says that he would be in danger of being a stumbling block to himself. Is perfection then a gift both difficult to verify and perilous to possess?

the doctrines of "Sanctification by faith," and the "Baptism of the Holy Ghost."

It appears that the whole body of the Oberlin teachers of perfection were entirely at one, from the start, in declaring that sanctification is by faith. Time was required, however, to bring them into even measurable harmony in their conceptions of how faith brings about this sanctification which is to be had only "by" it. Finney himself seems inclined at first to represent faith as the immediate producing cause of sanctification. No doubt his fundamentally Pelagian type of thinking was peculiarly embarrassing to him when he came to deal with a thing like faith, which, in its very nature, looks outward from self and seeks something from another. Even in his early teaching faith is the indispensable condition, he would say, of the "reception of Christ," "the eternal life," "the holiness of the soul." But at this early stage of his teaching this language seems merely the repetition of a shibboleth. There seems no particular reason why "Christ" should be "received," and certainly no reason why "the holiness of the soul" should wait for His "reception." For faith, according to Finney, is itself a holy exercise, both in kind and degree all the confidence of the heart, working by love, that God does or can require. That is to say, like all other holy exercises, it is a perfectly holy exercise; and, as there is nothing about us, morally considered, but our exercises, in exercising faith we are perfectly holy. We are already therefore perfectly holy before Christ is received, who is nevertheless designated "the holiness of the soul." And as S. B. Canfield²⁶ pertinently asks, if we may previously to the reception of "the holiness of the soul," put forth one holy exercise, and that one perfectly holy, why may we not put forth two, or three, or ten thousand? If we may enter into perfection without Christ, why may we not abide in it without Christ? The fact seems to be that Finney's fundamentally Pelagian mode of

²⁶ *An Exposition of the Peculiarities, Difficulties and Tendencies of Oberlin Perfectionism*, p. 45.

thinking, already run to seed in his doctrine of "the simplicity of moral action,"—the origin of which it is customary (apparently erroneously) to date in 1841,—has betrayed him here into a conception of man which makes him sufficient for himself, and leaves no need for either Christ or the Holy Spirit to make him perfect. The doctrines of Christ and the Holy Spirit appear thus as only ornamental superstructures to the system. How he employs them as such may be illustrated by a remark like this: "Faith would instantly sanctify your heart, sanctify all your doings and render them, in Christ Jesus, acceptable to God."²⁷ What is the effect of the insertion of the words "in Christ Jesus?" If our heart and all our doings are already sanctified, are they not already acceptable to God? "They are," remarks Canfield,²⁸ "by his supposition as free from moral defilement as Christ's own doings." Since faith "instantly" sanctifies our heart and all our doings, *ex opere operato*, what place is left for the sanctifying Christ? The instantaneousness of the sanctifying action of faith, is much insisted on and should not be passed by unmarked.²⁹ If you will only believe, says Finney, "this will at once bring you into entire sanctification."³⁰ The exercise of faith is manifested holiness; holiness is not a subsequent result flowing from faith—it and faith are the same thing. "Let it be distinctly noted, then," Canfield comments,³¹ "that accord-

²⁷ Quoted by Canfield from *The Oberlin Evangelist*, Vol. I, p. 19. This seems to carry the notion back to 1839.

²⁸ P. 45.

²⁹ In *Views of Sanctification*, 1840, pp. 168f, Finney says: "Full faith in the word and promises of God naturally and certainly and immediately, produces a state of entire sanctification." "This result is instantaneous on the exercise of faith and in this sense sanctification is an instantaneous work." "The sense in which I use the term sanctification," he says in this context, "includes all that is implied in perfect obedience to the law of God." Immediately on exercising faith we have kept the whole law of God.

³⁰ Cf. also *The Oberlin Evangelist*, vol. II, p. 57, referred to by Canfield.

³¹ P. 47.

ing to the principles of 'Oberlin Perfectionism,' entire sanctification is conditioned on previous perfection. To *become* sinlessly perfect, you must go to the Saviour already perfect." It cannot even be said that, though we make ourselves perfect, we must depend on Christ to keep us perfect. He does not, according to "Oberlin Perfectionism," keep us perfect—we may fall. And if we continue perfect that is because we preserve our faith: permanent entire sanctification is conditioned on permanent faith, just as simple entire sanctification is conditioned on simple faith. We must keep ourselves perfect as a condition of Christ's keeping us perfect. "Permanent entire sanctification is conditioned (according to this view) *on itself*! You shall be perfect as long as you shall continue to be perfect."³²

Approaching the subject in another passage from a different angle—in the midst of a long description (there are thirty-five numbered affirmations) of what entire sanctification is not³³—Finney tells us that "entire sanctification does not imply the same degree of faith" in everybody. It does not, for example, imply the same degree of faith in us, sinners, "that might have been exercised but for our ignorance and past sin." It requires a lower degree of faith to make a sinner perfectly holy than is required to make a saint perfectly holy: and the worse sinners we are the lower is the degree of faith that is required to make us perfectly holy. It does not resolve this paradox to observe that Finney is obviously confusing here the degree of faith exercised, and the amount of knowledge which is possessed of the object on which faith rests. What he really means to say, however, is that the less knowledge we have of God and divine things, the less faith is required of us that we may be perfect. The proposition on which he relies for support runs: "We cannot believe anything about God of which we have no knowledge," and therefore, "entire sanctification implies nothing more than the heart's faith and

³² Canfield, p. 48.

³³ *Views of Sanctification*, p. 29.

confidence in all the truth that is perceived by the intellect." The deflecting influence here is derived from his doctrine that as obligation is limited by ability, he who does all he can (being what he is) is as perfect as God Himself. On this ground he declares that: "Perfection in a heathen would imply much less faith than in a Christian. Perfection in an adult would imply much more and greater faith than in an infant. And perfection in an angel would imply much greater faith than in a man, just in proportion that he knows more of God than man." Our attention is attracted for the moment by the suggestion that Perfection is conceivable in a heathen. This is not a slip. Finney fully means it. "The heathen," he explains, "are not under obligation to believe in Christ and thousands of other things of which they have no knowledge." Not being under obligation to believe in Christ, of course they can be perfect without believing in Him. If they have "heart's faith or confidence in all the truth that is perceived by their intellect," they will not be kept from being perfect by lack of faith in Christ of whom they have no knowledge. Perfection clearly is not conceived as the product of Christ in the heart and life of him who believes in Him. It is not Christ but faith that makes us perfect, and it apparently does not much matter what the object is on which the faith rests. The faith of a fetich-worshipper (provided it embraces all he knows) is as efficacious to produce perfection in him as the faith of a John or a Paul. We see how loosely Finney sits to the fundamental proposition for which, under Mahan's influence, he argues, that the effective attainability of perfection is a gift of God in the provisions of the gospel.

All this leaves us quite in the dark as to how faith sanctifies us. That faith sanctifies us wholly, and that instantaneously on our exercising it, quite independently of what we believe, whether much or little (so only it be all we know), we are told with some emphasis. But we are not told how faith does this extraordinary thing. Henry Cowles offers

himself to us for this time of need.³⁴ He has a chapter on "the Bible doctrine concerning faith as a means of holiness," in which he describes in a very attractive way the sufficiency and richness of the provision in Christ for the believer's sanctification. But he does not deal with the matter exhaustively, and what he omits is unfortunately the gist of the matter. He does not tell us that it is by faith that we are united with Christ, and, having received forgiveness of sin and a title to eternal life, are granted the Holy Spirit as a power within us, not ourselves, making for righteousness. He deals in his next chapter with the work of the Spirit as Sanctifier; and does not there mention the reception of Him as a result of our faith. But though he does not give an exhaustive account of the part played by faith in our sanctification, what he does say is true and important, and errs only by defect—although it is by a great defect. There is a two-fold function ascribed to faith in our sanctification. Through it we obtain true and vivid views of what Jesus is—and are sanctified "by the influence of His character contemplated." And by it we "turn to Him for His aid in the divine life," and so take "the attitude of suppliants and recipients at His feet—and He does sustain us." If the concluding clause here seems to promise relief from the bald Pelagianizing of the rest, we are the more disappointed to discover that promise unfulfilled in a later passage. We *walk* by faith, we there read; we *live* by faith; and " 'the life I now live in the flesh, I live,' not by self-moved holy impulses, but 'by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave Himself for me.' " The unnecessary opposition of "self-moved holy impulses," and "faith" may seem to point to a mystical doctrine of the indwelling Christ superseding our activities. But no—Cowles explains thus: "My belief that the Son of God did thus love me, and give Himself for me, works love in my soul, and constrains me to live to Him who thus lived and even died for me." There is nothing supernatural about it, then, at

³⁴ *Holiness in Christians*. 1840, pp. 39ff, 90ff.

all. "Christ lives in me by faith," means only that a belief in Christ lives in me; and it is not Christ but this belief which is the dynamic of my activities. Accordingly Cowles proceeds at once to say that what Paul teaches is that "Christ lived within him," "*in this sense*, viz.: his belief of certain great truths in respect to Christ, through the Spirit impressing these truths upon his heart [we wish we knew how he supposes the Spirit to do this!], constrains him to live wholly for Christ." "Love of Christ, produced through the Spirit [how?], by believing these things, now reigns in his soul and controls his life." Has not the phrase, "through the Spirit" an awkward appearance here? Somehow, we know not how, it was in some way, we know not in what way, "through the Spirit," that the love of Christ was produced "by believing these things"; and this love which we have to Christ constrains us to follow after Him. Pelagius himself could scarcely have said less.

That some such ideas as these were present to the mind of Finney also seems to be implied in a passage in the *Lectures on Systematic Theology*.³⁵ His fundamental contention here as always, is that the state of sanctification "is to be attained by faith alone." "Both justification and sanctification," he says, "are by faith alone"—meaning that both are surely enjoyed by the believer, but that each is attained by an act of faith of its own. He is no longer prepared to assert, however, that the faith by which sanctification is attained is itself the immediately producing cause of sanctification. On the contrary he proceeds to guard against that notion. "But let me by no means be understood," he writes, "as teaching sanctification by faith, as distinct from and opposed to sanctification by the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of Christ, or, which is the same thing, by Christ our Sanctification, living and reigning in the heart." Again and with even more precision of statement: "Faith is rather the instrument or condition, than the efficient agent that induces

³⁵ Ed. 1851, pp. 635ff. The passage occurs also in the first edition, 1847.

a state of personal and permanent sanctification. Faith simply receives Christ as King, to live and reign in the soul. It is Christ in the exercise of His different offices, and appropriated in his different relations to the wants of the soul, by faith, who secures our sanctification." This assertion is the direct contradiction of what we have formerly seen Finney affirming. In the former affirmations, faith was the immediately producing cause of our sanctification. In this it only entrusts the production of our sanctification to Christ, and Christ Himself undertakes and carries through the work of our sanctification. How He does it is explained in the following words: "This He does by divine discoveries to the soul of His divine perfections and fulness. The condition of these discoveries is faith and obedience." Our sanctification, secured by faith and obedience, is wrought by Christ, whose offices in working it are the precise thing that we secure by faith and obedience.

We ought not to neglect to notice the intrusion of the words "and obedience" into this statement. It is unexpected—and unauthorized. We had just been told that "the state of sanctification is attained by faith alone." We are now told that it is secured by "faith and obedience." We had just heard faith alone designated the "condition" of our sanctification. We now hear that its "condition" is "faith and obedience." And we are a little puzzled to understand how obedience can be the condition of obedience—for sanctification in Finney's definition of it is nothing but obedience. We are again very near to saying: We can become holy by becoming holy. All this, however, by the way. The main affirmation here is that the way in which Christ, who it is that sanctifies us, sanctifies us is—by making discoveries to the soul of His divine perfections and fulness. The real efficient agent of our sanctification is then no more Christ than faith; one is as little the "condition or instrument" of it as the other: the immediate, effective cause of our sanctification is the vision of the glory of Christ granted

the soul. We are told, it is true, that Christ lives and reigns in the souls of those who receive Him by faith, and, living and reigning in them, exercises His different offices there: but nothing is meant beyond His making Himself known to these souls in His glory, and in His relations to the soul's varied wants. And nothing happens until the soul, moved by this great vision into action, sanctifies itself. Christ does nothing to it except make Himself known to it. We are sanctified by revelation, not by renewal: Christ brings instruction, not power. The efficiency of the inducement here particularly intimated is now argued³⁶ on the ground that man, as sinner, is the victim of a one-sided development of his sensibilities. He is lopsided. All he needs is that the spiritual world should be revealed and made real to him. This can be done only by the Holy Spirit who takes the things of Christ and shows them to us. What we need in order to become entirely sanctified may be summed up in three things. We must have "natural ability" to do the whole will of God—and that we all have. We must have sufficient knowledge to reveal to us our whole duty—and that also we all have, because nothing is duty until we know it as such. But we must have also "sufficient knowledge or light," "to reveal to us clearly the way or means of overcoming any and every difficulty or temptation that lies in our way." This "is proffered to us upon condition that we receive the Holy Spirit, who offers Himself as an indwelling light and guide, and who is received by simple faith." Our sanctification is here conditioned on faith in the Holy Spirit and is wrought by Him as "light and guide"—we need only to have the way pointed out, we are quite competent of ourselves to walk in it. There is a long list of the functions of the Holy Spirit as "light and guide": nothing is intimated but various forms of "knowledge."

There is an appearance at a little later point,³⁷ it is true, that something more may be acknowledged. "The Holy

³⁶ Pp. 636ff.

³⁷ P. 644.

Spirit sanctifies us," we are here told, "only by revealing Christ to us as our sanctification. He does not speak of Himself, but takes the things of Christ and shows them unto us." It is Christ who is our real Sanctifier, or rather our Sanctification. And Finney proceeds now to magnify Him in this office. He does not, to be sure, admit that Christ "does something to the soul that enables it to stand and persevere in holiness in its own strength"; "He does not change the structure of the soul." This language is only Finney's customary way of denying that Christ does what He Himself says He does—make the tree good that the fruit may be good. In point of fact Christ does precisely what is intended to be denied here. He does do something to the soul that enables it to stand and persevere in holiness in its own strength,—though not all at once. The sanctified Christian will do holiness in his own strength in the same sense that a holy angel does—or that the sun attracts the earth in its own strength, or that it is with its own sweetness that honey is sweet. But sanctified Christians in this full sense do not exist on earth; and no creature of God is independent of Him, in whom we all live and move and have our being. What Finney means is to reject altogether all "physical" sanctification; although "physical sanctification" is of course all the sanctification that is real sanctification. Permit him, however, to repudiate that, and he seems willing to go pretty far—if we can speak of anything as far which falls short of that. Christ, he says, "watches over the soul"—but that is sufficiently external. He also, however, he says, "works in it to will and to do continually"—and now we begin to take notice. This is less, to be sure, than that transforming of the soul's ethical character which the Scriptures ascribe to Him; but it appears at least to imply control. It seems to ascribe to Christ not merely a plying of the soul with motives, but a determining of its action under these motives. And when we read: "He rules in and reigns over the soul," "in so high a sense, that He, as it were, develops His own holiness in us,"—we

are almost ready to rejoice with trembling. We do not quite know what the words "develops His own holiness in us" are intended to mean; as indeed Finney himself did not, as the qualifying "as it were" seems to imply. The words may bear the perfectly good sense that Christ produces in us a holiness just like His own. They may become, however, a rather crass mystical suggestion, as if Christ transferred His holiness to us or shared it with us. And there is other mystical language employed in the context. We read of His "swallowing us up, enfolding, if I may so say, our wills and our souls in His." What is it to have not only our wills but our very souls "swallowed up," "enfolding" in Christ's? Our souls swallowed up in His soul, enfolding in His soul! This language, however, is not only qualified by the inserted "if I may so say," suggesting that it is not really meant, but is incorporated into a sentence which wholly empties it of the meaning that it might seem naturally to carry. What is said is, that Christ "*as it were* so swallows us up, so enfolds, *if I may so say*, our wills and souls in His, *that we are willingly led captive by Him.*" We drop at once from the mystical heights, and discover that all that is intended is that "we will and do as He wills within us"—that is, obey Him. And having started to drop, we drop still lower when we read the next sentence, which reduces again the working in us to will and to do to a mere matter of inducement: "He charms the will into a universal bending to His will." Control has become only a "charming." And now comes the end: "He becomes our sanctification only in so far forth as we are revealed to ourselves and He revealed to us, and as we receive Him and put Him on." "What! has it come to this!"—we borrow this exclamation from Finney with our apologies—that after all the apparent promise of a real sanctifying operation in us—after all the even mystical language employed to describe it—we have nothing left in our hands but "revelation"? Christ reveals us to ourselves and Himself to us; and then, we, induced by this revelation, "re-

ceive Him," and "put Him on." What Christ gives is revelation; we do the rest.

Despite all this elaborate relegation of the whole sanctifying work to ourselves, Finney continues strenuously to insist that sanctification is by faith alone; as truly so as justification. His meaning apparently is that the "revelation" under the inducement of which we sanctify ourselves, is secured by faith, so that ultimately it is through faith that we are sanctified. He is willing to allow accordingly one difference between the relation of justification and sanctification respectively to their procuring acts of faith. Both are "brought about by grace through faith"; but "it is true, indeed, that in our justification our own agency is not concerned, while in our sanctification it is."³⁸ This somewhat notable admission of the part played by our own activities in the process of sanctification, need not be, but is, a recognition of sanctification as self-wrought. It affirms therefore a very great difference in the relations of justification and sanctification to their respective procuring acts of faith. In the one case faith secures from God a decree of justification. In the other faith secures from God only inducements under which we sanctify ourselves. Meanwhile Finney speaks now and again in very misleading language of the relation of sanctification to works "of law." Whatever is said to an inquirer, he says on one occasion,³⁹ "that does not clearly convey the truth that both justification and sanctification are by faith, without works of law, is law and not gospel." There can, of course, be no such things as sanctification "without works of law." In Finney's own phrase, sanctification is just "obedience, for the time being, to the moral law." How can "obedience to law" take place "without works of law?" Justification can be "without works of law" because justification is not law-keeping on our own part, but acceptance of us as righteous by God: and when it is said to be without "works

³⁸ *Systematic Theology*, Ed. 1851, p. 745.

³⁹ P. 631.

of law," what is meant is that the ground of our acceptance as righteous is found not in our own obedience to the law, but in that of another rested on by us in faith. When, on the other hand, it is said that sanctification is by faith "without works of law,"—that, to speak frankly, is mere nonsense. The phrase might have meaning if what was intended were that, as sanctification is an issue of justification, and justification is by faith without works of law, we obtain our sanctification ultimately by faith "without works of law." That is true; but what we obtain in sanctification is just "works of law"—for sanctification is, as Finney rightly tells us, obedience to the moral law. This obedience to the moral law, now, cannot possibly be, in any case, the immediate effect of faith. We do not obey by faith, but by works. Faith by its very nature, rests on something outside of ourselves; obedience is the product of something which works within us. Another's righteousness can form the basis of our pardon; another's righteousness cannot form the content of our holiness. Another can supply the ground of our acceptance with God: another cannot supply our personal conformity to the requirements of the law. We may entrust our sanctification to another, just as we entrust our justification to another. We do. But the effect is wrought differently in the two cases: in the one case without us and in the other within us. And unless we are willing to admit that Christ works in us, conforming us to the law, we cannot speak of sanctification as by faith: and even in that case we cannot speak of it as "without works of law." It is not secured by "works of law," but it consists of "works of law," apart from which it does not exist.

Into this closed circle of Pelagian conceptions Mahan breaks with his assertion of the supernaturalness of salvation. It is as an assertion of the supernaturalness of the whole of salvation, that he understands the declaration that our sanctification as well as our justification is by faith, by faith alone. Faith, in its very nature, is a commitment, an entrusting to another; and its results must be brought about

therefore by the action of this other. Sanctification by faith is thus only another way of saying sanctification by Christ through His Spirit, on whom it is that faith rests. This is the precise contradictory of sanctification by our own activities, and it is only paltering in a double sense, according to Mahan, to explain that Christ, through His Spirit, sanctifies us, by presenting the motives to sanctification to us so strongly as to call out our self-activities effectively to that end. The motives which induce us to commit our sanctification to Christ would induce us to sanctify ourselves if that were possible to us under the mere influence of motives: in point of fact they do induce us to sanctify ourselves, in the only way in which we can sanctify ourselves, namely by committing our sanctification to Christ. The committal of our sanctification to Christ in faith is a confession that we cannot sanctify ourselves; and the prescription of this method of sanctification by the Scriptures is their testimony that we cannot sanctify ourselves. The main facts in the case accordingly are that we are incapable of sanctifying ourselves, and that it is precisely because we are incapable of sanctifying ourselves that sanctification is by faith, that is to say, by Christ in response to the commitment of it to Him. Here we have the foundation of Mahan's reasoning. Some of the corollaries which he draws from it are, that because this sanctification is wrought by Christ alone, it may be and is immediate, instantaneous and complete. His perfectionism is thus distinctively a supernatural perfectionism. Christ's people may be perfect, precisely because it is Christ the Lord who makes them perfect, and not they themselves.

There are some passages in Mahan's *Christian Perfection* which seem to imply that Christ's sanctifying work⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Both Mahan and Finney sometimes use the word "work" of sanctification in contrast with "act," used of justification, apparently out of mere reminiscence of this distinction of usage in the Shorter Catechism, but not reproducing that distinction. They mean by "work" to distinguish sanctification as a production, from justification which is only an action. Cf. e.g. Mahan, *Autobiography*, pp. 292f.

is conceived by him as accomplished simultaneously with the act of justification and in response to the same exercise of faith by which justification is obtained. In one of these,⁴¹ he represents it as "the grand mistake into which "the mass of Christians appear to have fallen, in regard to the gospel of Christ," that they expect "to obtain *justification*, and not, at the same time, and to the same extent, *sanctification*, by faith in Christ." Attention is naturally attracted, first of all to the phrase "to the same extent"—a mode of speech repeated elsewhere, as, for instance, in the sentence:⁴² "If Christ should justify, and not to the same extent sanctify His people, He would save them *in*, and not *from* their sin." It seems at first sight to be implied that justification like sanctification is a progressive work, and that the two proceed *pari passu*, and therefore always coëxist in the same measure: we are always sanctified just so far as we are justified and cannot be justified beyond the measure in which we are sanctified.⁴³ Closer scrutiny makes it clear, however, that this is not Mahan's meaning. He is not insisting that justification must be as progressive as sanctification; but, just the contrary, that sanctification must be as instantaneously complete as justification. He means to say that it is absurd to suppose that we are completely justified all at once—as we certainly are—and not to suppose that we are completely sanctified at the same time: and it is as wicked as it is absurd, since then we should be asserting that we are saved *in* and not *from* our sins.

⁴¹ P. 106.

⁴² P. 21.

⁴³ Canfield as cited, pp. 52ff., does not fail to put his finger on the passages in Mahan's *Christian Perfection* (pp. 27, 123 of ed. 1839), in which he insists that Christ must sanctify His people "to the same extent" that He justifies them. He rightly points out that it is absurd to speak of a gradual or incomplete justification. He expounds Mahan's teaching, however, as that "complete justification and entire sanctification are simultaneous,—that justification is not complete until sanctification is entire,"—and that no one can be an heir of eternal life unless he is entirely sanctified. Only the perfectly sanctified can say: There is, therefore, now no condemnation.

This, however, is all the more strongly to assert the absolute coëtaneousness of justification and sanctification in its completeness; and compels us not only to give its full validity to the phrase "at the same time," but to throw a strong emphasis upon it. Justification and sanctification in its completeness are thus affirmed in the most uncompromising way to take place together.

It is of course true that it is by one and the same act of faith that we receive Christ both as our justification and as our sanctification, and that we cannot have Him as the one without having Him as the other: we cannot take Him in one of his offices as our Mediator, and reject Him in another. Had that been Mahan's assertion he would have been only repeating an elementary teaching of the universal Reformed faith. When he asserts, however, that by this single act of faith we not only obtain both justification and sanctification, but obtain them both at once in their utmost completeness, he asserts more than either the Reformed faith or his own better judgment permits. On the ground here taken, if the believer be not perfectly sanctified from the very moment of his justification, that is, of his believing, he is, in the sense here conveyed, saved *in* his sin. If he has a single sin remaining, and that the tiniest that a sin can be and yet remain a sin—he is saved *in* his sin. What is really declared then is that every believer is perfect, in the sense that he is freed from all sin from the moment of his believing. That carries with it the consequence that no one is a believer—that no one is justified—that no one is saved in any sense, to whom there clings a single, even the tiniest sin. Christ's salvation is *from* sin and never *in* sin. Now Mahan does not in the least believe that. He is only for the moment caught in the meshes of his own chop-logic, and is reasoning on a submerged premise, assumed not only without but against proof—that sanctification takes place all at once and occupies no time. If sanctification occupies time, then it does not follow that because sins still occur in a Christian's life, he is not in Him who saves *from* sin

and not *in* sin; it follows only that his salvation *from* sin is not yet completed. At the moment Mahan is commenting on Rom. viii 3, 4—"that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us." "To have this righteousness fulfilled in us," he comments, "implies that it be *perfectly accomplished in us*, or that we are brought into *perfect conformity to the moral rectitude required by the law*. This is declared to be one of the great objects of Christ's death." Nothing truer could be said. But then he adds: "Such conformity, then, is practicable to the Christian, or Christ failed to accomplish one of the prime purposes of his redemption." And at once the submerged premise confuses the reasoning and vitiates the conclusion. Both too little and too much is said. It is too little to say that perfect conformity to the moral rectitude required by the law is practicable to the Christian. It is assured to him. He not only may have it; he certainly will have it. There is no question of Christ's failing to accomplish this prime purpose of His redemption. It will be accomplished. But too much is said when it is implied that the Christian can enjoy this prime purpose of redemption, in its absolute completeness, at any moment he wishes, without regard to its nature, or the method—the laws if you will—of its conference. This is a blessing in the conference of which time is consumed; and it is not to be had without the expenditure of time-consuming effort. To suggest that the Christian is warranted in concluding that Christ has failed to accomplish one of the prime purposes of His redemption, if he finds himself *not yet* in possession of this blessing in its fullest extent, is a sad piece of reasoning. To intimate that we may have all that Christ has purchased for us, in all its fulness, all at once, at the moment of believing, is not merely to confound all human experience, but to go beyond what Mahan has found it possible to believe himself. For after all, Mahan does not believe what he here asserts—that all who believe in Christ are immediately in that act of faith both perfectly justified and perfectly sanctified.

One indication that he does not believe it may be found in passages, lying side by side with those just quoted, in which he develops a conception of the relation of faith to the blessings obtained by it, which is quite incongruous to what he here asserts. In one of these⁴⁴ he is discussing the difference between perfect and imperfect faith. This he finds not in a difference in the degree of confidence the two exhibit—as if trust and distrust were mixed in them in different proportions—but in the breadth of their reference. “In consequence of ignorance of the perfect fulness of Christ’s redemption in all respects,” we may be found reposing “confidence in one, and not in every, feature of Christ’s character as a Savior.” Our confidence in Him may be full confidence, from the intensive point of view, but far from full from the extensive point of view. We entrust to Him utterly what we entrust to Him, but we do not entrust to Him all we ought to entrust to Him. The illustration given is precisely this: “The mind . . . may repose full confidence in Christ as a justifying, but not as a *sanctifying* Savior.” We may then receive justification and not sanctification. These two are not necessary concomitants, the inseparable co-products of one act of faith. They are severally products of different acts of faith and are sought and enjoyed each for itself. There is indeed a wider implication behind this—that we seek by faith and receive the several benefits which Christ bestows on His people one by one, as we appeal to Him for each. And behind that lies the deeper implication still that salvation is not a unit, but may be broken up into fragments and granted piecemeal; and therefore also may be enjoyed by this or that individual only in this or that part. He that has only partial faith, that is to say faith for only part of the things which are to be had in Christ, may be saved only in part, that is, may receive only part of salvation. We may be justified, for example, and not sanctified. One would like to know what the state of such a man is. Being justified, his sins are all

⁴⁴ *Christian Perfection*, p. 114.

pardoned; he is accepted in God's sight; and the reward of eternal life is given him. We suppose this means, in common parlance, that he will "go to heaven." And indeed, where else would one go, against whom the law of God brings no charge, and for whom it bears witness that he is righteous? But not having been sacrificed, he must go to heaven a corrupt and polluted, though not guilty, wretch. And we are brought up short by the fundamental principle that without holiness no man shall see the Lord.

It is of course in part a defective view of justification itself which produces these remarkable results. Corruption is the very penalty of sin from which we are freed in justification; holiness is the very reward which is granted us in justification. It is therefore absurd to suppose that sanctification can fail where justification has taken place. Sanctification is but the execution of the justifying decree. For it to fail would be for the acquitted person not to be released in accordance with his acquittal. It is equally absurd to speak of a special "sanctifying faith" adjoined to "justifying faith"; "justifying faith" itself necessarily brings sanctification, because justification necessarily issues in sanctification—as the chains are necessarily knocked off of the limbs of the acquitted man. The Scriptures require of us not faiths but faith. Mahan, on the other hand, is very much inclined to make a hobby of the notion that we must have a special faith for every particular benefit received of Christ. "Perfect faith," he asserts,⁴⁵ "is a full and unshaken confidence in Christ, as in all respects, at all times, and in every condition, a full and perfect Savior, a Savior able and willing to meet every possible demand of our being." That is true, and well-said: that is in its nature the faith which every Christian has and lives by. But must all the sides and aspects of Christ's saving activities be explicated in our knowledge or else we do not get them? Does our enjoyment of them absolutely depend on our explication of them in our knowledge and the direction of our

⁴⁵ As cited, 114.

faith to each and every of them separately? That is the tendency of Mahan's treatment of the matter. We must not go to Christ, he tells us,⁴⁶ as a Savior in general, expecting him to save us from our sins. We must take our sins to Him one by one. "From our sins Christ does not and cannot save us, unless by faith we thus"—that is distributively—"appropriate the provisions of His redemption." So strongly is the notion of the exercise of faith distributively pressed, that Mahan is even ready to say,⁴⁷ that no blessing will be received—for example the blessing of sanctification—if it be applied for in a general way. This is the reason, he says, that "Christians apply to Christ for sanctification, etc., almost without success. Their object is commonly general and undefined, and nothing specific is presented." We must come to Christ with a specific need in our hearts and one of His specific promises in our hands, and do this over and over again, until we work through all our needs and all His promises. We seem far enough away, in this presentation of the way of life, from the notion asserted in the passages formerly adduced, that perfect sanctification accompanies justification as its inseparable concomitant, else Christ would save us *in*, not *from* our sins: that we must in other words at once on believing be saved *from all* our sins on pain of implicating Christ in their continuance.

However Mahan may have endeavored to conciliate for himself such conflicting lines of thought, he emerges into the open with the clear and firm conviction that justification and sanctification are two distinct and separable benefits to be sought and obtained by two distinct and separable acts of faith. This is already apparent in the full exposition which he gives us of the theoretical foundation of his doctrine of perfection, in the fourth discourse of his *Christian Perfection*.⁴⁸ He speaks freely here of our being

⁴⁶ P. 134.

⁴⁷ P. 157.

⁴⁸ Pp. 77ff.

made perfect by divine grace,—even of our being made perfect by the indwelling Christ—after a fashion which seems to bear a more mystical than Pelagian implication. But the two tendencies are not to him irreconcilable. Everything is made to depend on the human will; and man may therefore be said to work out his own perfection. But it appears that he does this not directly but indirectly,—by handing it over to grace or to the indwelling Christ to work it out for him. Accordingly Christ is represented as saying to the believer, “I will secure you in a state of perfect and perpetual obedience to every command of God, and in the full and constant fruition of His presence and love”; and as promising, “All this will I do in perfect consistency with the full and uninterrupted exercise of your own free agency.”⁴⁹ What the believer is to do is “to make a full surrender” of himself to Christ. This includes “an actual reception of Christ, and reliance upon Him for all these blessings, in all their fulness,—a surrender of his whole being to Him, that He may accomplish in him all the ‘exceeding great and precious promises’ of the new covenant.”⁵⁰ And we are told that “when this is done—when there is that full and implicit reliance upon Christ for the entire fulfillment of all that He has promised,—He becomes directly responsible for our full and complete redemption.” By a complete surrender to Him we voluntarily put ourselves into His hands, and He thereafter assumes “all the responsibility.”⁵¹ “Christ is now present in your heart, and ready

⁴⁹ P. 78.

⁵⁰ P. 89.

⁵¹ Canfield, pp. 67ff., adduces this statement of Mahan’s and analogous ones of Finney’s, and remarks that it is involved, of course, that we can never sin again. If Christ becomes “directly responsible for our full and complete redemption”—is “pledged,” “to produce in us perfect and perpetual obedience,”—to “‘sanctify us wholly, and preserve our whole spirit, soul, and body, blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ,’” (in the sense Mahan put on these words)—how can we possibly sin again? Yet Mahan within four pages can write: “We can ‘abide in Christ,’ and thus bring forth the fruit required of us. If by unbelief we separate ourselves from Christ, we

to confer all this purity and blessedness upon you, if you can believe that He is able and willing to do it for you, and will cast your entire being upon His faithfulness."⁵² "If . . ." It is all primarily in our hands and rests on our will. But when we have met that "if," then it is all in Christ's hands and He will do it all. "We learn" hence, Mahan explains,⁵³ "how to understand and apply such declarations of Scripture as the following—'Wash you, make you clean'; 'Make ye yourselves a new heart and a new spirit'; 'Let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit,' etc." "The common impression seems to be," he says, "that men are required to do all this, in the exercise of their own unaided powers; and because the sinner fails to comply, grace comes in, and supplies the condition in the case of Christians." That is not his view. His view is that grace is always standing ready to do the work, if only we will draw on it for it. We are not required to do it ourselves; we are required to do it by means of grace, which is put at our disposal for the purpose. The fountain, whose waters cleanse from sin, is set open: it is our business to descend into it and wash. "The sinner is able to make to himself a 'new heart and a new spirit,' because he can instantly avail himself of proffered grace." It is really his own act: *facit per alium, facit per se*. Grace is but the instrument he uses to accomplish his result. "He does literally 'make to himself a new heart and a new spirit,' when he yields himself to the influence of that grace. The power to cleanse from sin lies in the blood and grace of Christ; and hence, when the sinner 'purifies himself by obeying the truth through the spirit,' the glory of his salvation belongs, not to him, but to Christ."⁵⁴ The validity of this inference is more than questionable: Christ in this view

of necessity descend, under the weight of our own guilt and depravity, down the sides of the pit, into the eternal sepulchre" (p. 92).

⁵² P. 90.

⁵³ P. 91.

⁵⁴ P. 92.

is but the instrument with which the sinner works. Meanwhile, however, it is made very plain that Christ and Christ only does or can do the work; and as the application is expressly made to the work of sanctification, the immediate supernaturalness of sanctification and its direct dependence on faith and faith alone are clearly asserted. "Herein also lies the ability of the creature to obey the commands of God, addressed to us as redeemed sinners . . . We can 'abide in Christ,' and thus bring forth the fruit required of us."⁵⁵ The way we bear fruit is to apply to Christ for it.

We may perhaps be advanced in apprehending Mahan's conception by attending to a passage in which he undertakes to discriminate between what he calls the antinomian, the legal and the evangelical spirits. The antinomian spirit, he says, looks to Christ for justification now, and satisfied with that, does not bother itself at all about sanctification. The legal spirit has two forms. In its extremest form—the form in which it appears in the ancient Pharisee and "modern moralist,"—it seeks both to justify and to sanctify itself by its own efforts. In its milder form it looks to Christ for justification and depends on its own efforts for sanctification. The evangelical spirit looks to Christ for both justification and sanctification through faith alone. He differentiates himself here from the antinomian through his zeal for sanctification: he is concerned for personal holiness and earnestly seeks it. He differentiates himself on the other hand from the "legalist," by the means he uses to obtain this longed-for holiness. The "legalist" seeks it "by personal efforts;" he seeks it "by faith." This is as much as to say that the "legalist" seeks it in himself and expects to draw it out of himself by strenuous strivings; while Mahan seeks it in Christ and expects to receive it from Christ on faith. We do not stop to point out the injustice of setting sanctification by effort and sanctification by faith in mutually exclusive opposition to one another. If there be any who, having looked to Christ for their justi-

⁵⁵ P. 94.

fication, then expect to sanctify themselves altogether apart from Christ, they present in their own persons a very odd contradiction. How can they, united to Christ by faith, act in their attempts to be holy, altogether out of relation with Christ, into union with whom they have come? Their efforts to be holy are themselves part of the sanctifying effects of the faith by which they are united with Christ—not all of it nor even the main part of it, but a part of it. Effort and faith cannot in themselves be set in crass opposition to one another, as if where the one is the other cannot be. They rather go together in a matter like sanctification which consists in large part of action. But that is not the matter which it concerns us most at the moment to take note of. The matter for us to note now is that by setting himself in opposition to those who “expect sanctification from personal effort,” and by the very inconsiderateness of this opposition, it is made the clearer that Mahan thinks of himself as teaching that sanctification is obtained not at all by “personal effort,” but by faith alone, and is the work of Christ exclusively, into which no other work of man enters except faith alone.⁵⁶

In a later writing,⁵⁷ Mahan tells us explicitly that, when

⁵⁶ This is of course a Quietistic attitude. John Woodbridge (*Theological Essays Reprinted from the Princeton Review*, 1846, p. 413f.) deals admirably with Mahan's Quietism. The illustrative passages quoted from Mahan (*Christian Perfection*, pp. 189, 190, 191) are excellently chosen and the comments are telling (p. 414). “It is manifest from the inspired volume that we are to come to Christ, not for the purpose of saving ourselves the trouble of a personal warfare, but that we may engage in such a warfare with good motives, with becoming zeal, with persevering energy, and with success . . . When Christ works in us both to will and to do, of his own good pleasure, it is that, sustained, quickened by his power, we may work out our own salvation with fear and trembling.” “Yet, after all,” he continues, “it is not intended by the writers to whom we refer, to ascribe all holiness to divine agency. Their meaning appears to be, that Christ will sanctify us wholly if we look to him for such a blessing: yet there is no provision in their system to secure the act of looking itself. Man begins to turn, and God completes the sanctification of man.”

⁵⁷ *Out of Darkness into Light*, 1875, p. 37.

he was first converted, he "knew Christ well in the sphere of justification, or pardon of sin, but knew nothing of Him in that of our sanctification, and had never heard of Him as 'the Son of God who baptizes with the Holy Ghost.'" "Of the idea of the life of faith and of the life revealed in the words, 'I in thee, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in me,' I was as ignorant as an unborn babe." If we were compelled to take these words in their general, ordinary meaning, the statement made in them would be sheerly incredible. Mahan intends them only in the sense of his own special doctrines of sanctification and the baptism of the Spirit. In that case they amount only to saying that he had not yet elaborated his peculiar views on the subject, when he was first converted—as how should he? He therefore proceeds to plead that young converts should be taught at once that entire sanctification is to be had immediately from Christ on going to Him for it,—just as full justification has been had. His meaning is, that they should not be permitted uselessly to expend their strength in seeking to hew out sanctification for themselves, when the only way in which it can be obtained is from Christ by faith alone. A very striking enforcement of this counsel is found in a passage in his *Autobiography*⁵⁸ in which he sharply criticizes Finney's methods of dealing with converts "before he learned the way of the Lord more perfectly." He wished "to induce among believers *permanence* in the Divine life." But he knew no way to do it, it is said, except to insist on "the renunciation of sin, consecration to Christ, and purpose of obedience." He worked along this line with the utmost zeal and to the permanent injury of his converts. Years afterward, his converts at the Chatham Street Chapel, New York, had "never recovered from the internal weakness and exhaustion which had resulted from the terrible discipline through which Mr. Finney had carried them." "And this," Mahan adds, "was all the good which had resulted from his efforts." The same method, he says, had

⁵⁸ P. 246.

the same effect on Finney's first pupils at Oberlin. He was prescribing effort: the only right way is the way of faith.

It should be carefully noted that it is involved in these criticisms that, in Mahan's view, sanctification is not merely not by effort but by faith, but also not by the act of faith by which justification is received, but by a subsequent act of faith all its own. He is speaking of those already converted, and of their sanctification as a subsequent transaction. This is not a matter of little concern to him. He is insistent that sanctification follows conversion. He is found indeed sharply inveighing against those who say that all Christians have received "the baptism of the Holy Ghost" at the time of their conversion, and in doing so makes it plain enough that "the baptism of the Holy Ghost," which with him is a condition of the influx of the grace that sanctifies the soul, is a distinct and subsequent endowment to converting grace. He repels the accusation that, as we have received this baptism at conversion, there is "no such promise as you speak of, in reserve for us now." He insists that no matter what they once received, Christians are obviously in sore need of such an endowment now. He argues formally that Christ "makes prior obedience the express condition of this reception of the Comforter"—with the meaning that it must therefore be not an initial gift but one that comes in the course of Christian living. He declares directly that "inspiration speaks expressly of two classes of converted persons—of the one class as 'spiritual,' and the other as 'yet carnal'—the one as made, and the other as not yet made, 'perfect in love,'—the one as having, the other as not having 'fellowship' with the Father and with His Son Jesus Christ—the one as having received, and the other as not having received, the Holy Ghost since they believed,—and of the 'joy' of the one class as being, and of the other as not being, 'full.'"⁵⁹

There is a passage in the *Autobiography*⁶⁰ in which Ma-

⁵⁹ *Out of Darkness into Light*, 1875, pp. 317f.

⁶⁰ Pp. 292ff.

han's doctrine of sanctification is set forth in quite a systematic form, and which may well serve therefore as a norm for the interpretation of more scattered expositions. "Sanctification," we here read, "is a gift of grace in the same sense, and attainable on the same condition, that justification is. Justification is an *act* of God, an act by which our sins are remitted, and we restored to a legal standing before Him, as if we had never sinned. Sanctification, on the other hand, is a *work*⁶¹ wrought in us by the Holy Spirit, 'a renewing of the Holy Ghost,' by which 'the body of sin is destroyed,' that is, evil dispositions and tendencies are 'taken out of our flesh,' and we are made 'partakers of the Divine nature.' We have no more direct and immediate agency in sanctification than we have in justification. Each with equal exclusiveness is, I repeat, a gift of grace, and each is vouchsafed on the same condition as the other . . . To comply with the condition is our part of the transaction. The condition being complied with, our responsibility in the matter is at an end." Having cited Ezek. xxxvi. 25-27, he proceeds: "Three great blessings in all fulness, are here specifically promised: namely, full and perfect cleansing from all sinful dispositions, tendencies and habits; and equally full and perfect renewal, 'the gift of a new spirit,' and 'a heart of flesh,' in the place of a heart of stone which 'had been taken out of the flesh'; and the 'gift of the Holy Ghost,' by whose indwelling the believer is 'endued with power' for every good word and work, and perfected in his obedience to God's statutes and judgments." Here is a complete negative and positive explication of what sanctification is. Negatively, everything sinful is eradicated from the believer—including every sinful disability he may be supposed to have. Positively, holiness is infused into him, carrying with it power to every good word and work. "Every item" of this transformation "is the exclusive work of God." Our part in sanctification is "to come to God by Jesus

⁶¹ For Mahan's use of the term, see Note No. 40.

Christ, to have these things done for us."⁶² "Sanctification and justification, being both in common, and with the same exclusiveness, gifts of God, the one is just as instantaneous as the other."⁶³ The Scriptures do indeed speak of "growth in grace," but that is "quite another thing" from a process of becoming holy: it is the expansion and development of the already holy person. "First, the healing, restoration to health or sanctification; then growth, 'growth in grace,'"—a growth this, that is not merely progressive but eternal. The note struck here is the note of a supernatural, instantaneous, entire transformation—a transformation which is "total" not only in the extensive sense but in the intensive sense. For one of the most notable features of it is the emphasis with which it is declared that the transformation is a transformation of nature and not merely of activities. "The body of sin is destroyed"; and that is defined as meaning that "evil dispositions and tendencies are taken out of our flesh": a "full and perfect cleansing is made from all sinful dispositions, tendencies and habits." A new heart is placed within us: and we are made "partakers of the Divine nature." A work like this cannot well be called other than "physical."

It is important to observe that the "physical" salvation which is thus taught is strictly reserved for the second stage of salvation, and is a result of the second conversion. There is a curious passage in *Out of Darkness into Light*⁶⁴ in which this is explained to us. Here it is taught that, when we have been "through the Spirit convicted of sin, and have exercised genuine repentance towards God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ," strange to say, nothing has been wrought in us by His Spirit. We have taken up a new attitude, and that is all. We have done our duty—exercised repentance and faith,—and that is the whole of it. God responds to this repentance and faith, it is true, by

⁶² P. 294.

⁶³ P. 294.

⁶⁴ Pp. 270ff.

granting us pardon: but that takes place outside of us, and remains outside of us—we remain ourselves precisely as before. “As far as his *voluntary* activities are concerned,” Mahan remarks, the believer “is now in a state of supreme obedience to the will of God.” But he adds: “His old propensities, dispositions, temper, and tendencies, however, remain as they were, and remain to war against this new-born purpose of obedience.” Nothing has happened to the believer in himself: he has turned to God, but this has brought no change to his inner self. If left in this condition,—and Mahan says the majority of believers are left in this condition—the believer cannot sustain himself in his newly assumed attitude. He lapses from his first love, lives on a low plane, falls, and falls again. There is apparently attributed to him a power to retain the faith he has conceived; but, being left to himself, he can retain it only with a feeble hold. What we wonder at is that he can be supposed to retain it at all. “Open and gross immoralities excepted,” we read,⁶⁵ “the convert carries with him into the Christian life the same propensities, dispositions, and temper that he had before his conversion, and these, when strongly excited, overcome him as they did before.” The convert in his own strength can avoid open and gross immoralities; but, nothing having happened to him within, he is unable to resist the impulses which arise from his unaffected “old man.” It is a curious condition this, and one cannot see that there can be attributed to it anything that can justly be thought of as a state of salvation. We are told that the believer has escaped the penalties due to his sins—is a pardoned man: but he remains in precisely the same inward condition in which he was before. He is still in the condition of the natural man seeking to reform himself.

But now a second step can be taken. Christ may be apprehended “as the Mediator of the New Covenant”—to employ a favorite phrase of Mahan’s; that is, the convert

⁶⁵ P. 271.

may seek and obtain from Christ "the baptism of the Holy Ghost," and thus receive the Spirit for "the work of universal renovation." The Spirit now takes away the heart of stone and gives the convert a heart of flesh,—a new heart and a new spirit; writes the law in his inward parts—and the rest. This is "an all-cleansing, all-renovating, and all-vitalizing process," and, in contrast with "the washing of regeneration," is called "the renewing of the Holy Ghost." The convert is now, his old man being crucified, imbued with a new "divine nature," and "filled with the Holy Ghost." The old propensities, dispositions, tempers and lusts are gone; and the Christian is free. "What a melancholy reflection it is," Mahan exclaims,⁶⁶ "that most believers advance no further in the Christian life than 'the washing of regeneration,' are ignorant of Christ as the Mediator of the New Covenant, and, consequently have no experience of 'the renewing of the Holy Ghost.' " Is it not a more melancholy reflection still that a Christian teacher can so cut Christ's great salvation up into sections as to imagine that a sinner can sincerely repent of his sins, and cast himself in faith on Christ for salvation—and then not receive it? According to Mahan this is the condition in which most Christians find themselves. Their salvation has been wholly intermitted after the first step.

We see that one of the things which Mahan has greatly at heart, in urging to this second step, is that the Christian may be relieved from his old evil propensities and thus be freer to fight, in the Christian warfare, against external enemies. Up to the reception of "the second blessing" the old evil propensities remain and are the constant source of sin. It is useless to strive against them—we cannot eradicate them: though, as we have just seen, we can do what seems on the whole not a little in the way of repressing their worst movements, and Mahan accordingly characterizes this condition as one, not of darkness, but of "twilight." He is not counselling, however, inert acceptance of

⁶⁶ P. 273.

them; he is only recommending rightly directed efforts—we must strive not ourselves to conquer them, but to obtain their eradication at the hands of Christ. In one of the passages in which he describes most fully what he means by this,⁶⁷ he is speaking directly of “religious joy,” but he expressly makes the attainment to this “religious joy” rest on the same principles as the attainment of holiness,⁶⁸ and we may use the description of the method of the attainment of the one therefore equally well of the attainment of the other. We can have it, he says, only on the condition “that with all sincerity, earnestness, and tireless perseverance, ‘God shall for this be inquired of by you to do it for you.’” This is one of the phrases which he loves to repeat; and the enforcement of the duty inculcated by it he makes one of his chief concerns. If we wish any blessing we must inquire of the Lord for it, and we must do this with all strenuousness. “When you are told,” then, he explains, “not to make any effort to banish your cares or sorrows, or to induce religious peace or joy, you receive wise advice.” These things do not come “at the bidding of our wills, but at the bidding of Christ.” We must strive after them—but we must strive after them from the hands of Christ. It is wrong, then, “when inquirers are told, as they frequently are, not to think anything about their feelings, not to give themselves any concern about them one way or the other.” The truth is⁶⁹ “that our emotions as well as our moral states”—it is here that our own interest for the moment focuses—“should be the objects of reflection, faith and prayer. The divine direction is this:—‘Be careful for nothing; but in everything by prayer and supplication, with thanksgiving, let your requests be made known unto God’ . . . The promises pertaining to our peace are as really the objects of faith and prayer as those pertaining to our justification and sanctification.” Striving thus in the right

⁶⁷ *Out of Darkness into Light*, pp. 329ff.

⁶⁸ P. 344.

⁶⁹ P. 344.

way, we may be rid of our evil propensities, rid of them not in part, or merely in their activities, but altogether. Mahan knows, for he has tried it. "As a witness for Christ," he says,⁷⁰ "I would say that, were there a perfect oblivion of the facts of my life, prior to the time when thus I knew my Saviour, I should not from present experiences, ever suspect that those old dispositions, which once tyrannized over me, had ever existed." And one of the things that render it important to be rid of them is that then we are free to contend against external temptations with no traitor in the camp. For though perfected now, we are not free from temptations. And we shall need to strive against them with all our might.

At this point in the discussion Mahan introduces a warning against what he represents as an extreme position taken up by some in his own camp, which surprises us very much.⁷¹ "There is much said," he says, "about receiving Christ as our present sanctification" which must be accepted with caution. If we have nothing in view but salvation from actual sin—we may, of course, expect immediate relief on believing. But "when we inquire of Him, as the Mediator of the New Covenant, to do for us all that is promised in that covenant, the case is different." And the difference in the case apparently consists in this—we must leave the fulfillment of all that for which we believe to God's own good time and way. We may, like the disciples, have to tarry for "the promise of the Spirit." After all, then, entire sanctification is not the immediate and complete response to faith. It may come gradually, in instalments. We may expect "salvation from actual sin" at once. But "heart-searching may precede the final cleansing, searching for God with all the heart must precede the finding of Him, and waiting and praying may precede, we cannot tell how long, the baptism of power." There is an appearance of excessive analysis here. Salvation from actual sin, final

⁷⁰ P. 275.

⁷¹ Pp. 277ff.

cleansing, finding of God, baptism of power,—and there are others. There is for example the distinction which is at once made between the “presence” of Christ in the heart and His “manifestation” there. It seems that Christ may dwell in us, and yet dwell there after some otiose fashion—not occupying Himself with us. We obtain His indwelling by faith: His manifestation of Himself within us awaits His own pleasure. The effort seems to be to safeguard to some degree the divine sovereignty. When we do our part, that does not compel His doing His part—at least, at once: He will do it, no fear as to that; but He will do it when and as He will. “Faith on our part does not of itself give us rest. The rest of faith is what Christ gives ‘after we have believed.’” *Gives*—an emphasis is laid on this. We do not by faith take it: Christ gives it. We must conceive then, it seems, of our second act of faith as securing for us the indwelling of Christ, who brings, of course, His benefits with Him; and then of His conferring these benefits one by one at His own discretion, but always in response, we infer from other passages already cited, to acts of faith claiming them. This notion of the indwelling Christ forms apparently the culmination of Mahan’s conception of the saving process. At the end of his book, *Out of Darkness into Light*,⁷² he has a chapter on “Christ in us, and Christ for us,” a phrase in which, he thinks, the whole gospel is summed up. He declines⁷³ to explain the “sense” and “form” in which “Christ dwells and lives in believers,” on the ground that no one who has not experienced it can understand it. He outlines, however, some of the blessings which this indwelling brings. We shall, possessing it, have union, fellowship, and intercommunion with Him, in kind the same as obtains between Christ and the Father. “Christ will so completely control and determine our mental and moral states and activities, and so completely transform our whole moral character after His own image, that the

⁷² Pp. 327ff.

⁷³ Pp. 332f.

Father will love us as He does Christ"—that is, of course, with the love of complacency, since we are then perfect; our love to Christ "will, in our measure, be rendered as perfect as His to us;" "our content under all the allotments of Providence" will be as perfect as His; our peace and joy as constant and full; and our love for our fellow-Christians "will be the same in kind as that which exists between Christ and the Father"—and the like. In a word, although we cannot tell what the indwelling of Christ is, we know it by its effects; and these effects are so described as to show that we are by it assimilated to Christ. By His dwelling within us Christ makes us like Himself.

Now, there are two conditions of obtaining this high gift. The first of these is that "through faith in Christ, in the varied relations in which He is for us, as a Saviour from sin, we must be brought into a state of full present consecration to Christ, and obedience to His commandments." We must, in other words, receive Christ in all that He is "for us." We must already be loving Christ and keeping his words; Christ will not make His abode in any but loving hearts and obedient spirits. Certainly this seems to say that the indwelling Christ does not make us "perfect," but finds us "perfect." The second condition is that we must have already received the "Comforter," "to enlarge our capacities to receive Christ and the Father." That is to say not only is perfection but also what Mahan calls "the baptism of the Holy Spirit" presupposed. "Christ and the Father," we are told, "can dwell within us but upon the condition that the Spirit shall first 'strengthen us with might in the inner man'; shall 'take the things of Christ and show them unto us,' and shall 'show us plainly of the Father.'" "Remember," we are told more broadly, "that the promise can be fulfilled in your experience but upon the condition that you shall love and obey Christ as the disciples did; and 'the Holy Ghost shall fall upon you as He did upon them at the beginning.'" It is clear from a

passage like this that to Mahan the twin pillars on which the highest structure of salvation rests are "perfection" and "the baptism of the Spirit"; and these, we will remember, he repeatedly tells us are the great doctrines to the promulgation of which he gave his life.

In the earliest of his perfectionist books,—the *Scripture Doctrine of Christian Perfection* of 1839—the doctrine of the "Baptism of the Spirit" is not developed. The last of the discourses included in the book, however, deals with the work of the Spirit in sanctification under the caption of "The Divine Teacher," and this caption fairly conveys the conception of the mode of His sanctifying work which is presented in the discussion. He is directly described in it as "enlightening the intellect, and carrying on the work of sanctification, by the presentation of truth to the mind." And again we are told⁷⁴ that "the Spirit sanctifies by presenting Christ to the mind in such a manner, that we are transformed into His image." These phrases are so external that it is necessary to remind ourselves that it is the work of the indwelling Spirit which is spoken of. He is spoken of in such a fashion as to imply that His presence in the heart is conceived as a supernatural fact, and His action as a supernatural action. But His action is spoken of exclusively as of the nature of "enlightening"; it is as "the divine teacher" alone that he is presented. It appears to be intended distinctly to deny that the mode of His action is of the nature of what is called "physical," and to confine its effects to such as are wrought by the truth. We are left, however, in darkness as to how the indwelling Spirit is thought to enlighten the mind, or, as that is here explained, to present truth or to present Christ to the mind. It does not seem to be meant that the Spirit reveals new truth to the mind, or reveals to it the old truths afresh. His action does not appear to be conceived as, in the strict sense revelatory, but rather as in its nature clarifying and enforcing: he gives clearness and force and effectiveness to

⁷⁴ P. 172.

the things of Christ. He makes Christ, in all that Christ is as our sanctification, vivid and impressive to us. What puzzles us is how He does it. Surely not by an effect on the truth itself with which He deals; or on Christ Himself whom He presents. Must not His operation terminate on the mind itself, affecting it in such a manner that it sees the truth in a new light and the Christ in His preciousness, and goes out to and embraces it and Him? And what is that but a "physical" effect? In subsequent discussions this ambiguity is left still imperfectly resolved. In the opening pages of *Out of Darkness into Light*,⁷⁵ for example; we read this sentence: "According to the express teaching of inspiration we know, and can know, divine truth in none of its forms but through a divine insight imparted to us through the Spirit." This is of course true, and would call for no remark except in a writer of this type. In such a one, it leaves us wondering how this insight can be thought to be imparted, especially when we read further and learn that all knowledge imparted thus by the Spirit is absolute knowledge. We may have beliefs of greater or less degrees of "conscious certainty" with "the teaching of the Spirit"; but when He illuminates the soul, we have not *beliefs* but *knowledge*, and that in the form of absolute knowledge.⁷⁶ On the basis of the religious psychology prevalent at Oberlin, it is exceedingly difficult to understand what the process of illumination can be which produces this effect. It seems to involve the assumption of an effect wrought by the Spirit on the man himself, that is on his heart, which cannot be called anything but "physical," and that seems to demand such a "physis" for man as is susceptible to such an operation. Mahan goes on to say ⁷⁷ that by an action of the Spirit he "was himself made absolutely conscious that God had pardoned and accepted him." "I was as absolutely—I could not tell how—assured of this, as

⁷⁵ 1875, P. 5.

⁷⁶ P. 7.

⁷⁷ P. 17.

I was that I existed at all." That is a familiar mode of speech among mystical perfectionists, and is called by Mahan "the witness of the Spirit." It seems to be represented as merely an ungrounded conviction; the ground of it is assumed to be the Spirit; and the guarantee of this assumption appears to be merely the absoluteness of the conviction. So explained, it falls within the category of revelations, and we observe Mahan, on a later page,⁷⁸ laying claim to special supernatural experiences which fall in nothing short of particular revelations. In this he but followed in the steps of those "New York Perfectionists" from whom he seeks fundamentally to separate himself, and of whom such experiences were characteristic. Perhaps we ought to state here also that the fanaticism of "faith cure"—"prayer cure," Mahan calls it,⁷⁹—was fully shared by both him and Finney.

The special doctrine of "the Baptism of the Spirit," under that name, seems to have been given vogue among the Oberlin coterie first by John Morgan, who published in *The Oberlin Quarterly* for 1845, two essays on "The Holiness Acceptable to God," and "The Gift of the Holy Ghost," respectively.⁸⁰ The latter of these works out the doctrine substantially as subsequently taught at Oberlin, with great clearness and force of presentation.⁸¹ Mahan's first formal discussion of it appears in his book bearing that title, which was not published until 1870.⁸² The doctrine is set forth

⁷⁸ P. 229.

⁷⁹ Pp. 288ff., where a number of typical instances are described.

⁸⁰ Subsequently reprinted at Oberlin, 1875.

⁸¹ See the excellent accounts of Morgan's discourse by James H. Fairchild, *The Congregational Quarterly*, April 1876, p. 353, and Frank H. Foster, *Genetic History*, p. 456.

⁸² In his *Autobiography*, p. 150, Mahan speaks of this book with a certain amount of pride. "Every discourse in that book," he says, "two or three of the last excepted, was prepared and delivered as a part of a regular course of theological lectures to a class of theological students, and was sent to the publisher just as prepared and delivered." He says the delivery of the lectures produced a revival in the institution, Adrian College, Michigan, of which he was then President. His

in outline in the opening pages of the volume. First a very welcome and no doubt much needed testimony is borne to the fact "that whenever any of the leading characteristics of 'the new man' are referred to in the Bible, they are specifically represented as induced by the indwelling presence, special agency and influence of the Holy Ghost."⁸³ This is true and important—the most important fact in the premises; we are sanctified by the Spirit whom God has given to dwell in us, and otherwise not. But next it is affirmed, as if it were equally true and equally important, that this gift of the spirit for our sanctification is an after-gift, granted to believers subsequently to their becoming believers. "The indwelling Spirit in our hearts is distinctly revealed as promised to us, and given to us AFTER [emphasis his] we have through His converting power 'repented of sin, and believed in Christ.'" There is a sense, of course, in which it is to be said that the work of the indwelling Spirit in sanctifying the soul, follows upon His act in regenerating it, by which we are converted, and, being converted, are justified. But this is not what Mahan means; he is not analyzing the unitary salvation into its distinguishable stages but dividing it into separable parts. Consequently he goes on⁸⁴ to affirm as the third element in his doctrine, that "the indwelling presence and power of the Spirit, 'the baptism of the Holy Ghost,' are, according to the express teachings of inspiration, to be sought and received by faith in God's word of promise, on the part of the believer, *after* he has believed; just as pardon and eternal life are to be sought by the sinner *prior* to justification." That is to say, the gift of the Spirit is not a result of justification, inseparably involved in it, but an independent gift to be obtained by an independent act of faith. The sinner

latest exposition of the doctrine (which pervades all his later writings) will be found in the *Autobiography*, pp. 353ff. It does not differ from that in *The Baptism of the Holy Ghost*.

⁸³ Pp. 10ff.

⁸⁴ *Baptism of the Holy Ghost*, pp. 13ff.

seeks pardon and eternal life *prior* to his justification, by one act of faith; he then *after* his justification seeks the gift of the Spirit by another, similar but distinct act of faith. "If this promise is not embraced by faith, the gift, 'the sealing and earnest of the Spirit,' will not be vouchsafed." We believe for justification and get it; and if we are content with that, we get that alone. But the way is open to us, to believe for the baptism of the Spirit, too, and if we do so, we get that, too. If we do not take this second step we shall remain merely justified and shall not receive the Spirit. A very inadequate conception of justification of course underlies this notion. Mahan identifies it here with "pardon and eternal life," but is obviously thinking of "pardon," as merely, in the most limited and external sense, relief from penalty incurred, and of "eternal life" as merely the extension of this relief indefinitely. Even so, however, it is difficult to understand how he can imagine that this benefit can be received and continue to be enjoyed alone. Is it conceivable that a child of God, pardoned all his sin, can remain just as he was before his pardon; can abide forever an unchanged sinner?

It cannot be said that it is made overly clear precisely what are the effects of the baptism of the Holy Ghost. This is apparently partly because these effects are conceived very comprehensively—as bringing for example blessings personal to the individual who receives it, and also blessings through him to others; as including thus both the gift of holiness, and that of power. In one passage, for example, the effects of the baptism are described thus:⁸⁵ "Now the special mission of the Spirit is to take truth in all its forms—truth as revealed in both Testaments—and to render it most effective for our sanctification, consolation, fulness of joy, and through us for the sanctification and edification of the church and the salvation of men." He who has received this baptism is accordingly marked out from other men, especially, by these two characteristics—he is holy,

⁸⁵ P. 77.

and he has power with men for the conversion of their souls and the establishment of them in holiness. It makes men on their own part perfect and in their Christian relations a source of perfection for others. Mahan is very much interested in the second of these effects: the baptism of the Holy Ghost is a baptism with power and conveys to its recipients a mysterious effectiveness in the propagation of the gospel and the winning of souls. We are naturally most interested in the former of them; the baptism of the Holy Ghost is the *rationale* of perfection, the efficient cause of our "entire sanctification."⁸⁶ There is a curious passage⁸⁷ in which it is likened to a kind of divine house-cleaning of the soul. Just as the housewife in her annual house-cleaning brings to light much dust and dirt that have been hidden from sight, and all seems in confusion and disorder, though this very confusion and disorder is but the preparation for universal order and purity: so, we are told, the Holy Spirit as He takes possession of the heart often discloses forms of internal corruption, "secret faults," evil tendencies and habits, emotive insensibilities unsuspected before—though this is only preparatory to the enduement of power. Perhaps in comparing the baptism of the Spirit specifically to the housewife's "annual housecleaning," Mahan drops a hint that it is not conceived as a process which is done once for all, but as one which may be repeated. Elsewhere, somewhat surprisingly, he seems to intimate this. At least we read of its being "renewed,"

⁸⁶ In *Out of Darkness into Life*, p. 315, Mahan remarks that the mistake, as it seemed to him of very many who teach the doctrine of the higher life, "is in the fact that they do not set forth as the inevitable condition of entering into and continuing in that life, that we must receive 'the promise of the Spirit in our hearts.'" This at least fixes Mahan's conception of the relation of the Baptism of the Spirit to perfection—it is its "condition." At the bottom of this contention there lies a healthful supernaturalism. Our faith does not itself work the miracle of the Christian life: that is wrought by God the Holy Ghost. There may be something left to be desired when we inquire after the manner of His working this effect.

⁸⁷ P. 118.

"often renewed,"—perhaps, however, here in the sense of relaying rather than reënaction.⁸⁸ He certainly teaches that after we have received it we may lose it again,⁸⁹ and that leaves the way open for its "renewal" in the strictest sense. "With the Spirit in our hearts," he says, and he means it of this supernatural gift received in the Baptism of the Holy Ghost, "we need not sin, but we may sin. We may even 'grieve' or 'quench' the Holy Spirit of God." He instances men who, having had this great gift, have lost it: "who have attained the highest forms of the Higher Life," and "afterwards 'made shipwreck of the faith.'" He warns us that it is possible that Christ may, for our sins, "take our part out of the Book of Life."

Perhaps it ought to be explicitly stated that Mahan does not think of God ever bestowing this great gift of the baptism of the Spirit spontaneously. It must be obtained by us. What God does is merely to put it within our reach. It depends on us, then, whether we obtain it. "All who receive this baptism," he says,⁹⁰ "do so in consequence of a previous compliance with the conditions on which God has promised the blessing." He must be inquired of by believers to do it for them. He never grants it unless He is inquired of with all the heart and all the soul. We must previously be keeping his word and preparing the way for his coming; and, then, seek it with all the heart. Mahan's supernaturalism thus rests on a very express naturalism. We must take the initiative; and indeed it sometimes looks as if we must do much more—as if we must first have the blessing that we may get the blessing, as if we must be perfect in order to acquire perfection. At any rate, it is clear that God never blesses any except those who first "agonize" for the blessing. It is an indispensable prerequisite to the reception of the Baptism of the Spirit, we are told, that the mind be "brought to realize a deep, inner want, 'an aching void within,'—a soul-necessity which must

⁸⁸ P. 102.

⁸⁹ Pp. 124, 127, 128.

⁹⁰ P. 111.

be met.”⁹¹ “Our Methodist brethren,” it is added, “formerly denominated this state, being convicted for sanctification.”

It is an inconvenience to Mahan that he has to depend for the Scriptural ground of his doctrine of the baptism of the Spirit on passages which teach that the Spirit is given to all believers. He is compelled to transmute this into the very different representation that He is at the disposal of all believers. “While all that believe become thereby entitled to this provision,” he says,⁹² “its fulfillment is sought by faith, after we have believed; just as pardon is to be sought in conversion.” “The promise,” he elaborates the comparison, “is just as absolute in the one case as in the other. There is nothing which God so desires to bestow upon sinners as pardon, and with it eternal life. There is no gift he is more willing to bestow upon believers than the divine baptism.” Only, God does not say that all sinners have pardon and eternal life; that this is the characteristic of sinners that they have pardon and eternal life. And He does say that all believers have the Spirit; that it is their very characteristic that they have the Spirit. Only those who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God: “if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His.”

There are, to be sure, the charismatic passages, and perhaps the most amusing instance of the inconvenience which the Scriptures he is compelled to depend upon occasion Mahan, is afforded by one of these—Acts xix. 2ff. This is so much the main passage on which he relies in proof of his cardinal contention that the baptism of the Spirit is a subsequent benefit, sought and received by a special act of faith, “after we believe,” that he weaves it into the statement of his doctrine with an iteration that becomes irksome. We have already met with more than one instance of the emphatic employment which he makes of it. It has of course no bearing on the subject in any case; for its

⁹¹ P. 96.

⁹² P. 51.

reference is to the charismatic and not to the sanctifying Spirit. But Mahan, although protesting⁹³ against confounding the two things, finds himself compelled to draw the primary support for his doctrine of the sanctifying Spirit from the charismatic passages—Acts xix. 1-6, viii. 14-17; x. 44-47.⁹⁴ The point now made, however, is that even when thus perverted from its real reference and violently applied to the sanctifying Spirit, the passage in question is so far from serving Mahan's purpose that it bears precisely the contrary meaning to that which he attributes to it. So eager is he in his employment of it that he adduces it even in the preface to his book on *The Baptism of the Holy Ghost*,⁹⁵ with the emphasis of italics: "Paul put this important question to certain believers, when he first met them, to wit: 'Have ye received the Holy Ghost *since* ye believed?' Does not the question imply that the promise of the Spirit awaits the believer *after* conversion?" And of course, when he comes formally to expound his doctrine,⁹⁶ he exploits the same passage: "We learn that the gift of the Spirit was not expected *in* but *after* conversion: 'Have ye received the Holy Ghost *since* ye believed?'" It would be a curious speculation to inquire into the effect it would have had on his constructions, had Mahan learned that what Paul really said was, "Did ye receive the Holy Spirit when ye believed?" At all events, since the wrong doctrine not only seeks support from the wrong reading of the text, but to a very extraordinary degree is dependent on it and apparently is even largely derived from it, it is a pity that Mahan did not look beyond the language of the Authorized English Version in seeking the meaning of the text. It is true that he did not have the Revised Version to set him right. But he had his Greek Testament; and he had his Alford, whom he repeatedly quotes when it serves his occasion—but not on this occasion. His Alford would have

⁹³ P. 113.

⁹⁴ Chapter 3.

⁹⁵ P. iv.

⁹⁶ Pp. 37ff.

told him that "the aorist should be faithfully rendered: not as E. V., 'Have ye received the Holy Ghost since ye believed?' but '*Did ye receive the Holy Ghost when ye became believers?*'" Indeed Alford would even have argued the question for him, pointing out that not only the grammar but also the sense of the passage requires this rendering. The matter is made the more absurd that Eph. i. 13, which is not a charismatic passage, is repeatedly quoted⁹⁷ in support of Acts xix. 2ff. and is stumbled over in the same fashion. From it is extracted, indeed, such nonsense as this:—"When we believe we set to our seal that God is true; when God gives us the Spirit God sets His seal to us: but unfortunately the two do not go together; we may give our seal to God long before He vouchsafes His to us." What the Apostle really says is of course, that we were sealed "on believing"—intimating that the sealing occurred at once on our believing, and that it occurs, therefore to all that believe. The sealing of the Spirit belongs according to their very nature as such, to all Christians. It is not a special privilege granted after a while to some; but at once to all. Alford would have set Mahan right here, too. He renders the passage: "in whom, on your believing, ye were sealed," and remarks that "the use of the aorist marks the time when the act of believing first took place."⁹⁸

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

⁹⁷ Pp. 38, 40, 113.

⁹⁸ Similarly H. C. G. Moule, *Ephesian Studies*, 1900, p. 35: "*In whom also, on believing, you were sealed with the Spirit of the Promise, the Holy One; the gifts and power of the Paraclete were made yours at once on your union with the Christ of God.*" He adds, to be sure, in a note: "Those gracious gifts may indeed need the believer's constantly advancing use, and his growing discovery of what they are. But in covenant provision they are *his at once* 'in Christ.'" This, however, does not affect the testimony of this passage against the "second blessing."

[The articles in this series were completed by Dr. Warfield some months before his death; the last two will appear in the July and October issues respectively.]

FAITH AND FELLOWSHIP

The following discussion might very well be entitled "A Study in the Apologetics of Experience." It is concerned, in general, with the reciprocal relations between faith in Christianity's peculiar claims, historical and doctrinal, and the experience which is distinctively Christian. It aims to evince the two-fold fact (1) that Christianity finds the final and decisive vindication of its total supernatural claims not in historical and doctrinal considerations, as such, but in experience, but (2) that this vindicating experience is determined not by the religious imagination and sentiments but by historical and doctrinal considerations apart from which it is psychologically unexplainable, unverifiable, and impossible.

We are not here immediately concerned with the question as to the primary source, cause, or ground of faith. Suffice it to say that, according to the Scriptures, distinctively Christian faith originates in an immanent regenerating and witnessing work of the spirit of God within the soul enabling it to re-act spiritually upon divine truth and fact as presented in Christ and the benefits of His redemption; and this teaching of the Scriptures is abundantly substantiated by observation of the fact that faith is invariably identified with and springs from a moral and spiritual state of mind and heart. Back of the act of faith is a disposition toward truth and right. As Jesus said, "If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the doctrine," etc.; and again "He that is of God heareth the words of God: for this cause ye hear them not because ye are not of God." But, as stated, we are concerned with the problem of the confirmation rather than with that of the origination of faith and so with the mutual corroborativeness of the historical and doctrinal considerations, on the one hand, and with the experiential considerations, on the other hand, by which faith seeks to vindicate itself.

In a real and evident sense, Christianity's claims and as-

sumptions are primarily and basically historical and doctrinal; and, in so far as they are such, they must be adjudged by way of a thoroughgoing application of the soundest available principles of historical and philosophical criticism. But Christianity, like other religions, ultimately and supremely occupies itself with the matter of man's relationship, be it real or imaginary, to deity and the psychological entailments of such relationship. More particularly, it purports to introduce the believer into a very determinate and well-certified fellowship of holy love with God through Christ.

Whether or not this claim and assumption is warranted is a question as to the facts of experience. It can, therefore, be answered only by a direct appeal to experience. We must each one appeal, in other words, to our own individual experience as corroborating and as corroborated by the common consciousness of believers; and the verdict reached by this appeal must be accepted by each one of us as for himself final. Only, in saying this, it is vital to recognize that this appeal must be made in full view of the historical, theoretical, and practical (not to say merely pragmatic) presuppositions and consequences of the purported experience; for, while the experience, if real at all, must be self-vindicating in character, nevertheless, it cannot, in view of its purported very determinate character, be divorced from fact and reason after the fashion of our familiar modern pragmatized and sentimentalized theology. What are some, at least, of the most outstanding of these historical, theoretical, and practical considerations?

(1) We may mention first the fact that Christianity, in purporting to establish communal relations between man and deity, is in complete harmony with the essential nature of religion.

A very cursory survey of the religions of mankind evinces the fact that they for the most part at least, resemble Christianity in purporting to achieve intercourse between man and deity. Christianity's distinction, in other words, lies not at

all in its mere assumption and claim of achieving this high result but rather in the ideal character of the intercourse it purports to establish and the wholly unique merit of the credentials which it arrays in support of its contentions. Nothing, therefore, in the nature of religion, as such, can be urged against this specific contention. The fact is that the demand of the human spirit for fellowship with deity, the conviction that such fellowship is possible albeit morally hindered, and the ceaseless struggle, through placating sacrifices, offerings, fastings, self-torture and limitless exorcisms, for the attainment of the coveted boon, these constitute the age-long tragedy of religion. What is more, there lurks under these sentiments and gropings, albeit much obscured, beguiled and thwarted, *some* sense of actualised fellowship, or personal intercourse of a measurably friendly sort, with deity,—superinduced, it may be, by the very craving for it or traceable, it may even be, to some deeper psychological or ultra-psychological origin.

That such is the case is not a matter for question. The only question is as to whether this general characteristic of the various religions is accidental or essential to religion; and this question can be answered only by looking somewhat analytically into the nature of religion, as such. While we cannot undertake, as part of this discussion, to carry out such an analytic procedure, we may summarize several findings of such a procedure which are most relevant to our present discussion.

(a) In the first place, religion, whatever its particular form, is that in which man seeks to bring his life up to the highest potential or level of achievement, completeness, and blessedness. From this unassailable premise it is but a short, direct step to the inference that religion must be conceived as a quest after and as reaching its goal in a social form of experience; for it is only in such a form of experience,—that is, only in the relation to persons rather than to things,—that the powers and susceptibilities of human personality are evoked to the utmost. What is more, religion

must be interpreted in terms of *transcendent* social experience or perfected fellowship; and, whereas such experience is inconceivable except in relationship to transcendent personality, it follows that religion must be interpreted in terms of fellowship perfected through relationship to deity conceived as personality possessed of infinite natural and moral perfections, or as "the only perfect personality," to appropriate Lotze's phraseology.

(b) This finding is corroborated by another consideration of a psychogenetic sort, namely, that there is rooted in the very nature and condition of man's developing personality a demand for an ideally perfect, or transcendent fellowship. This demand is a veritable function of personality, as such. It is not something sentimentally superadded and adventitious to man's constitution. Selfhood is something more than mere naked individuality. It never exists in complete isolation. It is essentially and functionally reciprocative and associative. It finds its genesis and development in an original and perpetual activity of mind which is, on one side, ejective and, on the other, assimilative and which, as such, is quite as self-communicating as it is self-differentiating; quite as socializing as it is individuating. In other words, self-conscious individuality emerges as also a consciousness of kindred "other," or eject selves; and it is only in the reciprocity between the subject-self, or Ego, and other kindred, or eject, selves that its own individuality from first to last proceeds.

Such being the case, personal perfection is possible only in and through perfected personal relations; and the demand of the soul for a perfected fellowship is just the expression and unfolding of its impulse toward individual completeness of life. Conversely, its abstractly conceived merely moral quest for a personal *summum bonum* is seen, under adequate scrutiny, to be something more than a mere grasping after an exclusively individual boon. It is implicitly and sub-consciously a reaching after a perfected communal experience; and, as such, it is more than merely ethical. In

short, the innate, functional demand of our selfhood for perfected fellowship which constitutes the chief underlying incitement of its progress toward perfected personality, is religious. What is more, it is precisely what constitutes man religious; for as already stated such fellowship is possible only in relation to deity, as "the only perfect personality." In other words, religion conceived as a quest after perfected friendship and so as fellowship with an infinitely perfect Friend, or Father-God, enters into what we may, with Professor Baldwin, call the very "Dialectic of Personal Growth."

(c) This brings us to a third and very intimately related conclusion; namely, that the notion of and the belief in deity as personal, so universal and ineradicable in religion, is itself not so much the psychological prius, or cause, as the consequent, or dialectical posit, of the genetically prior groping of the human soul after a perfection of fellowship in which its most primal spiritual impulses vaguely seek satisfaction. It emerges and takes logical shape in the course of the development of personal consciousness; and it does so—as a direct consequence of the reciprocative activity inherent in the human spirit from birth. It is the outcome and aftermath of the soul's inevitable effort to give appropriate intellectual representation to these primal impulses.

This is only to assert that the conception of deity as infinite personality emerges and evolves as the expression and satisfaction of a vitalistic impulse of the human spirit which itself precedes the formal concept. Just as the babe's craving for food precedes any intelligent concept of food but inevitably issues afterward in more and more well-defined notions pertaining to food, so is it with the determinate notion of deity. To change the analogy, just as the babe is the subject of and manifests social instincts long before it has attained any distinct or formal notion whatever of personality either in itself or in others, so likewise does the unfolding human spirit reach out for the satisfactions of a companionship, or friendship, which wholly transcends mere

human relationships and does so long before it has framed any determinate notion of that transcendent personality which must be logically equated with such transcendent experience.

In view of such considerations as the foregoing, we are abundantly justified in affirming that nothing in the nature of religion as such, can be urged against Christianity's claim and teaching concerning union and communion with God through Christ. Indeed, this claim is in profoundest harmony with what we have seen to be the essentially communal nature of religion. Thus Christianity and the other religions of mankind are mutually corroborative in their support of the belief in the possibility and even the actuality of personal intercourse, more or less ideal and friendly, between man and deity. Certainly polytheistic faiths are full of the warm, vivid sense of such intercourse, even though the purported intercourse lack ideal moral quality and potency. It may even be fairly said that in this particular respect polytheistic faiths may and sometimes do more nearly satisfy the soul's demand for divine fellowship than does a tightly closed monotheistic, unitarian, or deistic form of faith, to say nothing of pantheism.

(2) The presumption thus raised in favor of Christianity's doctrine of God as personal and as holding fellowship with man finds for itself a background of philosophical support in whatever considerations may be adduced in favor of interpreting the ultimate reality and agency of the world in terms of personal spirit rather than in terms of objective nature such as matter, force, life. These considerations are quite largely identical with the traditional "proofs" of the divine existence on aetiological, teleological, moral, aesthetic, and ontological grounds. To these familiar "proofs" should be added, however, some less familiar considerations of an epistemological and ontological character which must find place in any adequate philosophy of the world and man but which we cannot here undertake to expound. Very especially should be taken into account the fact that the ultimate,

or divine, being must be conceived as personal and self-communicating in order to provide an adequate metaphysic of human personality, that is, an adequate onto-genetic account of the human soul. The origin and ontological basis of personal spirit in us can be nothing less and nothing else than personal spirit in deity.

Suffice it here simply to submit the opinion that these various considerations, taken conjointly, greatly strengthen the presumption in favor of that notion of deity as personal and self-communicating which underlies all of Christianity's special claims and, particularly, the claim just now under discussion.

(3) The presumption raised by the two preceding considerations is further strengthened by the fact that the very conception of fellowship with God which is enshrined in Christianity's claims is so wholly transcendent that it cannot be adequately or plausibly accounted for as the mere product of the idealizations of the religious imagination; that is, it cannot be satisfactorily accounted for except on the assumption of the verity of the supernatural claims which enshrine it and are, in turn, historically, doctrinally, and by a psychological necessity, entailed by it. It perfectly harmonizes with and satisfies the whole round of the ideal demands of religion for a concrete, significant, coherent, experience of personal relationship to deity in which all truly vital interests and intrinsic values of human existence are unified, furthered, and consummated. It is absolutely free from those puerile, phantastic, often crass, even immoral elements which inevitably enter more or less into the idealisations of all non-biblical religions.

Accordingly, the Christian conception of fellowship with God, as such, supplies a desideratum of all religions which neither the popular poetic nor the speculative imagination has been able to supply; namely, a normative ideal consistently related to human experience and yet consistently transcending and spiritualising it. In short, all that can be said of the Christ-ideal, as such, can be said of this ideal of

fellowship with God through Christ. It is an ideal to the spiritual purity, charm, sublimity, and potency of which the human mind, apart from Christianity alone, has never even approximately attained and to which there is no warrant in the religious history of mankind for thinking it could ever attain. Just as, on the testimony of the great majority of thoughtful students of the matter, including many who cannot themselves accept the traditional supernatural claims of Christianity, the portraiture of Christ, simply as a possession of the mind, could not be a fabrication of the religious imagination, just so it is with this mental representation of union and communion with God, as Father, through Himself which Jesus engendered in the minds of His followers. Indeed, the two ideals of the Christian mind are logically and historically inseparable and are complementary one of the other.¹ They represent successive moments in the full Christian apprehension of God.

It is futile to attempt to portray more specifically than does the language of Scripture the exalted and blessed nature of the Christian's fellowship with deity. It is there represented under the form of a friendship, replete in closest intimacy, confidentiality, and privilege; an ineffable oneness of believers with the Father and with his Son and so with one another; a sitting "in the heavenlies" and being "blest with all spiritual blessings," etc. It is "life more abundant." It is love, joy, peace, comfort, assurance, hope, trust, at their highest potential. It is human experience on the highest imaginable levels of moral and

¹ Referring to "Christ as exhibited in the Gospels," John Stuart Mill asks: "But who among his disciples or among their proselytes was capable of inventing the sayings ascribed to Jesus or imagining the life and character revealed in the Gospels? Certainly not the fishermen of Galilee; or certainly not St. Paul, whose character and idiosyncrasies were of a totally different sort; still less the early Christian writers in whom nothing is more evident than that the good which was in them was all derived, as they always professed that it was derived, from the higher source." The same might be said *mutatis mutandis* concerning the Christian idea of union and communion with God through Christ.

spiritual meaning, worth, and achievement. It is, as expressly set forth, a sustained experience at every juncture of which it may be testified that "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him." In the apostolic benediction "the fellowship of the Spirit" is invoked conjointly with, because it is conceived as inseparable from, the "love of God" and the "grace of the Lord Jesus Christ."

The wholly unique character of the Christian portrayal of fellowship with deity is not a matter for proof. Rather it is a matter for moral and spiritual recognition; and for those who are capable of this recognition a redoubtable presumption is raised in favor of the supernatural origin of the portrayal, as such, and so in favor of the verity of the supernatural claims with which it is historically and logically bound up. In other words, the Christian conception of fellowship with God admits of no explanation except either as a miracle of the human imagination or as the mental reflection, or counterpart, of an objective revelation of that which lies above and beyond the experiences of earth. Which alternative is preferable is a point about which there need be no parleying. The choice is between a fake, and a real, supernaturalism.

(4) The presumption thus raised is still more positively and specifically confirmed by the whole extensive network of historical evidences, documentary, traditionary, sacramental, and institutional, whereby Christianity is wont to seek the objective attestation of its supernatural claims. We cannot, of course, undertake to set these evidences in array. That task must be left to the ordinary treatises on Christian evidences. Suffice it here to insist that no critical ingenuity has so far proven itself able to undo this congeries of historical considerations. Every attempt so to do has only entrapped the adventurer in an ever-deepening maze of dilemmas and artificial, strained, often conflicting conjectures which can offer in their own behalf little more than some

speculative, *Es ist möglich*, *Es ist wahrscheinlich* or, on the other hand, some dogmatic, *Es ist unmöglich*, *Est ist unwahrscheinlich*. Much occupation with critical theorisings of this sort gives one the sense of being whirligigged out of his wits. The experience is worth while, just to see how it goes, provided one has a sturdy knack of resisting, and, when occasion demands, of recovering, from learned befuddlement. A rugged and sanctified common sense is the only insurance against the grave liabilities entailed by indulging the experience. Only too often does it result in a persistent grogginess with reference to historic facts and their spiritual significances. Critical ingenuity which simply dissipates itself in overwrought efforts to tear apart the close, intricate web of Christianity's historical evidences is surely only stultifying to the cause of truth and religion to which it professes such simon-pure devotion.

(5) Very closely related to the historical evidences of Christianity are its fruits as externally manifested in the lives of individuals and its results, moral, cultural, and social, as embedded in the affairs and institutions of civilization. We can here only call attention to the evidential value and validity of Christianity's potent influence in promoting all that is good and blessed in the life of the world. Whatever corroboration is afforded by this consideration to Christianity's claims in general, of course, accrues to the strengthening of the particular and climactic claim concerning fellowship with God which is here especially under discussion.

In view of the preceding considerations and whatever presumptive significance they possess, let us now return to the momentous question, Is Christianity's assumption and claim concerning fellowship with God through Christ warranted? Only before dealing in the most direct way with the question let us fully recognise the theoretical and spiritual consequences of denying or doubting the purported fellowship of the Christian believer with God. These con-

sequences are grave for the very reason that Christianity, in making the claim and assumption under investigation, brings to a focus and to the final, supreme test of experience the whole round of its pretensions, and, at the same time, it brings to a decisive issue the question as to whether the common demand and assumption of religions, in general, concerning personal intercourse, more or less friendly, between man and deity have any sure vindication.

In the first place, this claim and assumption, in the very nature of the case, constitutes Christianity's supreme, most comprehensive and most ultimately significant contention. Herein, indeed, is to be found the sum and substance, the inner core, the very heart of hearts, of Christianity itself, the *raison d'être* of all its other contentions. This is fully evinced in that sublime, measureless yearning of Jesus which finds such passionate yet deep-toned, majestic expression in His prayer in behalf of His disciples and their successors in the faith:—"that they may all be one; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they may also be in us;—I in them, and thou in me, that they may be perfected in one." It is to the verity of this deeply grounded fellowship, that John, the beloved of Jesus, bears testimony when he declares, "our fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ." It is the invoking of this fellowship that constitutes the theme and motive of apostolic benediction.

In short, Christianity's entire import and purport are concentrated here. Accordingly, if it fails to make good its claim and assumption at this crucial, climactic point, it thereby fails to finally and adequately verify its supernatural contentions as a whole; for the supernatural can never fully evince its reality in objective miraculous fact unless and until it becomes equated with and transmuted into experience so vital, so dynamic, so significant that it is self-evidencing; and reconciliation, or restored fellowship, of sinful man with God, as Father, through the mediatorship of the God-man Christ Jesus and the inner spiritual relations

of God to the soul, is that experience in which Christianity's claims logically and avowedly culminate. Doubt or denial of this climactic and crucial claim is to discredit Christianity as a whole and then toss us the task of explaining or, what is even more difficult, of explaining away Christianity as a historical and spiritual phenomenon.

Similarly, if there be no such thing as certified fellowship with God through Christ, then the communal beliefs and sentiments that are universal in religion have *a fortiori* no decisive vindication in human experience. Then the only answer as to whether deity is self-communicating and personal is a purely speculative one. For this reason the rights and claims of all the religions converge here. The religious hopes, aspirations, and interests of all mankind are at stake. Religion, as such, be it natural or revealed, biblical or non-biblical, is on trial. It finds or fails to find decisive vindication just in so far as that fellowship which Christianity purports to establish between man and deity can be said to become certified, and no farther; for, if fellowship with deity in this its most highly accredited and transcendent form be not unmistakably real, then must it be confessed to the despair of all religion that the demand for satisfying and self-vindicating experience of personal intercourse with deity which inheres in religion, has no answer but its own mocking echo. Then truly is man, of whatever faith, but as

An infant crying in the night;
An infant crying for the light,
And with no language but a cry.

Such being the case, it only remains to press the crucial question, is union and communion with God through Christ a certified fact of religious experience? If so and in so far as it is so, this experience constitutes a decisive and final confirmation of faith not only in this climactic claim but also in the whole round of those Christian claims and teachings which are subsidiary to and involved in this experience. Not only so, this experience constitutes a final and decisive

answer to the broad question of all religion, whatever its form, as to the possibility and certified actuality of personal intercourse between man and deity. What then is the verdict of experience? Does experience render any decisive verdict?

In dealing with this question it is to be kept consistently in mind that the fellowship with deity which Christianity purports to achieve is specifically represented as available only to the true believer in Christianity's distinctive supernatural claims. More particularly, its *sine qua non*, according to the Scriptures and in the very nature of the case, is faith in the personality and fatherhood of God as revealed in the theanthropic person and the reconciling work and sufferings of Jesus Christ, God's Son, sent of God to be the Mediator between holy God and sinful man. It presupposes, to put it in the words of one among many relevant passages, that "God sent forth his Son, born of a woman, born under the law, that he might redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons" and that, in the further execution of this adoptive purpose, "God sent forth the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, Abba, Father." In other words, it presupposes (1) that Jesus Christ, as the Son of man *par excellence*, holds deepest kinship with us *in puris naturalibus*; (2) that, as the eternal, archetypal Son of God, He is one with God in an equally deep sense; (3), that, because of this double kinship, He is Mediator of a common life between God and man; and (4) that this common life, or union and communion with God through Christ, assumes the form of a consciously rehabilitated kinship with God, or sonship to God; that is, it assumes the form of a participation in Christ's filial consciousness, or, shall we say, a reproduction, in those who believe, of the Spirit of God's perfect Son; or, to put it still otherwise, it assumes the form of a consciousness of sonship to God which exists archetypally and perfectly only in the eternal Christ.

Conversely, it is not to the experience of the skeptical and

critical interpreter of Christianity that appeal is to be made regarding the reality of the fellowship which it purports to establish between man and God; nor is it to the experience of the mere pragmatist or other professed exponent and adherent of Christianity whose faith is not determined by and does not strictly answer to the historical and doctrinal claims of apostolic Christianity and whose experience in that measure fails to be distinctively and typically Christian from the apostolic standpoint. In the logical and psychological necessities of the case, it is only the believer's consciousness that can be in immediate first-hand possession of the experiential data in the light of which this issue must be finally adjudged. Only by penetrating within its inmost holy place is it possible to know directly and surely whether this climactic claim of Christianity finds vindication in the profoundest rational and spiritual verities of soul life; and none but the believer can enter here. "For who among men knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of the man which is in him?" And, similarly, who among men knoweth the things of a believer save the spirit of the believer that is in him?

Wherefore, the believer's consciousness itself being the final tribunal to which the question as to the reality of fellowship with God through Christ can and must be appealed, it follows that the verdict of this tribunal cannot be successfully gainsaid. The non-Christian mind has neither scientific nor moral right to challenge the believer's experience as illusory whether on the ground that it represents an ethically unique form of auto-intoxication of the religious imagination or that it is, at best, a merely psychological reflex of credulous acceptance of Christianity's critically unverified historical and doctrinal claims. In view of preceding theoretical considerations regarding the communal nature of religion and the demands of a sound philosophy, particularly in the way of providing a satisfactory onto-genetic account of human personality, we may unhesitatingly proclaim that the believer's consciousness of fellowship with

God through Christ is completely beyond effective assail on theoretical grounds. It is as the citadel within the wall which cannot be taken even though all the outer defences be shattered.²

The only alternative, therefore, is to accept the full implication of the fact that the question, What, as a matter of fact, is the verdict of human experience? resolves itself into the more particular question, What is the verdict of the Christian believer's experience? and that this latter question, like all ultimate questions of psychological fact, can be authoritatively answered only by way of the fundamental method of introspective observation. In other words, only the believer can have immediate, direct first-hand knowledge concerning the actualities of a believing experience.

We are not at all denying that the scientific psychologist, as such, even though himself not a believer in Christianity and so not a subject of Christian experiences, may make certain objective investigations concerning experiences into which he has never himself entered. He may, through ingeniously devised questionnaires and other more or less politely inquisitorial methods, accumulate a very considerable mass of proxy information about the inner consciousness of the Christian. He may systematically arrange and with much interesting statistical precision tabulate his purely objective, coldly scientific, and presumably sentimentally unbiased or, shall we rather say, unvaluated findings concerning the religious "reactions" and testimonies of professed believers. The fact that he is not in a position to pass judgment upon what lies back of these "reactions" and testimonies in the way of an unmistakable experience of fellowship with the divine should not lead us to discount what there is of real value in such methods of ascertaining the common content and features of the experience of believers and how far this common consciousness as revealed through common testimonies and "behavioristic similarities" harmonises with Christianity's claims. Perhaps it

² Cp. James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 422ff.

should suggest the propriety of such investigations being more largely undertaken by the Christian expert in psychology. Certainly a perusal of recent publications on the psychology of religion makes evident the great need of the devoted labors of some thoroughgoing Christian psychologist with his superior instinct for "getting next" to the inmost facts, for differentiating between a nominal or professed and a *bona fide* acceptance of Christianity's essential claims, and for enabling the true believer to analyze and interpret rightly his own experience. And yet we repeat that such considerations should not induce us to minimize unduly the value of any candid effort to ascertain what lies in the common consciousness of Christians. Such efforts, however prompted, inevitably subserve the cause of truth in the long run. Even though they bring to light no new facts of primary importance, they bring a worth while added support to long accepted facts and freshen our appreciation of the habit of the Christian apologete and theologian of establishing and defending Christianity's claims and doctrines by insistently appealing, if less formally and statistically, yet no less actually and accurately, to the common experience of believers.

It is very pertinent and, indeed, highly important, in this connection, to fully recognize that, according to the teachings of Jesus and His apostles, the believer's fellowship with God, though primarily an individual experience, cannot be divorced from fellowship with his fellow-believers. These are not two separable experiences. They are but the two sides, the Godward and the manward respectively, of one and the same experience. Neither form or phrase of experience is realizable in any ripeness or fullness without the other. What is familiarly denoted by the phrase, "the communion of the saints," embraces both of these correlated experiences, or phases of the experience of the believer. It is a conscious spiritual union and communion of believers with each other based upon and resulting from their union and communion with God in grace

and in glory through Christ; and the reality of the latter is concretely and practically certified both to the soul of the believer and before the eyes of men only by the equivalent reality of the former. As previously indicated, it is for this transcendent twofold experience charged and surcharged with holy love, joy, and glory that Jesus yearned when He said: "Neither for these only do I pray, but for them also that believe on me through their word; *that they may all be one*; even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be in us; that the world may believe that thou didst send me. And the glory which thou hast given me I have given unto them; *that they may be one*, even as we are one; I in them, and thou in me, *that they may be perfected into one*; that the world may know that thou didst send me, and lovedst them, even as thou lovedst me."

Whatever the other meanings with which this passage is so limitlessly pregnant, this much it makes unmistakably clear, that the believer's oneness of life and fellowship with God through Christ consummates itself and evinces its reality in a oneness of life, a mutuality of love, a solidarity of holy interests, a spirit of reciprocal service and sacrifice on the part of believers, which has its only adequate type, or analogy, in the relations between the Father and the Son and which, for that reason, transcends all the intimacies of earth in the blessedness and glory it reveals. This fact is made increasingly clear in the further course of the prayer and particularly in the closing petition, "that the love wherewith thou lovedst me may be in them, and I in them." We have stated before that it is to his consciousness of the fulfillment of this prayer of our Lord in his own experience that John is manifestly testifying when he declares, "our fellowship is with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ." The expression "our fellowship" denotes not merely that fellowship which believers severally and separately have with the Father, but includes the fellowship which they have with each other because of their individual and collective fellow-

ship with the Father; for, says the apostle, "that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you also, *that ye may also have fellowship with us*"; and again, "if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, *we have fellowship one with another.*"

We would, accordingly, not be inappropriately bringing out the thought of the apostle and of New Testament teaching, in general, if we should paraphrase one of John's later and cognate utterances in the same epistle (1 Jn. iv. 21) so as to make it read: "If a man say, I have fellowship with God, and despiseth the fellowship of his brother, he is a liar: for he that hath not fellowship with his brother whom he hath seen, how can he have fellowship with God whom he hath not seen."

Recognising fully, then, the evidential value of the common consciousness of Christian believers in the matter of their fellowship with God and with each other, as revealed in their testimonies and "behavior," we come back, in closing, to the primary apologetical consideration that the reality of this transcendent fellowship in both its God-ward and its manward aspects, must, in the last resort, be determined by each individual for himself in the light of the actualities of his own individual experience. After all is said, theoretical, historical, and other merely external, evidences, howsoever ethico-socially and pragmatically cogent, and even when corroborated by the directly and indirectly attested experience of others, have nothing more than a presumptive and corroborative force. Whatever the force of these presumptive and corroborative considerations, the verity of the Christian claim and belief concerning fellowship with God must be vindicated in individual experience before it can become transmuted into rational certainty.

To be sure, the true believer's experience may fall short of its best possibilities. Faith and experience³ alike have their vicissitudes. They suffer lapses and various degrees of obscurity from moral and spiritual laxity, from lack

³ See *Confession of Faith*.

of habits of and disposition for self-examination as well as from inability to analyse intelligently and interpret spiritual experience, and very especially from a lack of study of the Bible's teachings concerning what constitutes a distinctive religious experience. It frequently occurs as a result of doctrinal misguidance and critical speculative sophistication of the believer's mind. We have, for example, personal acquaintance with a professing Christian whose "walk and conversation" appears to harmonise fully with his profession but who, under the influence of the modern mode of interpreting Christianity into exclusively social terms, candidly maintains that with himself the consciousness of fellowship with God is wholly merged into that of fellowship with his fellow-men; so that he has no sense of fellowship with God as a plus something over his fellowship with man. This state of mind is due to doctrinal perversion and robs the subject of it, though in his way and measure a real Christian, of a typical experience such as is the normal equivalent of a full-orbed apostolic faith. It is altogether anomalous though not without parallel, real or feigned, on the part of others, even would-be Christian teachers and writers. It is as a house divided against itself. It most surely cannot stand. It must give way to a more distinctively apostolic form of experience or to outright unbelief. Such instances of perverted and questionable experience do not alter the fact that the typical believer's experience of divine fellowship stands out in its own immediately and fruitionally self-evidencing light and is not amenable to extraneous disproof. Suffice it to say, on the other hand, that, if and in so far as individual experience fails to yield a clear and decisive verdict, just in that measure does faith suffer eclipse and challenge. Accordingly, a persistent lack of actuating sense of fellowship with God through Christ is for the subject of it fatal to faith and to spiritual life.

Further than this discussion cannot go. It only remains for each one of us who would know Christianity's final de-

fence to go home to himself and put to himself the crucial, momentous query, Have I union and communion with God through Christ? Am I the fortunate subject of those particular benefits which are scripturally represented to us as accompanying and flowing from such union and communion? Do we have a concrete, vivid, assured sense of propitiated divine righteousness, remedied guilt, "solaced contrition," and rehabilitated kinship with God through Christ which puts Christ's mediatorship beyond all doubt? Have we so received Christ and through Him "come unto the Father" that His saying is verified, "he that hath seen me hath seen the Father," and we, consequently, no longer say in blind, unsatisfied longing, "show us the Father," but rather, in the consciousness of an exalted love infinitely reciprocated, say, "Abba, Father," and feel that "it sufficeth us"? And are we so perfected in our conscious union and communion with God as Father through Christ that, as He prayed might be the case, not only do we "know" that the Father hath sent Him but, in the solidarity of our life and the mutuality of our love as believers, we are giving to the world a convincing sign of the verity of what we ourselves know more surely through inner experience?

If so, then may we, giving utterance at one and the same time both to the deepest religious yearnings of the soul and to the complete satisfaction of these yearnings, join in testifying—

'Tis the weakness in strength, that I cry for! My flesh that I seek
In the Godhead! I seek and I find it. O Saul, it shall be
A face like my face that receives thee; a Man like to me,
Thou shalt love and be loved by, forever: a Hand like this hand
Shall throw open the gates of new life to thee! See the
Christ stand!

Omaha, Neb.

D. E. JENKINS.

THE BIBLE IN SHAKESPEARE

The Bible has furnished inspiration, substance and flavor to vast quantities of humanity's best literature. How is it with the myriad-minded Shakespeare, the mighty magician who waves his wand, and a world of men and women reveal the inmost workings of mind and heart and soul at his command? He is the most impersonal of artists. Back of the mimic world on whose prosaic plains, or in whose stifling swamps, or upon whose majestic mountain tops, the living creatures of his imagination move, no one dare really say that he has clearly discerned the features of the Master whose cunning hand is pulling the strings. What one may reasonably expect from a study of the Bible in Shakespeare is not so much a picture of what the Book was in the personal life of the man himself, as a cross-section, an "elevation," a set of characteristic samples, of its power and place and influence in his day or, possibly oftener, in the times of which he wrote; or these intermingled.

We should not be disappointed if Scripture did not bulk largely in Shakespeare's writings, in spite of the marvelous way it was beginning to take hold of the English mind. The nature of his own life and of his profession, and the general circumstances of his day, would account for a meager appearance of it in his works. He had no such inspiration, either from his own occupation or from the atmosphere about him, as had Dante or Milton or Tasso, to attempt lofty flights into the region of high religious emotion or exalted theological thought. He was a man of Thomas Cromwell's sphere and time, rather than of Oliver's. A practical working playwright and actor, his business was to make his theatre succeed, as only it could succeed, by "tickling the ears of the groundlings," whether these were common folk or the nobility. The splendor of his genius is seen in the fact that, working under such conditions and with such aims, he has left us the most marvelous picture-gallery of human character outside of the

Bible, painted with a masterly sweep of his inspired hand, and throbbing with inimitable life. But it could hardly be expected that Biblical subjects would be very much in demand amid the frequenters of the Shoreditch theatre, or the Globe, or Black Friars. The Puritans who might have been interested in the subject were no frequenters of the theatre, and would have cropped his ears for his impiety in prostituting such noble themes to such base uses if he had attempted it, and they had had the power; and the courtiers, the nobility as a rule, and the great common people, of Elizabeth's day, had scant sympathy with deep and earnest evangelical religion, even where their hearts had been weaned from attachment to their venerable spiritual mother, the Church of Rome.

His knowledge of Scripture must have been like his knowledge of so many other things, the result of the unpurposed absorption of perhaps the most assimilative mind humanity has ever known. He plunged into active life at eighteen, as the father of a family, and soon left home to try his fortunes in more congenial London. The well trained, scholarly Ben Jonson scoffed at his "small Latin and less Greek," but in his all too brief schooling at Stratford he must have acquired still less Scripture. Nor would the deficiencies of school education be supplied by any large instruction and inspiration at home, for he was of antecedents very little favorable to intensive Bible study. His mother's people, the Ardens, were Roman Catholics. His father John Shakespeare was publicly cited for non-attendance at the parish church. And William Shakespeare himself, in a somewhat roystering youth, engaged in a more or less extensive feud with the local Puritan magistrate, Sir Thomas Lucy, a feud whose memory has been perpetuated in various slighting allusions in the plays. The tradition that he died a Roman Catholic has at least as much for it as against it, though here as with other details of his life, the evidence is very meager. If we might judge of his own real opinions by the speech he puts into the mouth of the Ghost in Hamlet, he was a believer in Purgatory:

My hour is almost come
 When I to sulphurous and tormenting flames
 Must render up myself.
 I am thy father's spirit,
 Doomed for a certain time to walk the night,
 And for the day confined to fast in fires
 Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature
 Are burnt and purged away.

But we have no real warrant for considering this anything more than a belief the dramatist is ascribing to some of his characters.

If, as most critics agree, the Sonnets are more nearly autobiographic, both as to conveying the author's own feelings and as to their freer expression in forms and ways which exhibit the trend and characteristic working of the poet's mind, we must conclude that Shakespeare's was not a deeply religious nature, or else that it had never been awakened at its depths. There are many Biblical allusions in the Sonnets, but nothing to show a Biblical bent. The classical allusions are far more common, and far more "*con amore*." There is one fine variation on "Love never faileth":

Let me not to the marriage of true minds
 Admit impediments. Love is not love,
 Which alters when it alteration finds,
 Or bends with the remover to remove.
 Oh no! it is an ever fixed mark
 That looks on tempests and is never shaken.
 It is the star to every wandering bark
 Whose worth's unknown, although its height be taken.

But this is merely earthly love, not heavenly. The mind that in 2156 lines of verse, ingenious, elaborate, highly wrought, at times almost cloying in its sensuous sweetness, can ring the changes of its passion for its unknown object with an attention that marches round and round the absorption of earthly love, with never an outlook on God or things divine, except as a "fetching" comparison, is certainly not a mind "incurably religious."

How a really religious mind reacts under the combined

influence of love human and love divine may be seen in *In Memoriam*. Arthur Hallam is the human subject of the poem and of its clinging love, the love of lingering reminiscence, but the real subject is Jesus Christ and the immortal life in Him. The poet starts with

My Arthur, whom I shall not see
Till all my widowed race be run,
Dear as the mother to the son,
More than my brothers are to me;

but his thought mounts toward, and centers on

Strong Son of God, Immortal Love,
Whom we, that have not seen thy face,
By faith, and faith alone, embrace.

.....
Our wills are ours, we know not how;
Our wills are ours, to make them thine!

There is no such note as that in Shakespeare's Sonnets. But what religion can do with love that healthily contains the sex-element, how it

Took up the harp of life
And smote on all the chords with might,
Smote the chord of self, that trembling,
Passed in music out of sight,

is more strikingly seen in Mrs. Browning, that "lyric love, half woman and half bird." Her Aeolian harp of lofty intellect and intensest feeling had first, it is true, been swept in every string by the fingers of the great Master, and when in response to the tender, sympathetic, masculine love of Robert Browning her spirit is thrilled again, now with the human affection, it lost not any note of the divine, but the two mingled in a harmony that touched the loftiest spiritual and the intensest human. Perhaps only second in literary skill, artistic richness, and esthetic feeling to the Sonnets of Shakespeare, how infinitely they transcend his in their mounting height! Reading him, you have a profound pity for that soaring intellect, that fecund fancy, that prepotent energy, tethered to the treadmill of an earthly love it knows to be unworthy of it, unable to escape, and agonizingly glorying in its slavery, Ulysses fawning at the feet of Circe,

Prospero fallen under the spell of Caliban. But Mrs. Browning:

How do I love thee? Let me count the ways.
I love thee to the depth and breadth and height
My soul can reach when feeling out of sight
For the ends of Being and ideal Grace.
I love thee to the level of every day's
Most quiet need, by sun and candle light;
I love thee freely, as men strive for Right;
I love thee purely, as they turn from Praise;
I love thee with the passion put to use
In my old griefs, and with my childhood's faith;
I love thee with a love I seemed to lose
With my lost saints,—I love thee with the breath,
Smiles, tears, of all my life! and if God choose,
I shall but love thee better after death!

We have come out of the sickly, deadly, perfume-heavy air of an odalisque's chamber of dalliance into the pure, open, holy of holies, the sun-swept spaces of a godly love, sacred and unashamed.

Another modifying set of facts is connected with the peculiar circumstances of his time. He was a child of the Renaissance rather than of the Reformation. But he lived too early for either to exert and exhibit its full influence in English life, and therefore too early for the Bible to get in its full work on him. Shakespeare was born in 1564, six years after Elizabeth's enthronement; his first thirty-nine years were spent under the more or less protecting shadow of that "imperial votaress." In 1603, about the time he was writing the Sonnets, Elizabeth died, and James "the First and Sixth" came to the throne, reigning till 1625. Shakespeare died in 1616, fifty-two years old. His whole life was passed under Elizabeth and James, in whose reigns the Reformation in England, while formally and nominally accomplished, was by no means complete, as indeed, it has never become. There is grave doubt, in the minds of both "churchmen" and "dissenters," whether the word "Protestant" should ever be applied to the Church of England.

There had been much activity in Bible translation in Eng-

land, though up to Elizabeth's time amid many difficulties and considerable persecution. Coverdale's Bible had been issued under Henry VIII's royal sanction in 1534, the first complete English Bible. Matthew's Revision of this appeared in 1537, and became the basis of all other versions for 75 years. Taverner's followed this. In 1539 the Great Bible came out, largely under Coverdale's supervision. A "reformed" edition of this was issued in 1540 under Cranmer's authorization. These Bibles had met with more or less hearty royal approval, not from zeal for God's Word, but as promotive of independence of the Church of Rome. Henry VIII, never at heart anything but a Romanist, now began to react in that direction, though not toward the Papacy, seeing probably that the open and widely distributed Bible would be antagonistic to his own absolution and essential Romanism.

Accordingly he took drastic measures to restrict Bible publication and reading, confining its use to certain small social classes, less than one-tenth of the people, and prohibiting all but the Great Bible. Edward's reign, of course, was active in the production and distribution of Bibles. Mary's meant the destruction of many. But during her reign and a little later, at Geneva the "Geneva Bible" was prepared and printed (1560), becoming the popular English Bible. Elizabeth, 1558 to 1603, though no very ardent Protestant herself, required a copy of the Great Bible to be provided in every church, and gave every encouragement to the reading of the Scriptures. In 1568 a new revision appeared under royal authorization, entitled "The Bishops' Bible," which held sway until in 1611 the present "King James" revision of it was made. While the dates would be in favor of the supposition that the Bible he was most familiar with was either the Great Bible or the Bishops', Dr. Louis F. Benson has shown by a careful comparison of his Biblical allusions or quotations with the corresponding passages, that it was the Geneva Bible that had filtered into the roystering young Shakespeare's mind. But during a good share of

Elizabeth's reign, Convocation and the Universities, and probably a majority of the people generally, especially of the lower ranks, were still sympathetic with Rome, and it would appear that William Shakespeare's Bible knowledge entered his mind and heart, rather by the weight and permeating influence of a general body of teaching concerning Biblical facts and principles which came partly from the Pre-Reformation teachings and ceremonies (perhaps chiefly the latter) of the Church itself, partly from the earlier English versions, partly from the saturation of the public mind through the centuries with the simpler, more salient, more assimilable Scripture teachings. This suggestion is greatly corroborated farther on by a study of the source and character of his actual Bible allusions.

The Bible's touch on literature has been of three principal sorts. It has actually inspired and generated some of the world's greatest, like *Paradise Lost*, *Paradise Regained*, the *Paradiso*, the *Inferno*. It has marvelously enriched literature with character and quotation and allusion, so that he who reads the world's best, and is unfamiliar with the Scripture, will lose the highest, finest, subtlest beauties of those human masterpieces. And it has suffused literature with its own spirit, tone, temper, so that without intention, in spite of itself, the literature reveals the moulding, inspiring, uplifting atmosphere with which the Bible has surrounded it.

We have no work of Shakespeare's directly inspired by the Bible. He was the child, the servant, and the exploiter of his time; and he was a theatrical manager. All his plays are "potboilers." The Bible boiled no theatrical pots. As to the second and third contributions, the enrichment of character, incident and truth, and the influence of spirit, they are very great, the last, though subtle and hard to seize or exhibit, the greatest. It breathes itself unwittingly, imperiously, in the midst of and through everything he does; even where he seems most pagan he can not escape. But in studying these two elements we are confronted with

just the phenomena we should expect of the impersonal and "objective" William Shakespeare.

A careful examination of his very many Scriptural allusions reveals the fact that they are not uniform in frequency, but vary in number and character almost exactly according to the life, times, people, each play is picturing. Shakespeare strikes us moderns as a rather careless dramatist. His greatness certainly did not lie in a Tissot-like meticulousness of attention to the minutiae of histrionic and historic verisimilitude. He is guilty of saying "a painted vest Prince Vortigern had on, Which from a naked Pict his grandsire won." He makes his old Romans talk like Elizabethan Englishmen, and has his warriors at the siege of Troy gravely discussing the philosophy of Aristotle; and gives Bohemia, what she may soon have, a seacoast. Yet these are slips, carelessness, due to haste or absorption in his main purpose, the getting out of his play, the expression of his idea, possibly the easier and less complicated approach to the contemporaneous minds he is catering to. To the main purpose he is always true, and therefore the background of thought in each play will in general be that which Shakespeare conceives to be the background of its time and people, though even he can not shake himself absolutely free.

Without an attempt at unerring exactness, for each re-reading is likely to disclose new allusions and to fray out older supposed ones, the Biblical allusions, aside from the general references (which are very many) to "God," "the gods," or "Heaven," occur in the following proportions: *Titus Andronicus*, 4 (all "devils"); *Henry VI*, Part I, 13; *Love's Labor Lost*, 17; *Comedy of Errors*, 7; *Two Gentlemen of Verona*, 10; *Midsummer Night's Dream*, 12; *Henry VI*, Part II, 23; Part II, 15; *Richard II*, 19; *Romeo and Juliet*, 3; *Richard II*, 21; *Much Ado About Nothing*, 5; *Merchant of Venice*, 23; *King John*, 15; *Henry IV*, 17; *Henry V*, 28; *Taming of the Shrew*, none; *All's well That Ends Well*, 14; *Measure for Measure*, 3; *As You Like It*, 11; *Twelfth Night*, 8; *Macbeth*, 22; *King Lear*, 10; *Ham-*

let, 25; Troilus and Cressida, 10; Othello, 13; Julius Caesar, 3; Pericles of Tyre, 3; Cymbeline, 8; Coriolanus, 1; Timon of Athens, 3; Tempest, 7; Winter's Tale, 4; Henry VIII, including Fletcher's part, 31; Sonnets, 14; Lover's Complaint, 1; Phoenix and Turtle, 1; Passionate Pilgrim, 1; (38 general references to "Heaven" or "God," in Henry VIII; 23 in Macbeth; 63 in King Richard II).

It will be seen that the plays with the few Biblical references are chiefly laid in non-Christian times and places, like Titus Andronicus, Coriolanus, King Lear, Julius Caesar, Antony and Cleopatra, Cymbeline, Timon of Athens; or their characters and events are secular and non-religious, like the Comedy of Errors, Measure for Measure, Twelfth Night, the Tempest, the Winter's Tale. The plays which yield the larger numbers of Biblical allusions or references to God are those in which ecclesiastics, whose conversation will naturally or formally run into religion, are numerous or prominent; or they are those in which is presented some marked type of piety, semi-piety, or seeming piety, like the weak and wicked Richard II in his vacillation and his resignation, or the amiable and forceless Henry VI, "too good," and hence "no good," for this rough, resolved and ruthless world, or like the valiant soldier of Christ on literal battle-fields, Henry V, or like the hypocritical Richard III:

But then I sigh: and with a piece of Scripture
Tell them that God bids us to do good for evil;
And thus I clothe my naked villany
With old odd ends out of Holy Writ,
And seem a saint when most I play the devil.

One or two of the others, laid in Christian lands and times, such as Hamlet and Macbeth, are plays that deal with the profoundest tragedies of our turbulent human life, and so naturally call for most light or illustration from the Word of God. Henry VIII, of which the largest part is by Fletcher, is a labored attempt—magnificent, too—to cast a glory of romance, stateliness and religion over the sorrows of Queen Katharine, the splendid immorality of Henry, the character of Anne Boleyn, the imperious nature

and career of Elizabeth, and to shed a heroic gleam over that unmajestic, "shackly" character, James I. Four of the strongest characters are ecclesiastics, York, Cromwell, Wolsey and Cranmer, the last of whom is brought out into high relief, in which his many and massive virtues and splendid services are given full view, his weaknesses left untouched. Accordingly this has more Scriptural or religious references, probably, than any other except King Richard II.

We may look at the plays from still another angle, the chronological, marking the periods in the development of the author's genius and of his mental and spiritual experience and attitudes, and may say that the early comedies, and the comedies in general, the production mostly of his joyous, exuberant youth, are, naturally, only sparsely lighted up with the Scripture references, that the great cycle of early historical plays dealing much with church and state in France and England with the deep seriousness of early maturity, are perhaps richest of all. The second set of comedies are, for some reason, somewhat less rich than the earlier. Then comes the great Maker's "storm and stress" period of the great tragedies, which, where laid among Christian scenes, are rich again, like Macbeth, Hamlet, Othello, but where the setting is heathen contain few Biblical allusions, as Julius Caesar, Antony and Cleopatra, Coriolanus, Timon of Athens. King Lear, the tragedy of earthly despair, of "general woe," is true almost entirely to its pagan setting and to its motto: "The gods are just, and of our pleasant vices make instruments to plague us." It has but 10 allusions that can fairly be called Biblical, and 36 that are classical or pagan. After the final tragic outburst, the spirit of Shakespeare seemed to undergo another change. Storm and stress, death and partings, the unsolved, insoluble problems of life, give place to calm, victory, reunions, tranquil delights, as in the Tempest, Winter's Tale, Cymbeline. He seems almost to be carrying out the program the restored Lear had planned for Cordelia and himself:

So we'll live
And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh
At gilded butterflies.

The deep appeal of the troubled soul to things divine has largely gone from out the poet's mind; the subjects he has taken lend themselves to other thoughts, and so in these last plays, impersonal, imaginative, playful, and in their spirit and ending joyful, the Scriptural references are few.

How wide is their range? From what books of the Bible does he draw? Among the list noted, not of course complete, are found 23 to various books of the Pentateuch, 13 to the Historical Books, 21 to Psalms and Proverbs, just 1 to Job, and just 9 to the Prophets, if his references to cherubim are drawn from Isaiah or Ezekiel. There are 61 references to the Gospels, 42 to the Epistles, none (by this writer discovered) to the Acts, just 2 to the Apocalypse. Among the Epistles, are 11 to Corinthians, 5 to Romans, 3 to Ephesians, 3 to Hebrews, 3 to 2nd Peter, 2 to Titus, 1 or 2 each to Galatians, I Thessalonians, Colossians, Philipians. In the Gospels, 18 are to the Sermon on the Mount. These figures are significant. They show that Shakespeare had not at his command for daily use the Hebrew Prophets, very little of the Psalms, comparatively little of the Gospels, absolutely none of the Acts, just a few snatches from the Epistles, almost nothing from the Apocalypse. The argument from silence is precarious, and not to be unduly pushed, but the facts seem to corroborate the idea that Shakespeare got his Bible knowledge almost entirely by the absorption of an alert and assimilative mind, and through such general ideas of church teaching in form, ritual and ceremony as had filtered through into the general mind through the centuries.

The range of Scripture character and incident,—how wide was that? Here, too, he naturally uses those in which there is most of dramatic applicability to tragedy and comedy, poetic justice, striking contrasts, telling comparisons. He knows Adam and Eve, and their family. In the Comedy of Errors, Dromio of Syracuse says:

Have you got the picture of Old Adam new apparelled?
 . . . Not that Adam that kept the Paradise.

In Twelfth Night the clown declares

Thou are as pretty a piece of Eve's flesh as any in Illyria.

Sonnet 92 says:

How like Eve's apple doth thy beauty grow
 If thy sweet virtue answer not thy show!

Winchester, in Henry VI, Part I, exclaims:

This be Damascus. Be thou accursed Cain
 To slay thy brother Abel, if thou wilt.

With Cain go wandering through the shades of night,
 says Richard II.

Hagar is known, naturally, by Shylock, who asks

What saith that fool of Hagar's offspring?

Abraham is recognized as the father and protector of the faithful. Bolingbroke, in Richard II, has the ironically charitable wish for a friend of his:

Sweet peace conduct his sweet soul to the bosom
 Of good old Abraham:

He is more accurate than the Hostess in King Henry V, in her really pathetic account of the passing out of that grandest of all grand old rascals, Sir John Falstaff:

Bardolf. Would I were with him, wheresome'er he is, whether in heaven or in hell!

Hostess. Nay, sure, he's not in hell: he is in Arthur's bosom, if ever man went to Arthur's bosom.

Japhet he knows, and Jacob, and Leah, and Joshua. Lorenzo, "Merchant of Venice," says

Fair ladies, you drop manna on the way
 Of starved people.

Jephthah has touched his imagination. Hamlet says, "Am not I in the right, old Jephthah?" "To keep that oath were more impiety than Jephthah when he sacrificed his daughter."

A chaplet of other Old Testament references can readily be strung. "Samson so tempted, Solomon so seduced";

"Thou fightest with the sword of Deborah"; "no great Nebuchadnezzar, Sir, I have not much skill in grass"; "as poor as Job, but not so patient"; "I fear not Goliath with a weaver's beam"; "heat not a furnace for a foe so hot that it do singe yourself";—are just a few.

Pilate, Barabbas, Paul, Peter, Judas and Herod are the New Testament men he deals with most, except, of course, the Master.

A bloody deed, and desperately dispatched!
How fain like Pilate would I wash my hands
Of this most grievous guilty murder done!

Paul, more shame to him, but no blame, has been adopted patron saint by the double and deadly Richard III, who swears again and again "By Holy Paul." There is however, no allusion to anything in Paul's life; it is only his objurgatory or expletive value that appears. Peter, too, as far as discovered, is not the living Peter of the Gospel story whom we know, the real man, falling, struggling, rising, gradually transformed from shifting sand into solid rock, he is the idealized, depersonalized, officialized traditional guardian of heaven's gate. Othello, in the insensate passion of his broken heart, addresses Desdemona:

You, mistress,
That have the office opposite to Saint Peter,
And keep the gate of hell!

This use of Peter and Paul is another indication that Shakespeare's Bible knowledge was the product of absorption rather than study.

Many of the plays reek with blood, and cries of human woe

Do break the clouds as did the wives of Jewry
At Herod's bloody hunting slaughtermen.

One character even feels that "This outhierods Herod!"

Barabbas, naturally, is put on Shylock's lips:

Would any of the stock of Barabbas
Had been her husband!

Judas, of course, in a world of treachery and base ingratiation

tude, is full of dramatic possibility for Shakespeare and his hearers. He forgets in the *Winter's Tale* that his play is placed in Sicily among the heathen, and makes Polixenes, denying guilt, exclaim

Oh may my name
Be yoked with his that did betray the Best!

Richard II sadly protests

Did they not sometime cry All Hail to me
As Judas did to Christ? But he in twelve
Found truth in all but one. I, in twelve thousand, none!

"Three Judases," (he says), "And each one
Thrice worse than Judas."

With characteristic anachronistic and anachoristic carelessness, Shakespeare makes a personage in *Timon of Athens*, a contemporary of Alcibiades, say

Who can call him his friend
That dippeth in the same dish?

But we are most interested in his handling of the great Christian facts, principles, doctrines. We need not expect subtlety here, or wandering off into curious metaphysical questions. The acted drama of Shakespeare's or any other day will hardly do much with that. That, as Mrs. Browning said of one of her husband's plays, is "over subtle and refined for pits and galleries." But we may expect to find the great simple outlines drawn with no uncertain hand.

The place and value of the Scripture itself is taken for granted. As Iago says:

Trifles light as air
Are to the jealous confirmation strong
As proof of (from) Holy Writ.

God's sovereignty, control and rulership, "Providence divine," is also everywhere implicitly assumed by characters of every land, time, creed. "In the great hand of God I stand," says Banquo. Hamlet exclaims

There's a divinity that shapes our ends
Rough-hew them how we will.

Inspired merit so by breath is barred;
It is not so with Him who all things knows.

There sits a Judge
Whom no king can corrupt.

There's a special Providence in the fall of a sparrow.

His is the particular charge of his servants' lives, the decision in every human story

But he that hath the steerage of my soul
Direct my course. (Romeo.)

The will of God be done in this and all things.

Immortality, the judgment, heaven, hell, are always in Shakespeare's background and in numerous instances thundering in the foreground. Macbeth, "here upon this bank and shoal of time, Would jump the life to come"; but is sure he can not, sure of his own immortality: "Mine eternal jewel given to the common enemy of man." Even Hamlet in his desperation falls back before "the dread of something after death, "The undiscovered country from whose bourne No traveler returns." So sure is he, that he unflinchingly faces the fearful apparition:

And for my soul, what can it do to that,
Being a thing immortal as itself?

Before the weary, suffering, disillusioned, ever looms up the promise of "a better world than this." Wolsey, after his troubled life,

Gave his honors to the world again,
His blessed part to heaven, and 'slept in peace.

That world will be ushered in by cataclysm, resurrection, judgment, the eternal parting of the ways. "If the cause is not good, the king hath a heavy reckoning to make, when all these legs and arms and heads chopped off in battle shall join together at the latter day."

Let the vile world end,
And the promised flames of that last day
Knit earth and heaven together;
Now let the general trumpet blow his blast!

Then heaven, set ope thine everlasting gates!

The wild heart of murderous Othello, when the deed is done, bursts out:

Wash me in steep down gulfs of liquid fire!

Shakespeare's demonology is extensive, ranging from "the eternal devil," "the foul fiend," to Edgar's choice collection in *Lear*, "Obidicut," "Hobbididance," and that crew. They perform the regulation diabolic functions. They tempt, torment, betray, "cite Scripture," inspire to all sorts of evil, "fire the good angel out," lead through darkness to destruction.

Over against this dark hierarchy Shakespeare's folks behold another, of "angels and ministers of grace." They watch and guard, stand by to help to moral victory, and when a good man's work is done, he may

Every day expect an ambassage
From my Redeemer to redeem me hence,

of "radiant angels," "young-eyed cherubim."

Most important, and most deeply interesting, is what Shakespeare's people think and say about the Saviour and his salvation. If Shakespeare was "no saint," there is no reason to think he was a hypocrite. He died a respectable substantial, law-abiding citizen, professing the Christian faith, buried in the parish church, honored with a monument therein. We may take it that he fully sympathizes with his characters. The only slighting allusion, and that only mildly so, to our Lord, is put, appropriately, into the mouth "of a blaspheming Jew":

To eat of the habitation
Which your prophet, the Nazarite,
Conjured the devils into.

Shakespeare refers to the earthly parentage of Jesus: "Sweet Mary's Son." He notes, in *Macbeth*, the hour of the Savior's coming upon earth; Marcellus says of Hamlet's father's ghost:

It faded on the coming of the cock.
Some say that ever gainst the season comes
Wherein our Savior's birth is celebrated
The bird of dawning singeth all night long.

The scene of the sacred life is noted :

Those holy fields
Over whose acres walked those feet.

The betrayal is frequently mentioned from the side of its hideous treachery. It also points the moral of human anguish and disappointment. In Shakespeare's part of Henry VIII, the King says, referring to the trial of Jesus :

Ween you of better luck,
I mean in perjured witness, than your Master
Whose minister you are, whiles here lived,
Upon this naughty earth?

An echo of Gethsemane is found, no doubt, in
Could ye not forbear me half an hour!

The details of Jesus' life are little dwelt on, or much of his teaching. The Prodigal Son, as might be expected from Shakespeare and among his characters, is the favorite parable, if indeed any other is mentioned or referred to. The Sermon on the Mount is often quoted. Miracle is suggested here and there, as in the forcible exposure of fraudulent beggars :

Making the blind to see, the lame to fly.

But the chief interest is in the death of Christ and what it won for man. Herein Shakespeare shares the weakness and the strength of the theology of his, and many another day; weakness, because he does not bring the power and beauty of Christ's life as an example, and the ethical demand of the Christian faith, to bear upon the entire man; strength, because, after all, the death of Jesus is Redemption's central point and pivot.

He traces redemption unerringly to its true source :

Why, all the souls that were, were forfeit once,
And he that might the vantage best have took,
Found out the remedy.

He shows it springing spontaneously from the divine compassion :

The quality of mercy is not strained;
It droppeth as the gentle dew from heaven. . . .
In the course of justice, none of us
Should see salvation.

Its method is by surrendered life, typified by "the blood":

Christ's dear blood, shed for our grievous sins;
The world's ransom, Mary's Son;
With Blood he sealed
A testament of never dying love.

In its effects, the earthly instrument is to us "the Holy Rood," but for Jesus its meaning is far otherwise:

Those blessed feet
Which fourteen hundred years ago were nailed
For our advantage on the bitter cross.

He voices no "theory of the atonement," but proclaims its universal scope, potentially, at least:

Now by the death of him that died for all!

Very beautifully and graphically has he described the condition of salvation. It is not mere intellectual faith; he laughs at that: "A Christian that means to be saved by believing rightly." There is just one condition:

By penitence the Eternal's wrath appeased;

More will I do (exclaims Henry V)
Though all that I can do is nothing worth,
Save that my penitence comes after all,
Imploring pardon.

And Prospero, with those who have wronged him all within his power:

The rare action is in virtue rather than in vengeance,
They being penitent,

Hamlet bitterly complains that his poor father has been deprived of this one chance of salvation:

He took my father grossly, full of blood;
With all his crimes broad blown, as flush as May;
And how the audit stands, who knows but heaven?

The Ghost himself takes up the same wail:

Cut off, even in the blossoms of my sin,
Unhousel'd, disappointed, unanel'd,
No reckoning made, but sent to my account,
With all my imperfections on my head!

But the murderous brother is to gain no advantage over the murdered king. What a picture of that deadly counterfeit of repentance, which indeed resembles it as death resembles sleep! The king says, as he faces his sin, God's wrath, sure punishment:

Try what repentance can; what can it not?
But what can it, when one can not repent?
O wretched state, O bosom black as death!
O limed soul, that struggling to be free,
Art more engaged! Help, angels! Make assay!
Bow, stubborn knees; and heart with strings of steel
Be soft as sinews of the newborn babe!

But his feeling is remorse,—fear, not penitence; his heart keeps asking:

Can one be pardoned and retain the offense?

And so he rises with dry heart, unmoistened by the dews celestial:

There is not rain enough in the sweet heaven
To wash it white as snow;
My words fly up, my thoughts remain below;
Words without thoughts never to heaven go.

Our study has not found in Shakespeare a theological mind, a wide and deep individual acquaintance with Scripture facts or the more recondite Scripture truths, or the evidence of what we would call today a deeply spiritual religious life. Nevertheless, in Shakespeare the great Reporter of humanity, the mouthpiece of its many pulsed heart, the mighty Player on all the chords of human feeling, we have been discovering something of the great ground-swell of religious truth and emotion which had been transforming and uplifting the Christian centuries, we have been catching here and there the notes of God's own harp, made and played by God's own spirit. We wish we could report something more definite, powerful, of the man's own mind and inner life. But that is our tantalizing experience "all-along the line" with him. He was not, we are sure, like the poet's unfair picture of the man with whom some rash students confound him, "the brightest, wisest, meanest of mankind," but he hides himself.

As we watch him, grown old all too young, weave his last spells in the Tempest, and, like his own Prospero, break his staff, dismiss his airy sprites, and sink his book of enchantment "deeper than ever plummet sounded," are we seeing him go to Stratford to spend the evening of his life—alas, but a short afternoon!—where he can hear more clearly the voice of God than ever in his busy, bustling actor-manager's days? We have no means of guessing; but let us hope that in those quiet hours this mighty mind and heart, that had so far learned but the elementary lessons of the Christian life, went on to its profounder secrets, its deeper experiences, possible even to that wondrous eye and brain and spirit, only under the guiding hand and illuminating touch of the Spirit of God Himself. What a pity that, in this particular, he "died and made no sign," and we have no record that he who entered the inner hearts of his fellowmen and women so penetratingly, also found his way into God's Holy of Holies, in a submission and surrender to Jesus Christ like that of an intellect as massive as his, but loftier, "Paul, bondservant of Jesus Christ."

Kansas City, Kansas. PHILIP WENDELL CRANNELL.

BENJAMIN BRECKINRIDGE WARFIELD

Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield was born at "Grasmere," near Lexington, Kentucky, November 5th, 1851. He was graduated with the highest honors from Princeton College with the Class of '71. After two years spent in foreign travel and in literary work in this country, he entered Princeton Theological Seminary, graduating with the Class of '76. He was then for a short time stated supply of the First Presbyterian Church of Dayton, Ohio. After a year spent in study at the University of Leipzig and in travel, he served as assistant in the First Presbyterian Church of Baltimore for about a year, and was ordained by the Presbytery of Ebenezer on April 26th, 1879. In 1878 he was appointed Instructor, and in the following year was installed as Professor of New Testament Exegesis and Literature, in Western Theological Seminary. In 1887 he accepted the call to Princeton Theological Seminary to succeed Professor A. A. Hodge as Charles Hodge Professor of Didactic and Polemic Theology.

Dr. Warfield was a prolific writer along theological lines. From 1880, when his first article appeared in *The Presbyterian Review*, to the time of his death when three series of articles on "Perfectionism" had begun to appear in as many different theological quarterlies, his pen was incessantly busy. In 1889 he succeeded Dr. Francis L. Patton on the editorial staff of *The Presbyterian Review*. A year later he became the chief editor of its successor, *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*; and continued to edit it until 1903, when it was succeeded in its turn by *The Princeton Theological Review*. To this latter he was also a frequent contributor. In addition to his contributions to these and other theological publications, Dr. Warfield was the author of a number of books. His *Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament* appeared in 1886 and passed through a

number of editions. His more recent publications are, *The Lord of Glory, Faith and Life, The Plan of Salvation*, and *Counterfeit Miracles*. A number of his sermons have been published and also a collection of hymns and religious verses.

Dr. Warfield's scholarship was early and widely recognized, and he was the recipient of honors and degrees from learned institutions in this country and abroad. He received the degree of D.D. from Princeton College in 1880, of LL.D. from Davidson College and Princeton College in 1892, of Litt.D. from Lafayette College in 1911, and of S. T. D. from the University of Utrecht, Holland, in 1913. He was the lecturer on the Smith Foundation at the Columbia, S. C., Theological Seminary in 1917 and 1918.

Dr. Warfield was taken suddenly ill on Christmas Eve. His condition was serious for a time; but it improved very greatly and on the 16th of February he felt able to resume his teaching in part and met one of his classes in the afternoon. He apparently suffered no immediate ill effects from the exertion but died that evening at about 10 o'clock of an acute attack of *angina pectoris*. Until the Christmas vacation, Dr. Warfield had been actively at work and had met all his classes as usual.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

Ethics and Natural Law. A Reconstructive Review of Moral Philosophy Applied to the Rational Art of Living. By GEORGE LANSING RAYMOND, L.H.D., Professor of Aesthetics, George Washington University. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London. 1920. \$2.

This is an ambitious work, and must be either a great failure or a great success. The reviewer will give a few reasons for pronouncing it a failure.

1. The preface shows that the author proposes to determine ethical questions without reference to God, a logical impossibility; for, if men are under divine law, their duties to one another may be, at least in part, determinable only by that law. If there could be produced a textbook on ethics satisfactory alike to theists and atheists, and it were to become the standard textbook on the subject in our schools, that would itself be the heaviest blow yet dealt to religion, and especially to Christianity, a convincing demonstration that Christianity is useless in our modern life.

2. The author makes desire primary in human experience in relation to thinking and feeling. Just as good a case could be made out for the primacy of thinking or of feeling; and perhaps a still better case for the primacy of that which is not distinctively any one of these three, but the root of all of them. Certainly a system of ethics that builds on this at least doubtful position in one department of psychology does not promise much beyond fine distinctions of words.

3. Raymond classifies all desires as bodily and mental, connecting the mental desires with sight and hearing, and the bodily desires with the other senses, and making these selfish and those altruistic. He thus lays the foundation for a system of ethics in which righteousness will consist in benevolence guided into the subordination of the desires connected with smell and taste and touch and the like to the desires connected with hearing and sight. If there were any reason whatever for the assumed classification and principle, the assumption would only lead us into a jungle of innumerable and impossible distinctions, and never into a plain path of rational living.

4. Such terms as ought, moral obligation, veracity, justice, and authority could be omitted by Raymond in the setting forth of his system, which is another way of saying that in his system a number of concepts basic in the science of ethics are wanting, and the system is therefore not really a system of ethics. It is a system of the esthetic of desires.

5. Raymond of course approves of falsehood in cases where rational kindliness prompts to falsehood.

6. In an elaborate index of fourteen pages "rights" and "trespass" do not occur. Raymond has succeeded to a considerable extent in pushing aside the ideas expressed by such terms.

7. The style is not that of a textbook; it is too diffuse. Moreover, too much space is given to repeating the author's fad over and over, and attempting to prove it. The book is excellent for light reading, but is weak in the concise and precise exposition that should characterize a textbook.

But these criticisms must not exclude the expression of surprised admiration of the beauty of the work and the nearly always high tone of its practical teachings. The explanation must be that the author has grown and lived in an ethical atmosphere purer and nobler than his theory, once accepted and put into practice by his disciples, will be able to create for them and their children. Among the causes of this better atmosphere for Raymond were his own father and Mark Hopkins, the great teacher. They made a better character out of Raymond than Raymond is likely to make out of those who come under the spell of his applied esthetic.

Staten Island, N. Y.

F. P. RAMSAY.

Ethics, General and Special. By OWEN A. HILL, S.J., PH.D., Lecturer on Psychology, Natural Theology, Ethics and Religion, at Fordham University, New York City, N. Y. The Macmillan Co., New York. 1920. \$3.50.

The eminent Jesuit has given in this book a readable and lucid presentation of the Roman Catholic ethics, based on the medieval philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and the authorized teachings of the infallible Church, but applied to present-day conditions and questions. Those acquainted with this field will not need to read Part I., General Ethics; those not acquainted with it will find there, in brief and lucid form, the information they may wish about the underlying principles of this system of ethics.

It may be of interest to indicate some points of the lecturer's presentation in Part II., Special Ethics.

Concerning toleration he says, "When authority permits a practice as abominable in the sight of God as heresy, it may still be justified on the double ground of inability to remedy the abuse, and refraining from the crime of formal co-operation." He excuses our government from treating heresy as a crime: "Adherents of the true religion are not in the majority, and truth's victory would be uncertain," if the Roman Catholics undertook through the government to forbid every religion but their own. He makes it plain that he approves the government's toleration of Protestantism, only on the ground of its inability effectively to forbid Protestantism. If the time should ever come when in this country the Roman Catholics found themselves

strong enough to use the government for the effective extirpation of Protestantism, it would be their duty to do so.

The lecturer condemns suicide. The lectures were written too early to discuss the MacSwiney case.

He condemns the lie and "pure reservation," but permits "broad reservation," by which he means "language externally conveying the speaker's true mind, intelligible from circumstances, in spite of a certain ambiguity and obscurity." That is, if one has the skill to use language in such a way that his real mind *could be* understood from it by a cautious and penetrating hearer, but in such a way that even such a hearer *would not* detect that which the speaker desired not to convey, then this slight-of-tongue misleader is not a liar. The skilful reservationist can accomplish better by reservations what the liar desires to accomplish by lying, than the unskilful liar can accomplish by lying. When we are interpreting the statements of Roman Catholics, we must be on the lookout for "broad reservations."

Dr. Hill believes in private property against all forms of socialism; in celibacy for priests and nuns; in the immorality of divorce; in the badness of public school education; in the dangerousness of woman suffrage; and in the power of the state over the property and lives of its subjects.

He believes in monarchy. "God alone holds" the "supreme prerogative" of "making and executing laws" on his "own initiative"; "and this fact is clear proof not only that all authority is immediately from God, but also that all authority passes immediately from God to ruler, without effective interference with authority itself on the part of the people."

The reviewer must pronounce this work most excellent both in style and, from its own point of view, in content; but he rises from a study of it with the profound conviction that Roman Catholicism and our free institutions are built upon contradictory foundations.

Staten Island, N. Y.

F. P. RAMSAY.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

Can the Dead Communicate with the Living? By I. M. HALDEMAN, D.D., New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. \$1.25 net.

After Death: a Personal Narrative. New and Enlarged Edition of "Letters from Julia." Amanuensis, W. T. STEAD. New York: George H. Doran Company.

The Undiscovered Country: a Sequence of Spirit-Messages Describing Death and the After-World. Selected from Published and Unpublished Automatic Writings, 1874-1918. Edited by HAROLD BAYLEY. With an Introduction by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Cassell & Company, Ltd., London. 1918.

It is difficult at this date to say anything new on the subject of

Spiritualism, especially after the excellent discussion by Dr. John Fox in the pages of this REVIEW (April, 1920). The "peak" of the spiritualistic movement may have been reached and passed, but the continued output of books and articles shows that the public interest in the subject is still acute.

Dr. Haldeman admits the superhuman origin of alleged communications from the dead, but he believes, if we except the case of Samuel, that the dead in Christ never come back. He argues that the evil spirits of the New Testament are the Christless dead who seek to incarnate themselves in the living, and that the fallen angels can communicate with the earth. "The messages from the dead are the messages of these wandering spirits more or less tinged with the mentality of the medium." The argument is based almost wholly upon Scripture, but an effective contrast is drawn between the heaven of "Raymond" and the heaven of Revelation and the Christian hymns. The premillenarian views of the writer are prominent in the discussion.

The republication in an enlarged form of the *Letters from Julia* and the collation by Mr. Bayley of extracts from nineteen automatic writings (including the *Letters from Julia*) raise the question whether there is sufficient coherence and unity in the spirit-messages to justify the claim that a "New Revelation" has been made. This claim is explicitly made by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, who contends in the Introduction to *The Undiscovered Country* "that there is a remarkable unanimity, extending often to small details, about these descriptions of the life to come, and that when independent witnesses all agree it is reasonable to suppose that what they say is the truth." As the extracts are conveniently arranged under such topics as "The Threshold," "The Judgment," "Heaven," "Religion," "Philosophy," "War," it will be easy to see how close the agreement really is.

The agreement ought to be quite complete in order to be convincing. Otherwise there will be the suspicion of fraud or self-deception. "Julia" herself warns us that "the devil and his angels are no mere metaphysical abstractions. There are evil ones, false ones, frivolous ones on this side, as there are on yours." How, then, is Mr. Bayley's claim, in his preface, that "in essential features every version coincides and, moreover, that each account accords with the general principles of Swedenborg's 'Heaven and Hell' and the 'Harmonial Philosophy' of Andrew Jackson Davis," borne out by the facts of his own collection?

Discord rather than harmony is indicated in four successive quotations on pages 174, 175. One spirit, "Speaking across the Border Line," says: "Always remember that our minds have a natural bias, owing to our earth training. For instance, a Roman Catholic would give you a different view of truth from a Theosophist, both having passed to this side." And again the same writer says, "You must never look upon what comes from spirits on this side as *final* utterances of truth, *for they are not*" (*Italics are the spirit's*). . . . So many come here

with their spiritual nature practically undeveloped that they see nothing of the Saviour at first, and conclude that He is not here." The other automatic writer, in "Letters from a Living Dead Man," says: "It is strange, but many persons seem to be in the regular orthodox heaven, singing in white robes, with crowns on their heads and with harps in their hands." And further: "The holders of different opinions on religion are often hot in their arguments. Coming here with the same beliefs they had on earth, and being able to visualise their ideals and actually to experience the things they are expecting, two men who hold opposite creeds forcibly are each more intolerant than ever before."

When we remember that "Julia" (Miss Julia Ames) discovers in the end that "possibly not one in a million" of the dead, after being joined by their loved ones, wish to communicate with earth, and that Conan Doyle declares that "communications usually come from those who have not long passed over, and tend to grow fainter, as one would expect," we should not expect any very closely-knit and coherent body of doctrine to be derivable from the new revelations. Let us "try the spirits," if we may do so without irreverent curiosity, on the four points of the Deity of Christ, the Atonement, reincarnation, and the relations of the sexes in the future life. We may take Julia's opinions in *After Death* and compare with them the views of various automatic writers quoted in *The Undiscovered Country* and elsewhere.

(1) When asked, "What about the Divinity of our Lord?" Julia replies, "Oh, why do you trouble yourself about these scholasticisms?" In another book, we find it stated that one who had seen Christ "gave me to understand in a quiet and sweet manner that she did not regard Christ in a theological sense as God or as born of a virgin" (L. C. Graves: *Natural Order of Spirit*, 1915). On the other hand another spirit, through an automatic writer, says explicitly and repeatedly of Christ: "We worship Him as God. —Our Maker, our Redeemer. — The God who made the universe, yet the man who was with us on earth" (*Thoughts for Help*: W. C. Comstock, amanuensis, 1913). And Patience Worth sings:

"Mary, mother, thou art the Spring
That flowereth though nay man aplanteth thee.

.

Mary, mother of the earth's loved!
Mary, bearer of the God!"

(2) When asked about the Atonement, Julia prefers to be vague and non-committal, saying that the Atonement and the sacrificial death of Christ correspond to the eternal truth, but she would not exclude other plans of salvation. Conan Doyle thinks there was no fall and no atonement and that "far too much stress has been laid upon Christ's death." But again Patience Worth in more orthodox fashion speaks of "the flesh that dies for me"; and the spirit of *Thoughts for Help*

says: "Christ the propitiation for man's sin, Christ the life that was perfect, Christ the God who is at His Father's right hand—pleading with the Father that man may be forgiven." It is true that many spirits, following Rev. W. Stainton Moses, belong to the Broad Church or liberal school of theology; but it is questionable whether such agreement as there is may not be due to the spirit of the age, the *Zeitgeist*, rather than to revelations from discarnate spirits. It is interesting to note that the more Stainton Moses rejects the historicity of the Bible, holding that the Gospels are largely legendary and the original Moses a myth, the more seriously does this modern Moses take the new revelation made through him, even regarding it, as did Swedenborg and Mrs. Eddy, as the real second coming of Christ. The more sceptical and disdainful he became towards the inspiration of Scripture, the surer he became of the plenary verbal and mechanical inspiration of his own automatic writing (See *The Undiscovered Country*, pp. 16 and 182).

(3) Some of the spirits show a fondness for the doctrine of reincarnation, but again the response of the oracles is obscure. Julia says: "I do not know whether I shall be reincarnate again on the earth sphere;" but then, recalling perhaps the line in "Abt Vogler,"

"On earth the broken arcs; in heaven, a perfect round,"

she draws a picture of the Ego as a wheel, the separate spokes of which can become incarnate. She tells Mr. W. T. Stead that he is a spoke that has been reincarnated. She even says: "Oh, yes, it is possible for the Ego to be in heaven—the hub Ego, so to speak—and the spoke to be in hell." In *The Undiscovered Country*, one spirit, speaking across the border line, believes it incorrect to say that all must come back to a material life on earth, but he adds: "I will not say none has ever been reincarnated, but I have never yet met anyone who has." Another wanderer in the spirit lands thinks that reincarnation is the experience of many spirits and the law of their progression. But again another spirit, "Hafed," when asked whether he has ever met a spirit who remembered passing through more than one experience on earth, replies: "No, No! If such were the case I could not say I was myself. I believe I never was on the earth till I was sent direct from the Great and Mighty Source of all Spirits." On the other hand no less a spirit than "Martin Luther," in *Thoughts for Help* already quoted, is sure that "Reincarnations many will each self need for its finished work of earth. One short man's life is not sufficient."

(4) On the relation of the sexes, Julia says: "There is no restriction on the liberty of love. If any one arriving here is incapable of vibrating in sympathy with any one but the spouse of earth, they can remain as monogamous here as on earth. But we do not regard that selfishness of two as the higher stage." Other spirits, it seems, if we may judge from those quoted in *The Undiscovered Country*, re-

port a monogamous organization of society, although the affinity which each soul ultimately meets may not necessarily be the partner of earth.

There appears to be as much ignorance and difference of opinion among the spirits as among mortals upon the earth. At any rate it would be premature to speak of a spiritistic orthodoxy. We may not care, with Dr. Haldeman, to assign the spirit-messages to a demonic source, but certainly there is as yet no such agreement among them as to lead us to prefer the "new revelation" to that which was given by men who spake from God, being moved by the Holy Spirit. In the meantime we may be thankful that it is not necessary to seek the road to Endor in order to enjoy "mystic sweet communion with those whose rest is won."

Lincoln University, Pa.

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Contending for the Faith: Essays in Constructive Criticism and Positive Apologetics. By LEANDER G. KAYSER, D.D., Professor of Systematic Theology in Hamma Divinity School, Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio. New York: George H. Doran Company. Pp. 351. 12mo. 1920.

This is the best general defense of the Old Testament that has come within our observation since Dr. Orr's great work on the Problem of the Old Testament appeared in 1906. It deals with fundamental questions, and answers them in a clear, thorough, and convincing manner. The author handles the assailants of the Old Testament without gloves and knocks them out without mercy. It is refreshing to feel the conviction of faith and the assurance thereof that breathes on every page. Professor Kayser scoffs at the presumption of the destructive critics in claiming to have a monopoly on scholarship and laughs at their assertion that they have the consensus of all scholars arrayed in support of their anti-biblical views. He denounces the wickedness of those professors who have been appointed by the church to explain and defend the faith and yet spend all their time in undermining the very foundations thereof. The present writer appreciated especially the essays on the Old Testament Religion, The Old Testament Jehovah, The Jehovah of Israel, and The History of Israel. Others might value more highly the discussion of Inspiration, the Incarnation, Evolution and Immortality. The chapters on Christ's authority as a teacher and on his witness to the Old Testament are timely and illuminating. A full and satisfactory review of the work would make a volume equal in size to the work itself. So, we shall merely give it a *carte blanche* of recommendation and close by advising our readers, one and all, to purchase the book and read and study it. It will be a resolver of doubts, a confirmer of faith, a destroyer of confidence in the critics' methods and statements, and a storehouse of

useful information on the latest theories and positions affecting belief in God and His Word.

Princeton.

R. D. WILSON.

Moïse et la Genèse, d'après les Travaux de M. le Professeur Édouard Naville par E. DOUMERGUE, doyen honorable de la Faculté libre de Théologie protestante de Montauban. Paris. 1920. Pp. xv., 121.

This small octavo volume is a clear and vivid presentation of the results of the researches of Prof. Naville upon the language and archeology of the Old Testament and especially upon the book of Genesis. Prof. Doumergue, dean of the protestant theological school at Montauban, is the brilliant author of a classic work on Calvin and his times. He has been led into the field of Old Testament criticism because he thinks that Prof. Naville by his long researches in the archeology of Egypt, especially in their relation to the history of the Pentateuch and of Israel in general, has brought the critics of the Old Testament before the bar of historic judgment and common sense (*bon sens*). The materials for this work, which might be called an *appreciation*, are to be found in Prof. Naville's numerous publications but particularly in *The Route of the Exodus—La découverte de la loi sous le roi Josias, une interprétation égyptienne d'un texte biblique* (Extrait des memoires de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres, tome xxxviii, 2^e partie, 1910)—*Archeology of the Old Testament*, Was the Old Testament written in Hebrew?—*The Unity of Genesis—The Text of the Old Testament* (The Schweich Lectures, 1916)—*L'archéologie de l'Ancien Testament*, réponse à M. le professeur Gressmann (Revue de théologie et de philosophie, 1916)—*Les deux noms de Dieu dans le Genèse* (Revue de l'histoire des religions, 1917) and *La composition et les sources de la Genèse* (Revue de l'histoire des religions, 1918).

In these numerous works, Prof. Naville does not pretend to speak as a specialist in Old Testament Higher Criticism; but he attacks the method "at the bar of the true principles which have been established by the masters of history and which ought to be the law in all impartial and unbiased historical research." For the method of the critics he would substitute that of M. Fustel de Coulanges that "it is necessary to take the texts as they were written, in the proper and literal sense, to interpret them as simply as possible, and to admit them naïvely without mixing with them any ideas of our own." To this principle of Coulanges Prof. Naville adds, that "it is necessary to replace the texts in the time when the author lived in the environment (*milieu*) which surrounded him with its manners and customs, to seek for the aim of a writing, its *raison d'être*, the spirit which inspired it and that of those to whom it was addressed. To do this, ethnology, the view of that which still exists today, brings to archeology at times most efficacious aid. The method applies equally to all the researches of antiquity; as well to the history of Rome as to that of Saul; to the

Chanson de Roland as to the Homeric poems. It is the history of Egypt that has conducted me to the Old Testament; like the Israelites, I have passed the borders from the Nile into Canaan."

The works of Prof. Naville, based on these principles, have already had a favorable reception on the part of M. Camille Jullian, professor in the College de France, M. Georges Radet, director of the *Revue des Études anciennes*, and M. Victor Bérard, the re-discoverer of the route of Ulysses as given in the Odyssey.

Following in the steps of these able fellow-historians, Prof. Doumergue accepts the principle of Dr. Naville and seeks in the volume before us to present the results of Dr. Naville's researches to the French people in a popular form. He has succeeded admirably in his undertaking. His work is a model of clearness and fairness, and cannot be too highly commended for the manner in which the purpose has been accomplished. The present reviewer is thoroughly convinced that the method of the Higher Critic is wrong and that Prof. Naville's method is right; and, also, that he has removed the most serious objection to the Mosaic authorship and to the unity, of the Pentateuch. I have not been convinced, however, that the original Scriptures of the Old Testament were written in the Babylonian language: much less, that from this original Babylonian they were afterwards translated into Aramaic, and later still from Aramaic into what we call Hebrew. Dr. Naville and his followers confound script and the language written in the script. In a paper read before the International Congress of Orientalists at St. Louis in 1904, the reviewer contended that the earliest records of the Old Testament were written in Hebrew but in the cuneiform script and that they were afterwards written in the Aramaic (Samaritan or Phenician) script and last of all in the present Hebrew characters. As to when and by whom these transcriptions were made, Dr. Naville presents no new evidence. For his theory that the Hebrew documents of the Old Testament as a whole were written originally in Babylonian and afterwards translated into Aramaic, probably by Ezra, and later at about the time of Christ translated again into the Jewish tongue (which we call *Hebrew*), he gives no direct evidence; and the indirect evidence is, it seems to me, all against him. The names of the places in Palestine found in the Egyptian inscriptions of Thothmes, Rameses and Shishak are Hebrew and not Aramaic. The names embedded as glosses in the Amarna letters are mostly if not altogether Hebrew. The proper names of Israelitish persons in the Old Testament are nearly all pure Hebrew. The language of the Siloah inscription is Hebrew and not Phenician, as Dr. Naville claims. Sufficient proof of this lies in the fact that the Siloah inscription uses הִיה for the verb "to be," whereas the Phenician would have used כִּין. The stele of Mesha, king of Moab, whether Phenician or Moabitic, certainly resembles Hebrew rather than Aramaic, as is instanced by its use of the Article and of the Wau Conversive. Moreover, the words transliterated into Greek

letters in the Septuagint version are Hebrew words and not Aramaic. And finally, if the Pentateuch was translated into Hebrew from the Aramaic about the time of Christ, how does it come that the Samaritans have their original Pentateuch in the Hebrew and not in the Aramaic tongue? That is, if the Jews, for the purpose of emphasizing their separation from the Samaritans and the uniqueness of their religion, not merely invented a new alphabet but translated their scriptures from Aramaic to Hebrew at about the time of Christ, why did the Samaritans adopt this new translation while preserving the old script? Did the Samaritans, also, have the Jewish dialect of Jerusalem, of which Dr. Naville makes so much? Why, also, did both Jews and Samaritans shortly after the time of Christ translate back again into Aramaic from the Hebrew which they had just adopted as a sacred tongue? Or, is Dr. Naville going to attempt to maintain that the Samaritan Aramaic Pentateuch and the versions of Onkelos and Jonathan and perhaps even the Peshitto are really more original than the Hebrew text? If so, how account for the numerous variations between these supposed versions, and for the paucity of variants between the Massoretic and Samaritan Hebrew texts?

However, fortunately for the method of Prof. Naville and for the work of Dean Daumergue, the value of their results does not depend upon the theory of the three languages, Babylonian, Aramaic, and Hebrew; nor even upon the three scripts, Cuneiform, Phenician, and square Hebrew. The services of Dr. Naville in the line of Egyptian archeological research and in showing the bearing of the data that he has discovered upon the history of the Old Testament are novel, permanent, and invaluable. They cannot be denied nor gainsaid. And so, also, the services of Dean Doumergue in presenting the arguments for the historicity of the Old Testament and especially of Genesis, insofar as they are based on Dr. Naville's discoveries, are great and thankworthy. So far as these arguments rest upon the archeological data and "common sense," they are irrefutable and the validity of his conclusions, does not depend on the acceptance of the impossible theory of triple languages, nor even on the more probable theory of triple scripts.

Princeton.

R. D. WILSON.

The New Testament in Syriac. London: British and Foreign Bible Society. 1905-20.

This is a beautiful, handy, and critical edition of the Syriac New Testament. We have compared a number of chapters with the Urumiah edition of the American missionaries, and find no variations except a few slight and meaningless changes in the spelling, an occasional omission or addition of a particle or noun and a few differences of pointing. Thus, the conjunction "and" is omitted before the last clause of 2 Pet. i. 9 and "our Savior" from ii. 20; the perfect is read instead of the participle in the proverb in 2 Pet. ii. 22; and in iii. 1 the last word means *pure* instead of *beautiful* as in the Urumiah edition (*shapyo* instead of *shappiro*).

The editors and the press are both to be congratulated and thanked for the masterly manner in which they have performed their arduous and most useful labors.

Princeton.

R. D. WILSON.

Ethiopic Grammar with Chrestomathy and Glossary. By SAMUEL A. B. MERCER, PH.D., D.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament in the Western Theological Seminary, Chicago. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1920. Pp. 116.

Professor Mercer has attempted in this little volume to "fill the gap," as he says, that exists in the aids to those beginners of Ethiopic studies who are confined to the use of the English language. He has made his book concise because it is intended only for beginners, and one who has mastered it may pass on to Dillmann's great work in its English translation. He has the conviction of an experienced teacher of Semitic languages that the shortest road to mastery of grammar is an initial memorizing of the chief grammatical forms. The volume he has prepared is therefore what he well calls a "skeleton." And it shares with all skeletons the obvious defect of utter ugliness. The author's purpose—"to add to the number of English-speaking students interested in the study of Ethiopic"—will scarcely be attained through this barren wilderness of paradigms. For only a student already enamored of grammar for its own sake, and with a will set to the conquest of a thankless task, will pursue this booklet to its end. Conciseness is all right, in its place, but we think it has been carried too far by this author. What we miss especially is illustrative examples for the rules presented.

But the most discouraging feature of the book to those who use it will be the many typographical errors that mar it. In the first three chapters we found a dozen such, including one (the sign for *fû*) in the alphabet itself. Random examination beyond this point has revealed the same lamentable state of affairs. Proof-reading of Ethiopic texts should always pass under at least two pairs of scholarly eyes in addition to the mechanical comparison of the professional proof-reader. If the demand for this little work ever exhausts the edition, it is greatly to be hoped that the author will have these discouraging blemishes corrected, and that he will make the learner's path a bit easier by simple illustrations.

Paterson, N. J.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

History of the Hebrew Commonwealth. By ALBERT EDWARD BAILEY, A.M., Director of Religious Education in Worcester Academy, and CHARLES FOSTER KENT, PH.D., LITT.D., Woolsey Professor of Biblical Literature in Yale University. With Maps—Illustrations. Charles Scribner's Sons: New York, Chicago, Boston. 1920. 8vo. Pp. xxiv, 396.

The manifest tendency of the higher criticism is to secularize sacred

history. History has its divine side and its human side. The Bible in contrast to profane history emphasizes the divine side; it dilates upon and glories in the fact that the hand of God is present in human history. To the critic who is decidedly suspicious of the supernatural and who regards miracle and prophecy, revelation in word and in deed, as improbable if not impossible, this emphasis upon the divine factor in human history is offensive. The Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament are to him "books of devotion"; not reliable history, but history written with a moral purpose so obvious that this is to be discounted from the very beginning. And he believes that it is only when the "goody, goody" element has been gotten rid of that the real facts of Biblical history can be seen in their true prospective. When they are so viewed, when science has set the events of sacred history in their true light, the difference between sacred and profane history almost if not altogether disappears. The Old Testament, instead of telling us of God's choice of a people and of his gracious dealings with that people, tells us rather of the struggles of that people toward self-expression and self-development. The Bible becomes a history, not of divine redemption, but of human evolution.

The present volume is a good example of this. Thus we read, "But the chief claim of the Hebrew world to our regard lies in the fact that the ideals of democracy which today are winning acceptance among the civilized races, first developed within this area." And, to cite a concrete illustration, we are told concerning Gideon, "On his return, when the men of his tribe tried to make him king, with true democratic spirit, he declined" The Old Testament record, on the other hand, tells us, "and Gideon said unto them, I will not rule over you, neither shall my son rule over you, the Lord shall rule over you." If the writers of this volume would substitute "theocratic" for "democratic" in the sentence quoted, their words then would be in accord with their best and only source of information. According to the Old Testament, Israel was a theocracy. It requires dexterous manipulation of the sources to change *theocracy* to *democracy*. We confess to the belief that if Dathan, Abiram and the sons of Korah, the next of kin also—Miriam and Aaron—were cited as witnesses they would testify to a decidedly autocratic rather than democratic trait in Moses, a trait which is readily understandable when we think of Moses as the personal representative of Jehovah, but which does not easily work into our author's portrayal of him as a great democratic leader.

The Bible does not, of course, ignore human rights and human relations. The second table of the Decalogue is devoted exclusively to them. But it places God's claim upon man ahead of man's claim upon his fellow men; and to substitute democracy for theocracy in writing a history of Israel is practically to ignore the first table of the Decalogue. Consequently, while our authors as a matter of fact do recognize the importance of the religious development in Israel, the very

least which can be said is, that they reverse the order of the two tables. Theocracy—God's control over the affairs of men—is relegated to the background, the emphasis is upon human progress, upon democracy. We see this very plainly in the attitude of the critics toward prophecy. The prophets become in the last analysis little more than preachers of social justice, heralds of democracy. But a democracy which lacks the theocratic spirit will never secure or conserve human rights. The peril of our modern democracy is that it does not rest upon the theocratic conception of the all-controlling, world-embracing rule of Christ; and if the modern critic cannot see the theocratic principle in Old Testament history, where it is so plainly set forth, how can we expect him to recognize it in our modern world?

The miraculous is, of course, rejected as legendary. Thus we are told: "The story of the adventures of the Ark belongs to the realm of legend rather than history, but it serves to show us the religious ideals that were common in those days" (p. 85f). Again we are told: "The remaining stories of Elijah [notably the record of his being "caught up to heaven in a chariot of fire"], while legendary in form, are true to sense" (p. 166). This means that in so far as they are true they admit of a perfectly natural explanation. The words of George Adam Smith with regard to the fall of Jericho are quoted with approval: "In war she has always been easily taken. That her walls fell down at the sound of Joshua's trumpet is not exaggeration, but the soberest summary of her history. No great man was ever born in Jericho; no great deed was ever done in her. She never stood a siege, and her inhabitants were always running away" (p. 65). In other words, the statement that the walls of Jericho "fell down" is merely a figure of speech: Jericho's heart "fainted within her" and she surrendered at discretion.

The land of Canaan was not a "promised land"; instead we read under the heading, "Canaan and the Wishful Eye," the following illuminating statement: "Rumors of rich land to the north induced the tribes to transfer their base from the holy mountain to the oasis of Kadesh Barnea, which lies fifty miles south of Beersheba and seventy-five southwest of Hebron" (p. 41). The conviction that Canaan had been promised to the patriarch Abraham generations before Moses is consistently taught in Scripture and is plainly stated in what the critics consider to be the oldest and consequently the most reliable document of the Pentateuch. Yet not merely do our historians ignore this promise, they also ignore the one to whom it was made. Abraham is scarcely mentioned in this history of the "seed of Abraham." It might be thought that this omission is due to the fact that the history of the Jewish Commonwealth begins with Moses not Abraham. But since our authors consider it worth while to bring their sketch—in briefest outline of course—down to modern times and General Allenby's entry into Jerusalem, two thousand years beyond the date of the destruction of Jerusalem, it is clear that the only explanation of their

practical ignoring of Abraham and of their failure to mention the blessing promised to him is that they look upon the one as a myth and the other as a "pious fraud."

That predictive prophecy, as anything else than shrewd surmise or a forecasting of events in terms of moral necessity, is to be placed on a par with soothsaying as we meet it among the Greeks and Romans appears from the following: "Now we see that the prophets were not soothsayers, but spiritual geniuses and statesmen who were inspired to interpret to the men of their own day God's nature and demands, and that when they predicted, their prediction was based upon the great moral laws of the universe" (p. 17). This means that the critics can find a naturalistic explanation for such a "prediction" as this: "The soul that sinneth it shall die," and can allow the prophet considerable talent in the application of this "moral law" to the lives of individual men, and to Israel and the nations. But such a prediction as that of the unnamed prophet regarding Jeroboam's altar must of course be treated as a "late tradition" and therefore as unreliable. It is painful to read of "bands of prophetic dervishes"; and to be told that the schools of the prophets were "communities of religious enthusiasts" which were "at bottom patriotic." The biblical conception of prophecy is obviously regarded as out of harmony with modern thinking.

We are cautioned "against accepting in general at their face value the estimates passed upon the kings of Judah and Israel by the biblical writers. . . . The modern historian, who is interested in economic and cultural history as well as religious history, who has other standards and judgments, reaches a different conclusion about the various rules and reigns" (p. 147f). This statement gives the whole thing away. The modern historian, the modern scholar, has "other standards of judgment" than those of the Bible. Because of this he does not hesitate to criticise, indeed he seems to delight in differing with, the estimates and judgments passed by the biblical writers. "Saul," we read, "deserves a higher place in the roll of Hebrew heroes than the writers of the old Testament have assigned him. . . . But if one reads all the data impartially, one sees clearly that Saul was at worst only the victim of a mental disorder which wrecked his career and made him at times an irresponsible despot instead of the chief counsellor of the others" (p. 97). That this "impartial judgment" overlooks entirely the cause of Saul's "mental disorder" (1 Sam. 15) and the great lesson contained in Samuel's words, "Behold to obey is better than sacrifice and to hearken than the fat of rams," is not the only defect in this attempt to "whitewash" Saul.

The book is decidedly interesting and attractive. It is profusely illustrated and might be a splendid textbook for Bible students were it not that its viewpoint is so emphatically not the viewpoint of the Scriptures and its estimates and conclusions are so incompatible with the obvious teachings of the Scriptures as to make it utterly untrust-

worthy save as an example of the outworking of the principles and conclusions of the at present dominant critical school. One of the most ominous features is the statement that this book has been submitted to a professor in the University of Chicago "who as a representative of the 'Commission on Standardization of Bible Classes for Secondary Schools,' has read the proofs of this volume" (p. vi.) The attempt is being made in this country as in Europe to treat the controversy over the Old Testament as closed and to insist that the "assured results" of criticism shall be universally accepted and taught to young and old alike.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

St. Bernard of Clairvaux's Life of St. Malachy of Armagh. By H. J. LAWLOR, D.D., Litt.D. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. London (The Macmillan Company, New York). 1920. 12mo. pp. lxvi, 183. Price 12s. net.

This volume is a member of Series V, devoted to "Lives of the Celtic Saints," in the extensive "Translations of Christian Literature" which the venerable Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge is publishing.

The translation before us, based mainly on the text in the *Acta Sanctorum*—substantially the same as in Mabillon's edition of the *Opera* and the reprint of this in Migne—is an excellent rendering of the original in a clear, flowing style. The italicizing of the scriptural quotations and allusions brings out in an impressive way Bernard's well known familiarity with the Old and New Testaments. The editorial comment by Dr. Lawlor in the form of elaborate notes—they make up about half of the volume—throws a great deal of light on the biographical and historical problems involved in the narrative. Doubtless, many readers would have welcomed an adequate critique of the numerous "miracles" and "prophecies" attributed to the Celtic worthy; but the editor has not deemed it necessary to discuss this phase of mediaeval hagiography.

Probably most students of Bernard have been content to find in his *Life of St. Malachy* little more than what Morison, one of the best biographers of the Cistercian abbot, has called "an image of his own beautiful and ardent soul." But Dr. Lawlor has exploited the work as a unique source in regard to the epoch-making reformation of the Celtic Church which took place in the twelfth century, largely in the lifetime of Malachy, and which he was one of the chief agents in promoting.

The Introduction (pp. xii-lxvi) is devoted mainly to an exposition of the facts pertaining to this transition, or, as it may more properly be called, revolution in the government, cultus, and moral life of the

Irish churches of that period. The figure of Malachy assumes the proportions and the significance of a great ecclesiastical leader and administrator who, as the rebuilder and abbot of the monastery of Bangor, as bishop of Connor, archbishop of Armagh, bishop of Down, and papal legate to Ireland, brought the whole Irish Church into closer allegiance to Rome, completely conformed its organization to that prevalent in the rest of Western Christendom, and secured the adoption of the distinctively Roman customs, rites, and ceremonies in place of the unique Celtic practices, which dated from the sixth century and were still in vogue at the dawn of the twelfth.

As has long been known, the early Irish churches were essentially monastic in their constitution and government, the rulers being the abbots of the convents, who ordinarily were ordained bishops, and were commonly called *coarbs*, that is, successors of the founders of such institutions. The abbot had supreme ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Even if he was not himself of episcopal rank, he had authority over the bishops, to whom certain functions, like that of ordination, were reserved, but who, if not themselves abbots, had no authority in church administration, save such as was personal to them by reason of their moral character or their scholarly attainments. But what had never been sufficiently cleared up—and what this edition of Bernard's *Life of Malachy* now makes quite intelligible—is the rather complicated series of events which early in the twelfth century brought about not only the termination of the Irish custom of having a hereditary succession of abbots in a single family, but also the practically universal establishment of genuine diocesan episcopacy; with the result that, while both Lanfranc and Anselm of Canterbury failed to extend the authority of the English primacy over Ireland, the Irish churches became directly and thoroughly Romanized in the lifetime (1095-1148) and under the personal leadership of Malachy.

The decisive steps had been taken, indeed, in 1110, when he was but a boy, by the Synod of Rathbreasil, convened by a papal legate for the very purpose of trying to introduce regular diocesan episcopacy. It legislated with respect to the distribution of dioceses among the provinces, and though some of its enactments were too arbitrary and artificial to be practical, it nevertheless "gave to Ireland a paper constitution of the approved and Catholic type," the adoption of which meant, in the course of the succeeding decades, the more or less violent dispossession of the *coarbs* and the non-diocesan "bishops" of the traditional Irish type.

Malachy was the disciple of the monkish Imar O'Hagan, from whom he probably imbibed those principles of church reform which he later so strenuously advocated. Consecrated priest about five years before the then canonical age—probably in 1119—he administered the diocese of Armagh as vicar under the archbishop Cellach, and, as Bernard says (p. 17), "in all churches he ordained the apostolic sanctions and the decrees of the holy fathers, and especially the customs of the holy

Roman Church." Three years spent at Lismore with Malchus, the retired archbishop of Cashel, and with Cormac MacCarthy, the son of the king of Desmond, who likewise became a champion of the Romanizing influences, confirmed the young priest in his career as a reformer. In 1124 he became abbot of St. Comgall at Bangor, and was consecrated bishop, with his see at Bangor. In this connection the author shows that it is highly probable that Bernard, in his ignorance of the transitional state of ecclesiastical affairs in Ireland at the time of his writing, wrongly assumed that Malachy ceased to be abbot, when he was consecrated bishop. The fact seems to be merely that at Bangor Malachy still made more of his monastic than of his episcopal office. Driven from Bangor by the king of the north of Ireland, Malachy went to Iveragh, County Kerry, and there founded a new monastery. While there, he received word that the dying primate, Cellach of Armagh, had nominated him as his successor,—the first break, in more than a hundred years, in the custom of selecting the *coarbs* of St. Patrick from the family of Cellach. Five of the preceding abbots had been married men, and probably not one of them an ordained bishop. The choice of Malachy, already a bishop, but not in the line of the *coarbs* of Armagh, encountered determined opposition on the part of the representatives of the old customs, but in the end it guaranteed the termination of the hereditary succession of abbots, and—what became of chief importance in the history of the Irish churches—a firm establishment of diocesan episcopacy in the primacy itself. For about three years Malachy labored as abbot and archbishop of Armagh, a position which Bernard quite inaccurately styles that of "pontiff and metropolitan of all Ireland." Having gained the chief point in his contest with the rival abbot—recognition as titular archbishop of Armagh—the reformer retired to his beloved Bangor, from which he soon found it expedient, in the interests of peace and efficient administration, to separate the see of Connor, inhabited largely by a tribe hostile to its neighbors on the south. He remained bishop of Bangor (Down) to his death. He promoted the cause of regular episcopacy still further by establishing the diocese of Oriel (Clogher), with its see at Louth.

In 1139 he left Bangor on a mission to Rome, to secure, if possible, the pall for the two Irish metropolitans, the archbishops of Armagh and Cashel; for from the beginning this symbol of "the fulness of honor" had been lacking. It was in connection with this trip that, going and coming, he twice visited Clairvaux, which resulted not only in his becoming intimately acquainted with the celebrated abbot, but also in his introducing, on his return home, the Cistercian order into Ireland. Innocent II declined to grant the palls, except on the condition that they would be asked for by a properly constituted council; but he conferred on Malachy the office of papal legate, just then falling vacant. In this new position Malachy created still another diocese, nominating and consecrating the first known bishop of Cork.

The Synod of Inispatrick, convened by the legate in 1148, in due form demanded the archiepiscopal insignia, and sent him to Rome to secure them. He again went *viâ Clairvaux*. Here he fell sick of a fever and died on November 2, 1148, on the very day—All Souls’—on which, according to his oft-repeated expression of desire, he wished to depart from this life.

The palls—four instead of two—were sent by Eugenius III, and received by the Synod of Kells in 1152, there being at that time at least twenty-eight regularly established dioceses, including that of the bishop of Dublin, who now, with the bishop of Tuam, was raised to metropolitan rank and made altogether independent of Canterbury, as the archbishops of Armagh and Cashel had been. Thus “the whole Church was ruled by the bishops. The Reformation may not have been complete in every detail . . . but the Synod of Kells had set the crown on the work of the Irish reformers. And this consummation was mainly due to the wisdom and the untiring zeal of St. Malachy of Armagh.”

At the close of the volume, the author presents translations of three letters of the abbot of Clairvaux to Malachy, another to the Irish Cistercians concerning the death of the saint, and two beautiful sermons delivered by Bernard, one at the funeral of the prelate, and the other probably on the first anniversary of that event. The “Additional Notes” (pp. 161-171) deal with the abuses in the Irish churches of the early twelfth century; the hereditary succession of the *coarbs* of Patrick; and the complicated details of Malachy’s contest with Niall, the rival abbot of Armagh.

Thus this *Life* by Bernard becomes, under the editor’s guidance, an instructive picture of an important epoch in the history of Christianity in Ireland. Specialists will find much to be grateful for in the Bibliography and particularly in the Introduction and the notes.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

West and East. The Expansion of Christendom and the Naturalization of Christianity in the Orient in the XIXth Century. Being the Dale Lectures, Oxford, 1913. By EDWARD CALDWELL MOORE, Professor of Christian Morals, Harvard University; Chairman of the Board of Preachers to the University; President of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. New York. 1920. Charles Scribner’s Sons. Pp. xii, 421. Price \$4.

These eight lectures were given on the Robert W. Dale foundation at Mansfield College, Oxford, in the autumn of 1913. Prepared for the press in August, 1914, they were not sent to the publisher until November, 1915, when, by common consent, it was agreed to postpone the publication of them until after the War. The author’s preface bears the date of June 18, 1919, and the book emerged from the press in 1920. The author observes that the manuscript of November, 1915, contained slight alterations of the original series, but that no changes

have been made since then. This fact should be remembered in any judicious reading of the book.

Yet, in noting this, we would not leave the impression that the material in this book is in any sense stale or outdated. It is true, we have been making history somewhat rapidly these last few years. Matters become *passé* very soon. But Professor Moore's study is not open to this objection.

What first arrests our attention is the title. It is "West and East." We might have expected it to be "East and West." No, it is the western influence in the east that forms the burden of this author. He sees two occidental influences in the east during the nineteenth century: western civilization and western religion. This naturally leads him to an historical discussion of the expansion of Christendom, a discussion which in the main is true to fact. He notes three periods covering about four hundred years: that of conquest, trade, and assimilation, the last representing the 19th century (pp. 50, 54, 148); which century, he elsewhere notes (p. 212), has been one of deep religious enthusiasms.

Almost every item of the great modern movements in East and West comes under the comprehending glance of this well-informed writer: Roman and Protestant missions, slavery, opium traffic, reformation, women, the press, the negro, the modern mass movements, etc. Some things must be passed over with a question-mark more or less bold. We fear, for example, that being a Romanist or a Protestant is something more than a matter of climate (p. 315). The authority for the apparently final dictum that Christian theology has accepted the doctrine of evolution and the results of the critical study of Scripture may very properly be demanded of the author, as well as a more precise definition of what is meant by "evolution" and "the results of the critical study of Scripture" (pp. 379-380). We are a bit surprised, too, to be informed with what impresses us as a hasty utterance (p. 380) that "no one can read" Butler's *Analogy* without seeing that it presupposed the very Deism it was written to combat. But the supreme emphasis on the Divine sovereignty or even on the super-terrestrial character of God, is not Deism. It is fundamental Theism. These things may seem to some scarcely worth mentioning, but they are vital in a work such as this which is so largely descriptive of historical conditions. And it is of first moment that the historian who summarizes conditions and movements make sure that his findings are strictly accurate.

On the other hand, there are plenty of splendid things in this book. Some of its truths are put in a very emphatic way. It makes one ponder to read "The popular unbelief of today is the learned unbelief of thirty years ago," and "What that youth knows today the labourer will know tomorrow" (pp. 261, 262). That the missionaries aimed to build Christian character, is well-expressed by saying: "There were no Gothic churches built with New York money" (p. 335). Dis-

tinguishing (p. 360) between doctrine as the theory of religion, and dogma as that part of doctrine set up by the church standards, Professor Moore speaks out plainly in defence of the doctrinal expression of Christianity, insisting that he who has any religion worth while must reflect upon it. "Life is a whole," he says; and while admitting changes in Christian theology, he stands on the firm ground of the dogmatic imperative. "He who would divorce religion from the intellectual life degrades religion and impoverishes the intellect" (p. 367). No less refreshing is the author's decided unfaith in some of the proposed panaceas of ill-advised zealots of our day. "There are no panaceas," he cries; and harangues upon soup and social rights and economic privileges, in his judgment, have no more dynamic than the flimsy magic of the Mass (p. 147).

Some of the paragraphs are inexcusably long (pp. 251-4, 335-8), particularly in view of the fine print of the whole book. On page 312 the error, a frequent one outside this work, is made of using "star" for "course" in Bishop Berkeley's famous line, "Westward the course of empire takes its way."

Professor Moore holds as the central contention of his book "the inviolable relation of civilization and religion" (p. 78). True to this purpose, his lectures detail an analysis of the civilization and religions of the 19th century that is at once bold, searching, and scholarly.

Hillsboro, Ohio.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST, JR.

SYSTEMATICAL THEOLOGY

Grace and Personality. By JOHN OMAN. Second Edition, Revised. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1919. Pp. 302.

This book represents a series of articles published in the *Expositor* beginning in the October number, 1911, but rewritten, not merely reprinted, in consequence of certain experiences of the author during the Great War. Among these experiences was the discovery that the "old infallibilities" were no longer believed by thoughtful people, and that it would be well, therefore, to push forward from "the entrenchments of outward authority into the open country of action and inquiry." The results of this exploring expedition are contained in the present volume. Let us briefly review them. Part I explains how in view of the results of scientific and historical investigation the thinking man of today can no longer hold to a faith based on infallible truth, a justification based on absolute legislation and a regeneration based on irresistible succour. This thinking man, nevertheless, is unwilling to reject Christianity unless he is absolutely compelled to do so, and therefore it becomes a worthy task to restate Christian belief in terms acceptable to the modern standpoint. In this attempt reflection shows that the central problem is that of the relation between God and man, or as it may also be stated, the problem of grace and per-

sonality. The author therefore devotes the remainder of Part I to an investigation of the meaning of the terms grace and personality, Part II to an exposition of the "mode of manifestation" and Part III to a brief sketch of the "way of working" of the relationship they engender.

The author rejects all attempts to define grace from the standpoint of God as absolute sovereign. His argument is that such attempts result either in the assertion of God's will to the obliteration of human individuality, or, by way of reaction, in the exaltation of man's will to the exclusion of God's help, or, by way of compromise, in a delimitation of the spheres of the divine will and the human will. The first is the Augustinian position, the second, the Pelagian, and the third is the Catholic. The author's solution is that the proper way to understand the nature of grace is to analyze the nature of the personality it aids. This personality is self-determined, self-directed, self-conscious. Grace, therefore, must be a divine characteristic of such sort that it meets the conditions laid down by the essential qualities of personality. This result may seem abstract and barren, but the author at once points us to the concrete embodiment of his meaning in the Father-and-child relationship in which Jesus lived himself and passed on as the normal Christian life to his followers.

Such a relationship must manifest itself in certain facts of experience, and these are described in Part II as Blessedness, or the life in "the world of God" so beautifully expressed in the Beatitudes of our Lord; as Redemption from the evil world, and (as condition of Redemption) Reconciliation to God's purpose in the world; as Love and Faith and Revelation (or discovery of that in God as Father which makes reconciliation possible and easy); as Fellowship and social help in developing the relationship.

The practical question is how on the basis of the concept of grace and personality explained in Part I the desirable states of being described in Part II are to be brought into existence. To the answering of this question our author devotes Part III. The problem is so to set forth the way of salvation that it "shall not be either God's working or our own, or, in part, God's gift, and, in part, our own achievement, but from its beginning in penitence to its completion in the possession of eternal life, be, all of it, at once of God's giving and of our own achieving . . ." The task then is the reconciliation of opposites, and we shall not attempt to show how Professor Oman carries it through in each stage of the journey, but merely in Justification, *et ex hoc disce omnia*. Sin leads to self-deception, and self-deception leads again to sin—how is the vicious circle to be broken? Enlightenment, the way of morality, might save us from self-deception only to lead us into despair over our sin; pardon, the way of religion, might save us from sin, but only by increasing our self-deception since it cannot really deal with sin. The difficulty has been attacked by the way of Compromise: the legal way of executive pardon, or by the

way of Composition, applying the merit of another person to compensate for our deficiencies, but the way out is to introduce the sinner into a sphere of love where legal conditions do not obtain, where sin is dealt with and not merely its consequences, and where forgiveness is restoration to fellowship, not merely condonation of offences.

Those who have nothing but contempt for everything that savors of Ritschlianism will probably be disposed to reject at once Professor Oman's entire offering. A more judicious position would be to receive it as a serious attempt, to study it, to note wherein it falls short of what we believe is the richness of the New Testament revelation, and in our turn to make as serious an attempt to commend the Gospel to the thoughtful and scientific unfaith of the time. That such an attempt should be made must be evident to all who are acquainted with the facts. That such will succeed not by levelling down the Gospel to the concepts it combats, but by unfolding it in all its length and breadth and height, should be equally evident to all who believe that the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth. Why not, therefore, explain Grace and Personality from the standpoint of Scripture? Would not this save us both from the Absolutism of traditional philosophy, and the Psychologism of the modernist, and would we not also escape the gospel of the Ritschlite, the gospel with the Gospel left out? It is not after all a question of "infallibilities," old or new, but of truth, and fidelity to the reality of divine revelation.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

J. Wilbur Chapman. A Biography. By FORD C. OTTMAN. New York. Doubleday, Page & Co. Royal octavo. Cloth. Pp. 326. Price \$2.50.

Dr. Ottman has rendered a great service by representing so complete and so satisfactory a summary of the life and activities of the distinguished pastor and evangelist whose departure has left such a vacancy in the leadership of the Christian church.

As a biographer he possessed the supreme qualification of a life-long intimacy which afforded him an accurate knowledge of facts and enabled him to give a sympathetic and revealing interpretation of character. Few such close friendships and continued companionships are known among modern ministers as those which existed between Doctor Chapman and the discriminating, admiring chronicler of his life. After dwelling upon his lineage and the circumstances of his birth, the biographer, in sketching the story of his early years, includes two incidents of interest and importance, one, his confession of the faith in Christ which had ever been his from the time of his earliest recollection, a confession he was led to make by the personal touch of his Sabbath School teacher, the other, his experience of an assured

salvation which came to him from the personal influence of Mr. Moody, the great evangelist whose friendship and example were molding factors in his life.

In describing the successive pastorates held by Doctor Chapman in Whitewater, Albany, Philadelphia and New York, it is made evident that ever increasing stress was being laid upon distinctively evangelistic methods and efforts, and this with such marked success that it is only natural to find that he was chosen as a leader of the evangelistic work in his own denomination and that he finally abandoned the work of a settled pastorate to devote his entire energies to the conduct of evangelistic services.

In this sphere of activity his fame and influence soon extended over the world. The reports of the notable campaign in Boston resulted in invitations to undertake similar work in large numbers of places at home and abroad. It was determined to accept those from the fields farthest distant, and Dr. Chapman sailed for Australia. The thrilling story of the results of his preaching in Melbourne, of the great meetings held in other centres, and in New Zealand and China and Korea and Japan, places Doctor Chapman among the chief evangelists of the Christian church. Surely the accounts of the campaigns subsequently conducted in Great Britain remind the reader of the most fruitful labors of Mr. Moody, even of Whitefield and of Wesley.

The biographer properly insists that in no small part the success of these evangelistic labors was due to the consecrated genius of one whose name was inseparably linked with that of Doctor Chapman on these world tours, namely Mr. Charles M. Alexander, who, as a leader of Gospel singing, and as an organizer of immense choirs and as a leader in the work of personal evangelism, has never been equalled. The chapter written in appreciation of the work of Mr. Alexander is read with a more pathetic interest because since the lines have been penned the beloved musician, like the great evangelist, has gone "to be with Christ."

The success of Dr. Chapman is attributed, however, to no one providence, nor to any peculiarity of method, but to the winsomeness of his own radiant personality and to his ability to present, in simple and vivid and arresting form, the essential elements of Gospel truth. These elements on which he laid continued emphasis may best be illustrated by the lines from a hymn which he himself composed:

"Living, he loved me,
Dying, he saved me,
Buried, he carried my sins far away,
Risen, he justifies freely forever.
Some day he's coming,
Oh, glorious day."

While Doctor Chapman made no special claim to scholarship, and while he was not eminent as an expositor of the Bible, he was always

an inspiration to his fellow ministers, and some of his most abiding influence was exerted in the great summer conferences of Christian workers. This is notably true of the great and conspicuous part he took in the conferences at Winona, and Montreat, and Stony Brook. When present at such gatherings for Bible study, his figure was the most prominent, his hours were the most popular. This was due not so much to the fact that he presented any new truths, or attempted any particular interpretations, but because his messages resulted in spiritual quickening, and in a new devotion to Christ.

The climax of his career was reached when he was chosen as Moderator by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, and when his ripe experience, his wide reputation and his compelling eloquence were consecrated to the service of the church and the nation during the crisis of the world war. In this service he literally poured out his life. From January first to May sixteenth, 1918, he delivered two hundred and forty-three addresses, attended ninety-two conferences, and visited seventy cities. "During the year he had travelled forty-one thousand five hundred and forty miles" (p. 303).

This tax upon his strength was so great that he was unable to sustain the strain of the surgical operations to which he was compelled to submit, and "on Christmas morning, between the darkness and the dawn, when the morning star, the symbol of his Lord's return, was glimmering, beauteous and reluctant, in the face of the sky, the darkness passed and with it the perfected spirit into the cloudless sunrise of a serene and never dying day" (p. 308).

Such a biography will help to keep alive the memory of one whose great service to the church should be regarded as a ground of deep gratitude to God.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Some Aspects of International Christianity. By JOHN KELMAN. New York: The Abingdon Press. 12mo, pp. 107, cloth. \$1.00 net.

These lectures, which were subsequently delivered on Sunday afternoons, in the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, were originally delivered on the Mendenhall Foundation at the DePauw University. They properly could have been delivered in practically any pulpit and on any platform; but it might be of interest to know just why they were selected for this particular Foundation which was given to secure "a perpetual lectureship on the evidences of the divine origin of Christianity and the inspiration and authority of the Holy Scriptures." It would appear that the relation of these discussions to that Foundation is rather remote, for the entire interest of the lectures centers in the presentation of a certain view of "national morality," in a rather passionate advocacy of The League of Nations.

The first lecture is a plea for "Rededication" of life in view of the new conditions which have arisen out of the war and the need of "reconstruction." This "Rededication" is demanded in the sphere of

"individual religion," in "the Church," in "social," and in "intellectual" relations.

The second lecture deals with "The Relation of Christianity to Patriotism." In opposition to an extreme "Internationalism" which regards patriotism as "a virtue long out of date," it is maintained that the "Larger Cosmopolitan Brotherhood can never take the place of loyalty to the nation." It is "too large a unit," and it overlooks the indebtedness of the individual to the country to which he belongs.

The third lecture discusses a problem which became acute during the war and which is pressing during these days when international relations are being so seriously considered. It is the question of "national morality." The author frankly contends that "public and national moral standards are lower than those of private individuals" and further "they must and *ought* to be lower" (p. 66). Most readers of this discussion will accept this "are" and can understand this "must"; but seriously will question this "*ought*." The lecturer insists that the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount cannot and ought not be applied to international relations. All will agree with his insistence that Christ used figurative language and that literalism will come wide of his meaning; but when we have attained his *meaning* is not this to be the standard of morality which ought to be demanded of nations? No attempt seems to be made to define just what the Sermon on the Mount teaches. It seems to be assumed in this lecture that it demands "Nonresistance"; but is this proven? The greater number of interpreters seem to agree that the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount are summed up in the words: "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." Is not this a true standard for "individual" and also for "national morality." The lecturer contends that a nation *ought* to adopt a standard of morality some place between those of Bernhardi and Christ. Just what mean to accept is admittedly difficult, but, especially in times of war, the standard which is advised is that of "the sportsman." Most readers will prefer for "national" as well as for "individual morality" the standard of the Golden Rule.

The writer argues that as the nation represents majorities therefore the moral standard of a nation must be lower than that of the individual; the larger the body the lower the standard. Might one therefore not conclude that the moral standard of a League of Nations must be lower than those of the individual nations? The moral standards of the nations must be some place between that of Christ and the "sportsman"; the moral standard of the League must therefore decline from that of the "sportsman" toward that of Bernhardi. Is this conclusion reassuring? It seems to be logical.

It is exactly here, in the discussion of the League of Nations, that most dissent from the position of the lecturer will be found. This discussion forms the substance of the fourth lecture. The League of Nations has been so widely debated, and so recently has been the oc-

casion of a very "solemn referendum" in America that it would be difficult to say anything new on the subject. As to this particular lecture, however, one or two suggestions might be ventured. First, a more careful distinction might be made between the provisions for this particular League, and those for a possible League. The ideal may be admirable, while the character of this actual "Compact" may be open to an honest difference of opinion. With this the author seems to agree. Secondly, it may possibly be unwise to place such absolute confidence in any union of nations as to make one declare that the sole choice is between this League and the destruction of civilization. Christian leaders must favor any wise scheme which seeks to make for the peace of the world; but is their ultimate hope to be placed in a League of unconverted nations, or is there real expectation to center upon a League composed of nations, the individual members of which are servants of Christ, a League which admits as its moral standard the Golden Rule.

The next chapter emphasizes the need of "Statesmanship in Foreign Missionary Work." After stating a number of pertinent principles, the author asks how these ideas can practically be applied, and declares that "the first obvious answer leads us back to the League of Nations," the principles of which he declares to be "identical with those of Christ." "In the League of Nations we have seen government baptized with the Holy Ghost, returning to the earth as that of the Kingdom of God which Christ lived and died to establish" (p. 141). Here again there is room for a difference of opinion.

The last chapter is one which will awaken an eager response in the heart of every true American. It is a plea for a better understanding between America and England. It is not quite certain, however, that this will be advanced in the ways most emphasized, either by a review of the historic relations between the two peoples or even by a remembrance that they fought side by side in the recent war. It will rather be by the insistence that both nations shall act toward all other nations in accordance with the principles of the Sermon on the Mount. The distinction which Dr. Kelman makes between "individual and national morality," may suggest a reason why some Americans love individual Englishmen without feeling as deep a love toward England. It is because they believe that British diplomacy and British international relations have been conducted according to moral standards which they do not believe a nation "*must and ought*" to accept. Most Americans, however, feel that the two nations are being drawn together by their common acceptance of great moral and religious convictions, and by their determination to live in accordance with principles of absolute justice, and honor and right; and they believe that a true union of the two peoples exists, and will continue to exist as long as each strives with all sincerity to conduct its international relations in complete accordance with the Golden Rule enunciated by Christ in his Sermon on the Mount.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Influence of Puritanism on the Political and Religious Thought of the English. By JOHN STEPHEN FLYNN, M.A., B.D., of Trinity College, Dublin. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company. 1920. Pp. 257.

This volume is timely, being apropos of an event of unique interest—the Tercentenary of the Landing of the Pilgrims. The book consists of twenty-three chapters, beginning with a Review of Puritanism, and ending with Puritanism in the Twentieth Century. An exhaustive Index adds interest and value.

In the Preface the author declares that “the sketches presented are of an impressional rather than of an historical character. They are an attempt at an appreciation of tendencies, making for righteousness and freedom, which have taken deep root in the English mind, and changed from time to time the course of politics and the outlook of churches.” What the writer thus attempts he does not fail to effect; for he demonstrates beyond peradventure that “the light, though often dimmed, has never failed,” and that Puritanism has been a permanent and permeating force for more than three centuries in the making of wholesome laws, the coloring of religious thought, the educating of public opinion and in maintaining and fortifying the fundamentals of morality. Admitting and accentuating all that Puritanism has meant for England which first gave it birth and nurture, the Tercentenary of the Landing of the Pilgrims should deepen our conviction as Americans that the marvellous power inhering in Puritanism has made it a dominant factor in determining the character of our own political and religious institutions. The Puritan has always been exposed to the gibes of unfriendly criticism. “His back has been bared to the smiter.” As a movement Puritanism has provided popular copy for the novelist and poet; and the preacher has not always been immune to the temptation to amuse his congregation at the expense of the Pilgrim fathers. With unsparing severity the Puritan has been characterized, or caricatured—his mannerisms, eccentricities, affectations, hypocrisy, bigotry, intolerance. A book such as this tends to create a healthy reaction from such superficial and misleading criticisms. It sounds the depths of the Puritan movement, and evaluates the spirit of the men who led it, from the standpoint of an impartial student of the philosophy of history. The author shows that Puritanism began with religion itself. The patriarchs and prophets were puritans; so were Jesus and Paul; so were Polycarp and Justin Martyr. In the third century the Novatianists, or Cathari, as they were called (*i. e.*, *The pure*), were puritans; so were St. Francis of Assisi, Savonarola and the Reformers.

But, more strictly speaking, Puritanism had its historic genesis in the middle of the sixteenth century when a section of the Church of England desired a more thorough reformation than was effected under Elizabeth. From the beginning of the Reformation age there had been three parties in the Church of England: a Romanizing element

which desired to continue connection with the Pope as the vicar of Christ; a Protestant party which desired such complete modification of the Church of England as would bring it into conformity with Continental Protestantism; and an intermediate party that, for want of a better designation, may be called Anglican, which, while desiring to see all foreign ecclesiastical authority rejected, and insisting upon the use of English in the services of the Church, yet did not desire such thoroughgoing modification in doctrine and organization as the strictly Protestant section demanded. This Anglican party looked to the sovereign as the source of ecclesiastical government. With this view Henry VIII and Elizabeth coincided, maintaining that the only system of Church government for England was that in which the ruler was supreme in ecclesiastical no less than in civil affairs. The powerful influence of Elizabeth brought a reaction from the Roman obedience of Queen Mary's time; but to make the transition as easy as possible she accepted the position of the Anglican party, retained not a few of the ceremonies and vestments of the older regime, and insisted upon uniformity of ceremonial without very strenuous investigation into the faith or even the conduct of the clergy. This compromise policy was naturally enough distasteful to the thoroughly Protestant contingent in the Church. Many of their leaders had fled to the Continent to escape the Marian persecution, where they had come into contact with Calvin and the Swiss reformers. They urged, therefore, Continental Calvinism as the model into accordance with which the doctrine and worship of the English Church should be moulded. They pleaded for disuse of vestments and the abandonment of such ceremonies in worship as tended to foster Roman sacramental misconceptions. Deeply conscious of the spiritual need of England, they advocated the establishment everywhere of an evangelical preaching ministry, and vigorous discipline. The bishops, as royal agents, were instructed by the Queen vigorously to enforce conformity in ceremony. The result of this repressive policy was a quickened evolution in Puritanism. Many began to question the rightfulness of that form of government, "by law established," which prevented the reforms which they deemed essential to the maintenance and propagation of pure religion. The typical leader at this moment was Thomas Cartwright. In his opinion the only Biblical system of Church government was the Presbyterian; and while he was willing to tolerate a modified Episcopacy, he insisted that into every parish should be introduced the disciplinary and elective features of Presbyterian government. From that time onward until the Restoration, the strongest element in the Puritan movement was Presbyterian. The author of this book fails to give due acknowledgment to this fact. It is perfectly true that a small wing of extreme Puritanism went much farther and contended that the only proper organization of the Church was in self-governing congregations. But these were known as "Separatists," and were looked upon with suspicion by the great body of Puritans.

It seems safe, therefore, to say that the two formative principles in Puritanism proper were Calvinism and Presbyterianism. Later, it is true, Independency gained numerical ascendancy, and the founders of the Plymouth Colony were of this type. The evolution of events by which this change was wrought is familiar to all students of English history. The later phenomena in the evolution of Puritanism should not, however, close our eyes to the fact that in its genesis, motive and principles Puritanism is synonymous with Calvinism and Presbyterianism.

The criticism here offered has to do only with emphasis. The discussion throughout reveals the author as a student who has thought through the subject which he illuminates with his facile pen. The volume fascinates and delights, while it instructs. Those who read the book will gain a new sense of the world's debt to Puritanism, and, especially, the mighty contribution it has made to political and religious thought and life in England and America. Its influence in our homes, our schools and whole system of education, in evangelical religion, in missionary enterprise, in all forms of moral reform, in the establishment and maintenance of civil and religious liberty, in faith in and obedience to our Eternal, Sovereign and Holy God—in all this the author vindicates Puritanism and commends its underlying principles to the age in which we live.

Princeton.

SYLVESTER W. BEACH.

The Vacation Religious Day School, Teacher's Manual of Principles and Programs. By HAZEL STRAIGHT STAFFORD. The Abingdon Press, 1920. Pp. 160. \$1.00 net, by mail \$1.10.

This volume is accurately described in the title. It is a teacher's manual of that type of vacation school of religion which is associated with the name of the Rev. Howard R. Vaughn and the American Institute of Religious Education which he organized. Mr. Vaughn is a pioneer in the attempt to secure more hours for religious education than are afforded by the Sunday school and under better educational auspices. The schools are interdenominational or community schools. Professor Norman E. Richardson of Northwestern University states an essential principle of this type of school in his editorial note, "The purpose of vacation religious day schools is to instruct the children in fundamental religious values common to all denominations. This instruction will in no way interfere with the work of the Sunday school, but, rather, will strengthen it." Such schools have been held with success in various communities in Illinois, Wisconsin and Michigan. They have maintained a very high educational standard. Dr. Athearn says of them, "The only difference between this school and the public school is the content of the curriculum." The chapter headings of the present manual will indicate its general scope: Vacation Religious Day School Program and Curriculum; How to Establish a Vacation Religious Day School; How to Conduct a Vacation Religious Day School; a separate chapter on Books, Ma-

terials, and Lesson Outlines for each of the eight grades; a separate chapter on Teaching Suggestions and Lesson Outlines for High School for each of three years; Chart-Synthetic Survey of Biblical Material. It is a very compact, thorough and useful manual. It will well repay study on the part of those who are planning to use the vacation period for religious instruction, because of its high educational ideals. Whether the community principle upon which these schools are founded is a sound one, is another question.

Philadelphia.

HAROLD MCA. ROBINSON.

Medical Missions: The Two-fold Task. By WALTER R. LAMBUTH, M.D., F.R.G.S. Published by the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions. New York. 1920. 12mo. 262 pp.

This is another valuable and timely contribution to the literature of Foreign Missions, in the production and publication of which the Student Volunteer Movement in America has taken such a conspicuous part. The author, Bishop Walter Russell Lambuth, is well qualified to write on the subject with which the book deals. He is the son of a missionary, born in Shanghai in 1854, who, as so often happens in the case of children born on the mission field, followed his father's example, returning to China in 1877 as a medical missionary, where he laboured until 1886. After this date he served as Superintendent of a mission in Japan, and afterwards as Mission Secretary of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, until in 1910 he was elected a bishop of that church. Besides the book just published he is the author of *Side Lights on the Orient*, *Winning the World for Christ*, and of various articles and pamphlets on the subject of Foreign Missions.

This is not the first attempt to write a handbook on Medical Missions. In 1886 Dr. John Lowe, F.R.C.S.E., in charge of a Training School for Medical Missionaries, wrote a valuable book entitled *Medical Missions: Their Place and Power*. In 1899 Dr. J. Rulten Williamson, then connected with the Student Movement in Great Britain, now a medical missionary in India, wrote a small but most suggestive volume on *The Healing of the Nations: A Treatise on Medical Missions—Statement and Appeal*. Again in 1913 Dr. Fletcher Moorshead, Secretary of the British Baptist Missionary Society, felt constrained to restate the case for Medical Missions in his book called *The Appeal of Medical Missions*. This book gives a very comprehensive survey of the subject, covering very much the same ground as that covered by Bishop Lambuth in the book under review. The distinctive feature of Dr. Lambuth's book is found in the fact that the author writes out of the fulness of his own personal knowledge and experience, which enables him to illustrate his subject with a great wealth of incident and experience. This characteristic gives to the book a value and an interest possessed by none of the books heretofore written. The following outline of the chapters of the book will

give the reader an idea of its character and scope: The Need; The Missionary Himself; The Aim and Scope; From Candidate to Missionary; Master Workmen and their Implements; Woman's Work for Woman; The Challenge; The Secret of Power. These chapters are followed by appendices, which will be found of great value to the student of Medical Missions, and especially to candidates under appointment.

The keynote of the whole book is struck right at the beginning in the preface, in which the author states that his object in writing has been "to place the medical missionary and his work on the high level where they belong. His is no mean profession—it is a vocation." This thought is brought out with special clearness in the chapters, "The Aim and Scope of Medical Missions," and "The Secret of Power." To quote the author's own words, "the medical missionary," he writes, "is first a missionary and second a doctor. His work is primarily spiritual rather than humanitarian." "Initially, the physician bends every effort to heal diseased humanity: then he must throw himself into the wider field of applying medical science to prevent disease in the individual, and to check the ravages of epidemics, and finally to eliminate them not only in the community in which he lives and works, but in all the world. Beyond this, however, and on a higher plane, he becomes an exponent of spiritual forces set in motion for the redemption of humanity from a life of sin and moral degeneration to a life of personal purity and efficient service." And again, "the medical missionary moves among the dead and dying. He touches life on every side: he deals with material as well as with spiritual forces, but through it all he must be the light that radiates, the leaven that permeates, and the salt that preserves and becomes the savour of life unto life. With him there is neither secular nor religious as separated from each other. His reverence for humanity lifts and transfigures his daily task into a divine mission."

But while Dr. Lambuth lays the emphasis upon the spiritual aim of the work, he at the same time makes an earnest plea for better equipment of medical missions, and for the best and most thorough professional training of medical missionaries. "It were better," he writes, "to reduce the number of medical missionaries and hospitals, much as they are needed, than to discount the science of medicine and lower the standards of efficiency . . . the highest standards must be maintained, and honest, thoroughgoing methods characterise the work in every department. To do less, is to write ultimate failure across the face of the enterprise."

The author in the preface informs us that the book has been written under the constant pressure of administrative duties. This fact probably accounts for the literary blemishes and for some typographical and other errors which appear in the volume. "The first missionaries to India," it is stated, "were Danes" (p. 110). The reference is to Ziegenbalg and Pluetschan, "both of whom were Germans, though

sent out by a Danish king." Jahan Kahn (p. 61) should be Jahan Khan; Miss Beilly (p. 136), Miss Beilby; Tarn Taren (p. 154), Tarn Tarn. On p. 176 we have a rather remarkable instance of mixed metaphor: "missionaries who can drive an entering wedge with master strokes into that dark mass of heathenism that the light of civilization and of the gospel may filter through." The book however was not written for literary effect, but for a much higher purpose. We feel assured that the author's desire will be fulfilled and that the volume will be used of God to convince many young men and women in our schools and colleges of the need, the opportunity, and the joy open to a life lived out in the presence and by the power of the Great Physician who came to seek and save the lost.

Princeton.

H. C. VELTE.

Personal Evangelism among Students. By GEORGE STEWART, JR., GENERAL SECRETARY YALE Y. M. C. A., AND HENRY B. WRIGHT, CLEMENT PROFESSOR OF CHRISTIAN METHODS, YALE UNIVERSITY. New York. Association Press. Cloth. 16mo. Pp. 96. \$1.00.

Few workers have had wider experience in winning men for Christ than the author of this hand-book. None can speak with more authority from a wide personal experience than can Professor Wright of Yale. These "Studies in the Practice of Friendship in School and College" indicate the rare opportunity which undergraduate life offers to a Christian student, Faculty-member and Association Secretary, for definite influence in bringing men into vital fellowship with Christ. In a book on "Evangelism" the reader is disappointed in not finding a more definite note as to the way of salvation through the atoning work of Christ. This may be in the minds of the authors; but one could wish for a clearer message as to the very essence of the Gospel which should be presented to the student who, as all other men, is in need of the full "Evangel." The studies contain a thoughtful analysis of the character of the college student and suggest the ways in which friendship can be shown and utilized in Christian service.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Every Morning. By ROBERT CLUETT. New York. Association Press. 12mo. Cloth. Pp. 192. Price \$1.50.

This collection of Scripture readings and prayers is intended for family or for individual worship. It contains selections for each day during the period of three months. The Bible Reading is given an appropriate topic and the prayer is in harmony with the Scripture passage. Such a book cannot fail to be of help in rebuilding the family altars, which in most sections of our country seem to have fallen down and been forgotten. The book is attractively printed in large clear type and seems admirably adapted to fulfill the purpose for which it was designed.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Day by Day with the Master. By ROBERT CLUETT. New York. Association Press. Cloth. 12mo. Pp. 208. Price \$1.50.

This volume contains Scripture readings with prayers for the use of young people. Daily readings are selected to cover a period of three months. These readings are drawn from the life of Christ. To each reading a brief introduction is given which summarizes the content of the Scripture passage. The reading is followed by a prayer which emphasizes the thought for the day. The book is designed for boys and girls who are beginning to feel the importance of daily Bible study and prayer. The aim is, therefore, to interest boys and girls in forming habits of daily devotion and in teaching them how to relate Bible truths to every day life. The author is the retired President of "Cluett, Peabody and Company," who for many years has been actively identified with civic, religious and philanthropic work. It is a companion volume to "Every Morning" which was previously published by the same author.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Jesus the Master Teacher. By HERMAN HARRELL HORNE. New York. Association Press. Cloth. 16mo. Pp. 212. Price \$2.00.

This volume comes from the pen of the Professor of The History of Education and The History of Philosophy at New York University. It applies the standards of modern pedagogy to the teaching methods of Jesus and leads the reader to a practical consideration of how far these methods can be employed today. It is by no means the purpose of the writer to consider the content of the teaching of our Lord. He is concerned entirely with the method of this teaching. Every reference, however, to the truths set forth by the Master Teacher is reverent, thoughtful and exact. The book will be of true help to all Sunday School teachers who have a high ideal of the importance of their work. It will be of service to all leaders of Bible study classes and to other Christian workers. Among the topics discussed are the following: "How Did Jesus Secure Attention?", "His Points of Contact," "His Aims," "His Answers," "His Discourses," "His Parables," "His Attitude toward the Children," "His Qualities as Teacher."

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Church Monthly, New Brunswick, January: A. C. HALL, The Lambeth Conference; J. G. H. BARRY, Meaning of Worship; MARSHALL M. DAY, Sin of Proselyting; FRANK HALLOCK, The Gift of Knowledge; J. RUSSELL VAUGHAN, Some Things Churchmen Believe. *The Same*, February: WILLIAM H. VAN ALLEN, Communication with the Departed; CHARLES C. MARSHALL, The Silence of Jesus Christ; GILBERT PEMBER, The Crisis in the Episcopal Church; JOHN H. YATES,

The Imperative Need for good Church Schools; FRANK H. HALLOCK, The Gift of Counsel.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, January: WILLIAM E. BARTON, The War and the Samaritan Colony; WILLIAM W. EVERTS, The Westcott and Hort Text Under Fire; BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, John Humphrey Noyes and His "Bible Communists"; HAROLD M. WIENER, The Law of Change in the Bible.

Catholic Historical Review, London, January: JOSEPH DUNN, The Brendan Problem; PETER GUILDAY, The Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide; F. G. HOLWECK, An American Martyrology.

Church Quarterly Review, London, January: E. W. WATSON, Collegiate Churches; T. A. LACEY, The Religious Development of St. Augustine; W. J. FERRAR, St. Malachy of Armagh: A Twelfth Century Saint; R. E. DENNETT, West African Religion; ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, The Beginnings of Christianity; J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON, The Faith of the New Testament.

Constructive Quarterly, New York, December: THOMAS GAILOR, The Lambeth Committee on Reunion; W. B. SELBIE, The Spirit of Lambeth; WILLIAM LAWRENCE, A Strong and Bold Utterance; ALFRED E. GARVIE, A Congregationalist View of the Lambeth Appeal on Christian Reunion; WILLIAM E. ORCHARD, Reunion; WILLIAM A. CURTIS, Priesthood and Laity in the Church of Christ; FRIEDRICH VON HÜGEL, Christianity and the Supernatural. *The Same*, March: EDWIN J. PALMER, Reunion: A New Outlook and a New Program; PHILIP M. RHINELANDER, The Lambeth Ideal of Unity; C. F. D'ARCY, The Lambeth Conference and its Appeal; OLIVER C. QUICK, Unity, Reunion and the Lambeth Appeal; LESLIE J. WALKER, The Ideal of One World-Wide Christian Church; FRANCIS J. McCONNELL, The Church and the Larger Freedom; P. VAN DER ELST, Christianity and Mystical Insight; E. BEAUPIN, Roman Catholics and International Relations; ROBERT E. SPEER, The Social Spirit of the Missionary Founders; FREDERICK D. KESHNER, Church Consolidation in America.

East and West, London, January: GILBERT WHITE, Preliminary World Conference at Geneva; E. F. BROWN, Mission Work among Educated Classes in India; G. H. WILSON, The Labour Problem in Nyasaland; FERGUSON DAVIE, Medical Missions; WILMOT VYVYAN, A Native Episcopate for South Africa; ARTHUR CROSTHWAITE, Liturgical Reform in India; GARFIELD WILLIAMS, Liberty to Experiment.

Expositor, London, January: JOHN E. MCFADYEN, An Old Testament Message; W. ERNEST BEET, The Number of the Beast; W. SPICER WOOD, Fellowship; WALTER R. WHATELY, "See Thou Tell no Man"; J. H. LECKIE, John MacLeod Campbell: the Development of his Thought; VACHER BURCH, Factors in the Christology of the Letter to the Hebrews. *The Same*, February: ED. KÖNIG, The Burning Problem of the Hour in Old Testament Religious History; J. H. LECKIE, John MacLeod Campbell: the Development of his Thought; W.

EMERY BARNES, Psalm lxii; G. H. WHITAKER, "Love Springs no Leak"; ADAM C. WELCH, Call and Commission of Jeremiah.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, December: ALEXANDER SOUTER, Rendel Harris; E. GRIFFITH-JONES, On the Laws of Growth in the Ministry; A. R. S. KENNEDY, A New Edition of the Syriac New Testament. *The Same*, January: ALFRED PLUMMER, William Sanday and his Work; ARNOLD BROOKS, The Teaching in Parables; WILLIAM E. WILSON, The Quaker Faith. *The Same*, February: ALFRED PLUMMER, William Sanday and his Work; R. C. FORD, St. Luke and Lucius of Cyrene; JOHN E. MACFADYEN, Spirit of Early Judaism; GEORGE MILLIGAN, Modern Greek and the New Testament.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, October: CHAMPLIN BURRAGE, The Earliest Minor Accounts of Plymouth Plantation; LINCOLN N. KINNICUTT, Plymouth's Debt to the Indians; HERBERT L. STEWART, Theology and Romanticism; ROBERT P. CASEY, A Neglected Principle of Liturgical Revision. *The Same*, January: GERALD H. RENDALL, Immanence, Stoic and Christian; KIRSOPP LAKE, The Epistola Apostolorum; RICHARD LEMPP, Church and Religion in Germany; GEORGE LA PIANA, The Tombs of Peter and Paul ad Catacumbas.

Homiletical Review, New York, March: JOHN A. MACCALLUM, The Presbyterian Attitude toward the Lambeth Proposals; EDWARD M. CHAPMAN, The Reunion of the Church; WILLIAM J. MUTCH, An Open Word; DWIGHT M. PRATT, The Atonement in the Light of Experience; HARLAN P. BEACH, Far-Sighted Statesmanship.

International Journal of Ethics, Concord, January: FRANK C. SHARP, Some Problems of Fair Competition; VICTOR S. YARROS, Is there a Law of Human Progress?; J. E. TURNER, Genesis and Differentiation of the Moral Absolute; I. W. HOWERTH, The Labor Problem from the Social Viewpoint; J. D. STOOPS, The Instinct of Workmanship and the Will to Work. HENRY S. CURTIS, The Mother's Confessional; ALLAN L. CARTER, Schiller and Shaftesbury.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin, January: J. FITZPATRICK, Some More Theology about Tyranny; P. J. TONER, Definability of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin; J. RICKABY, Faith and Free Thinking; P. COFFEY, An Injustice of the Capitalistic System; J. KELLEHER, The Lawfulness of the Hunger Strike.

Journal of Negro History, Washington, January: CARTER G. WOODSON, Fifty Years of Negro Citizenship as Qualified by the Supreme Court; CHARLES H. WESLEY, Remy Ollier, a Mauritian Journalist and Patriot; J. FRED RIPPY, A Negro Colonization Project in Mexico in 1895.

London Quarterly Review, London, January: JOHN TELFORD, Story of Benjamin Disraeli; J. SCOTT LIDGETT, The Idea of Progress; ARTHUR SYMONS, The Giorgiones in Italy; FRANK BALLARD, Christian Theism Justified; W. BARDSELY BRASH, Wesley's Wit and Humour; T. H. S. ESCOTT, The Middle Class Cleavage and the Rising Generation; T. ALEXANDER SEED, The Thoughts of Kings.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, October: LUDWIG IHMELS, Present State of the Church in Germany; JOHN A. W. HAAS, Prohibitions and Freedom; DAVID H. BAUSLIN, The Lost Note in Modern Preaching; EDUARD KOENIG, Present Problems of the Old Testament; PAUL E. SCHERER, Religious Education in the United States; CHARLES M. JACOBS, The Lambeth Encyclical.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, January: HERBERT C. ALLEMAN, The Pilgrim Tercentenary; N. J. G. WICKEY, Philosophy of Robertson's Religious Experience; J. L. NEVE, Union Movement between Lutherans and Reformed.

Methodist Quarterly Review, Nashville, January: J. ARTHUR THOMSON, Some Recent Aspects of Advances in the Study of Heredity; J. T. HODGSON, Personality and Peril: a Study of the Travels of John Wesley; CHARLES C. JARRELL, Some Educational Lessons from the War; MRS. ROBERT U. WALDRAVEN, Racial Friction in America; W. W. PINSON, John Huss and the Bohemians; J. W. DANIEL, The Need of Conversion; STEPHEN E. JENKINS, Conscience.

Monist, Chicago, January: L. L. BERNARD, Herbert Spencer's Work in the Light of his Life; W. O. BRIGSTOCKE, Logical Fictions (con.); SANFORD A. MOSS, A Mechanic on the "Mechanism of the Brain"; C. DELISLE BURNS, Defect in Current Political Philosophy; WESLEY R. WELLS, Natural Checks on Human Progress.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, January: JOHN W. APPEL, The Inauguration of the Rev. Professor George W. Richards; A. E. TRUXAL, Pittsburgh Synod, 1870-1920; WILLIAM J. HEINKE, The Reformed Church within the Bounds of Lebanon Classis during the Eighteenth Century; CHARLES H. PHILLIPS, The Pilgrims and their Ideals.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, January: S. ANGUS, Christianity and the Mystery-Religions; ALBERT D. BELDEN, Jesus—The Sin-Bearer; JOHN T. CHRISTIAN, The Pilgrim Fathers; E. M. KIRSTEAD, Meaning of Baptism; J. MORGAN WARNER, A Critical Estimate of Christian Science based upon Observations of their Religious Services; GEORGE W. BOULDIN, Japanese Ethics; A. L. VAIL, God's Method of Approach to Men.

Southwestern Journal of Theology, Seminary Hill, January: CHARLES T. ALEXANDER, Changing Emphasis in Religion; B. A. COPASS, The Hebrew Prophets as Preachers; H. E. DANA, The Holy Spirit in Acts; WILLIAM W. BARNES, Contribution of the Denominations to American Life; W. T. CONNER, The Glorified Christ; L. M. SIPES, Kenotic Theories; J. S. RODGER, Marks that made a Great Preacher and Leader.

Union Seminary Review, Richmond, January: B. B. WARFIELD, The Mystical Perfectionism of Thomas Cogswell Upham; HENRY W. DUBOSE, The Man of God; M. RYERSON TURNBULL, Joseph—a Character Study; THORNTON WHALING, Unity and Union.

Yale Review, New Haven, January: Germany Since the Revolution; ISRAEL ZANGWILL, Zionism Today; AGNES REPPLIER, The Masterful

Puritan; W. E. CLARKE, Robert Louis Stevenson in Samoa; W. R. INGE, Religion in England after the War; A. MAURICE LOW, Women in the Election; BRANDER MATTHEWS, Permanent Utility of Dialect; EDITH HOYT, In the Hunger Districts; ARCHIBALD MACLEISH, Professional Schools of Liberal Education; FRANZ BOAS, The Problem of the American Negro.

Biblica, Roma, II:1: A. KLEBER, Chronology of 3 and 4 Kings and Paralipomenon; L. FONCK, Paralyticus per tectum demissus; P. JOÛON, Sur le nom Qoheleth; E. POWER, Writing on the Ground; J. RUWET, Duo textus Origenis de canone A. T.

Bilychnis, Roma, Novembre: Il pensiero del Cristiano antico intorno allo stato, dagli apologeti ad Origene; D. PROVENZAL, Il libro del collare; A. RENDA, La teoria psicologica dei valori; M. PUGLISI, Misteri pagani e mistero cristiano. *The Same*, Dicembre: C. FORMICHI, Paul Deussen; U. BRAUZZI, La contraddizione di domani; B. BRUNELLI, Bernard Shaw e la religione. *The Same*, Gennaio: F. DE SARLO, Ernesto Haeckel; A. TILGHER, L'attualità di Treitschke; G. COSTA, Il sindaco di Cork e il culto degli eroi; A. VASCONI, Le ansie di un credente.

Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique, Toulouse, Novembre-Décembre: MGR. MARCEILLAC ET MGR. GERMAIN, Role et Utilité de l'Institut Catholique; LOUIS DESNOYERS, Les guerres extérieures de David; J. DE GUIBERT, La notion d'hérésie dans saint Augustin.

Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Enero-Febrero: V. BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Un gran hebraísta olvidado: El padre Pedro de Palencia; MANUEL RUBIO CERCAS, Explicación psicofísica de los que parecen prodigios de Limpías; A. COLUNGA, San Jerónimo, Doctor Máximo de la Iglesia; P. LUMBRERAS, El deseo natural de ver a Dios.

Nieuwe Theologische Studiën, Groningen, III:9: TH. SCHARTEN, Zondvloedverhalen bij de Miao in Kweichow; D. PLOOIJ, Tekst en Uitleg; W. J. AALDERS, Over Schleiermacher's Reden; H. STOEL, Het zegel van het klotser te Ter Apel; J. J. WOLDENDORP, Athanasius' "De Incarnatione." *The Same*, 10: W. MALLINCKRODT, Want zij zeiden: hij is buiten zijne zinnen; A. J. DE SOPPER, Religie et filosofie; J. DE ZWAAN, De bronnen der Evangelien.

Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique, Paris, Janvier: F. PRAT, Un aspect de l'ascèse dans Saint Paul; A. TANQUEREY, Un plan de Théologie ascétique et Mystique; P. DUDON, Les leçons d'Oraison du P. Balth. Alvarez; Sur la Confession fréquente.

Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique, Louvain, Juillet 1914: G. KURTH, A propos du Vita Genovefae; A. DEBIL, La première distinction du "De paenitentia" de Gratien; R. M. MARTIN, L'oeuvre théologique de Robert de Melun; A. DE MEYER, La relation officielle du Saint-Office sur la condamnation des cinq propositions de Jansénius; M. DUBRUEL, Le pape Alexandre VIII et les affaires de France.

Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, Lausanne, Novembre-Décembre: FRANK OLIVIER, Une correction au texte du Nouveau Testament:

2 Pierre 3:10; EMILE LOMBARD, *Mysticisme et introversion*; ARNOLD REYMOND, *Quelques ouvrages philosophiques récents*.

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Schweizerische Theologische Zeitschrift, Zurich, 37:4: P. MARTI, *Jeremia Gotthelf, Beiträge zur bern. religiösen Volkskunde*; A. WALDBURGER, *Geschichte der Elisabethenkirche und -Gemeinde zu Basel*; PFARRER RIPPMMANN, *Neuere Palaestinensische Forschungen*; M. HALLER, *Ein schweizerisch-protestantisches Lehrmittel für den Religionsunterricht*.

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Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Tübingen: 28:5: HINRICH KNITTERMEYER, *Zum Problem der Religionsphilosophie*; F. W. SCHMIDT, *Das Verhältnis der Christologie zur historischen Leben-Jesu-Forschung (ii)*; KARL BAUER, *Die Entstehungsgeschichte der "Christliche Glaubenslehre" von D. F. Strauss*. *The Same*, 28:6: GEORG WOBBERMIN, *Historische und systematische Theologie*; FRIEDRICH HEILER, *Die Hauptmotive des Madonnenkults*; HERMANN FABER, *Neuerscheinungen auf dem Gebiet der Glaubenslehre*.

CORRIGENDA

P. 299 (middle). Instead of "—I in them" read "... I in them."

P. 304 (near bot.). "Neither form or phrase of experience" should read "Neither form nor phase of experience."

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